defendant sought challenge in California

2005In Mazurette, supra, 24 Cal.4th 789 , 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 555 , 14 P.3d 227 , the defendant sought to challenge the denial of a *499 suppression motion by appealing from a drug diversion order made pursuant to Penal Code section 1000.2.

2005In Mazurette, supra, 24 Cal.4th 789 , the defendant sought to challenge the denial of a suppression motion by appealing from a drug diversion order made pursuant to Penal Code section 1000.2.

2004A criminal defendant who receives the benefit of his plea bargain should not be allowed to seek to improve the bargain on appeal. ( People v. Cepeda (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1239 , 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 246 , criticized on another ground by People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1098 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 969 P.2d 146 [court struck two alleged strikes pursuant to bargain].) Even if the court's sentence exceeded its jurisdiction, a defendant cannot complain of getting what he bargained for so long as the court had fundamental jurisdiction. ( Ibid. ) In People v. Webb (1986) 186 Cal. App.3d 401 ,

2004A criminal defendant who receives the benefit of his plea bargain should not be allowed to seek to improve the bargain on appeal. ( People v. Cepeda (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1239 , 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 246 , criticized on another ground by People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1098 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 969 P.2d 146 [court struck two alleged strikes pursuant to bargain].) Even if the court's sentence exceeded its jurisdiction, a defendant cannot complain of getting what he bargained for so long as the court had fundamental jurisdiction. ( Ibid. ) In People v. Webb (1986) 186 Cal. App.3d 401 ,

2026The court stated, “The general rule . . . that habeas corpus cannot serve as a substitute for an appeal, and, in the absence of special circumstances constituting an excuse for failure to employ that remedy, the writ will not lie where the claimed errors could have been, but were not, raised upon a timely appeal from a judgment of conviction.” (In re Dixon, supra, 41 Cal.2d at p. 759 .) In Seaton, the defendant sought to challenge his murder conviction and death sentence on the basis of racial bias by the prosecutor and by the county in manipulating the racial composition of its jurors (In re

2026The court stated, “The general rule . . . that habeas corpus cannot serve as a substitute for an appeal, and, in the absence of special circumstances constituting an excuse for failure to employ that remedy, the writ will not lie where the claimed errors could have been, but were not, raised upon a timely appeal from a judgment of conviction.” (In re Dixon, supra, 41 Cal.2d at p. 759 .) In Seaton, the defendant sought to challenge his murder conviction and death sentence on the basis of racial bias by the prosecutor and by the county in manipulating the racial composition of its jurors (In re

2017(Id. at pp. 956-957.) Garcia discussed a United States Supreme Court case holding “a defendant has no right under the federal Constitution to challenge the constitutional validity of a prior conviction in proceedings involving a subsequent offense, except upon the ground of Gideon[ 7 ] error.” (Garcia, at p. 963 [discussing Custis v. United States (1994) 511 U.S. 485 [ 128 L.Ed.2d 517 , 114 S.Ct. 1732 ]].) Garcia continued, ‘“[n]othing in the language of our state Constitution, or in our past decisions construing its provisions, presents a ‘cogent reason’ for us to reach an interpretation of o

2017(Id. at pp. 956-957.) Garcia discussed a United States Supreme Court case holding “a defendant has no right under the federal Constitution to challenge the constitutional validity of a prior conviction in proceedings involving a subsequent offense, except upon the ground of Gideon[ 7 ] error.” (Garcia, at p. 963 [discussing Custis v. United States (1994) 511 U.S. 485 [ 128 L.Ed.2d 517 , 114 S.Ct. 1732 ]].) Garcia continued, ‘“[n]othing in the language of our state Constitution, or in our past decisions construing its provisions, presents a ‘cogent reason’ for us to reach an interpretation of o

2017In one such case, Garcia, supra, 14 Cal.4th 953 , the defendant sought to challenge, by a pretrial motion to strike, an allegation that he had a prior serious felony conviction for residential burglary on the ground that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel.

2004A criminal defendant who receives the benefit of his plea bargain should not be allowed to seek to improve the bargain on appeal. ( People v. Cepeda (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1239 , 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 246 , criticized on another ground by People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1098 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 969 P.2d 146 [court struck two alleged strikes pursuant to bargain].) Even if the court's sentence exceeded its jurisdiction, a defendant cannot complain of getting what he bargained for so long as the court had fundamental jurisdiction. ( Ibid. ) In People v. Webb (1986) 186 Cal. App.3d 401 ,

2004A criminal defendant who receives the benefit of his plea bargain should not be allowed to seek to improve the bargain on appeal. ( People v. Cepeda (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1239 , 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 246 , criticized on another ground by People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1098 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 969 P.2d 146 [court struck two alleged strikes pursuant to bargain].) Even if the court's sentence exceeded its jurisdiction, a defendant cannot complain of getting what he bargained for so long as the court had fundamental jurisdiction. ( Ibid. ) In People v. Webb (1986) 186 Cal. App.3d 401 ,

2004A criminal defendant who receives the benefit of his plea bargain should not be allowed to seek to improve the bargain on appeal. ( People v. Cepeda (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1239 , 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 246 , criticized on another ground by People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1098 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 969 P.2d 146 [court struck two alleged strikes pursuant to bargain].) Even if the court's sentence exceeded its jurisdiction, a defendant cannot complain of getting what he bargained for so long as the court had fundamental jurisdiction. ( Ibid. ) In People v. Webb (1986) 186 Cal. App.3d 401 ,

2004A criminal defendant who receives the benefit of his plea bargain should not be allowed to seek to improve the bargain on appeal. ( People v. Cepeda (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1239 , 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 246 , criticized on another ground by People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1098 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 969 P.2d 146 [court struck two alleged strikes pursuant to bargain].) Even if the court's sentence exceeded its jurisdiction, a defendant cannot complain of getting what he bargained for so long as the court had fundamental jurisdiction. ( Ibid. ) In People v. Webb (1986) 186 Cal. App.3d 401 ,

1984(Id., at p. 36.) In rejecting defendant’s argument, the Green court reaffirmed and relied on the century-old decision in People v. Montgomery (1879) 53 Cal. 576 which held that evidence of an absence of flight was inadmissible to suggest a defendant’s innocence.

