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10 California opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rosen v. St. Joseph Hospital of Orange Countygreen2 sentences2022Joseph Hospital of Orange County (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 453, 465, fn. 4 .) Additionally, to the extent Dameron maintains stating in its reply brief that O.N.’s insurer was an ERISA plan raised an ERISA issue, Dameron forfeited any argument regarding ERISA by failing to include it in the opening brief. 2022Joseph Hospital of Orange County (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 453, 465, fn. 4 .) Additionally, to the extent Dameron maintains stating in its reply brief that O.N.’s insurer was an ERISA plan raised an ERISA issue, Dameron forfeited any argument regarding ERISA by failing to include it in the opening brief. | 3 | 3 |
Garcia v. McCutchengreen2 sentences2022(Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 482, fn. 10 [appellant may not raise new argument in reply brief].) DISPOSITION We remand to the trial court to allow the case to proceed on the second cause of action consistent with this opinion as to R.D. 2022(Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 482, fn. 10 [appellant may not raise new argument in reply brief].) 26 DISPOSITION We remand to the trial court to allow the case to proceed on the second cause of action consistent with this opinion as to