1984Previously we had allowed a defendant to challenge a prior by seeking a writ of habeas corpus after a final judgment in which the prior had been used to enhance his sentence. ( In re Woods (1966) 64 Cal.2d 3 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 689 , 409 P.2d 913 ]; In re Luce (1966) 64 Cal.2d 11 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 694 , 409 P.2d 918 ]; In re Tucker (1966) 64 Cal.2d 15 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 697 , 409 P.2d 921 ].) But in Coffey we decided that "it is clearly in the interest of efficient judicial administration that attacks upon the constitutional basis of prior convictions be disposed of at the earliest possible opportunity

1984Previously we had allowed a defendant to challenge a prior by seeking a writ of habeas corpus after a final judgment in which the prior had been used to enhance his sentence. ( In re Woods (1966) 64 Cal.2d 3 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 689 , 409 P.2d 913 ]; In re Luce (1966) 64 Cal.2d 11 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 694 , 409 P.2d 918 ]; In re Tucker (1966) 64 Cal.2d 15 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 697 , 409 P.2d 921 ].) But in Coffey we decided that "it is clearly in the interest of efficient judicial administration that attacks upon the constitutional basis of prior convictions be disposed of at the earliest possible opportunity

1984Previously we had allowed a defendant to challenge a prior by seeking a writ of habeas corpus after a final judgment in which the prior had been used to enhance his sentence. ( In re Woods (1966) 64 Cal.2d 3 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 689 , 409 P.2d 913 ]; In re Luce (1966) 64 Cal.2d 11 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 694 , 409 P.2d 918 ]; In re Tucker (1966) 64 Cal.2d 15 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 697 , 409 P.2d 921 ].) But in Coffey we decided that "it is clearly in the interest of efficient judicial administration that attacks upon the constitutional basis of prior convictions be disposed of at the earliest possible opportunity

1984Previously we had allowed a defendant to challenge a prior by seeking a writ of habeas corpus after a final judgment in which the prior had been used to enhance his sentence. ( In re Woods (1966) 64 Cal.2d 3 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 689 , 409 P.2d 913 ]; In re Luce (1966) 64 Cal.2d 11 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 694 , 409 P.2d 918 ]; In re Tucker (1966) 64 Cal.2d 15 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 697 , 409 P.2d 921 ].) But in Coffey we decided that "it is clearly in the interest of efficient judicial administration that attacks upon the constitutional basis of prior convictions be disposed of at the earliest possible opportunity

1984Previously we had allowed a defendant to challenge a prior by seeking a writ of habeas corpus after a final judgment in which the prior had been used to enhance his sentence. ( In re Woods (1966) 64 Cal.2d 3 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 689 , 409 P.2d 913 ]; In re Luce (1966) 64 Cal.2d 11 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 694 , 409 P.2d 918 ]; In re Tucker (1966) 64 Cal.2d 15 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 697 , 409 P.2d 921 ].) But in Coffey we decided that "it is clearly in the interest of efficient judicial administration that attacks upon the constitutional basis of prior convictions be disposed of at the earliest possible opportunity

1984Previously we had allowed a defendant to challenge a prior by seeking a writ of habeas corpus after a final judgment in which the prior had been used to enhance his sentence. ( In re Woods (1966) 64 Cal.2d 3 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 689 , 409 P.2d 913 ]; In re Luce (1966) 64 Cal.2d 11 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 694 , 409 P.2d 918 ]; In re Tucker (1966) 64 Cal.2d 15 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 697 , 409 P.2d 921 ].) But in Coffey we decided that "it is clearly in the interest of efficient judicial administration that attacks upon the constitutional basis of prior convictions be disposed of at the earliest possible opportunity

1984Previously we had allowed a defendant to challenge a prior by seeking a writ of habeas corpus after a final judgment in which the prior had been used to enhance his sentence. ( In re Woods (1966) 64 Cal.2d 3 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 689 , 409 P.2d 913 ]; In re Luce (1966) 64 Cal.2d 11 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 694 , 409 P.2d 918 ]; In re Tucker (1966) 64 Cal.2d 15 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 697 , 409 P.2d 921 ].) But in Coffey we decided that "it is clearly in the interest of efficient judicial administration that attacks upon the constitutional basis of prior convictions be disposed of at the earliest possible opportunity

1973In the case of In re Alpine (1928) 203 Cal. 731 [ 265 P. 947 , 58 A.L.R. 1500 ], the defendant sought to challenge by writ of habeas corpus a denial of his motion to dismiss when, again, a trial date was set more than 60 days after the filing of the remittitur following the reversal of a judgment of conviction.

1973In the case of In re Alpine (1928) 203 Cal. 731 [ 265 P. 947 , 58 A.L.R. 1500 ], the defendant sought to challenge by writ of habeas corpus a denial of his motion to dismiss when, again, a trial date was set more than 60 days after the filing of the remittitur following the reversal of a judgment of conviction.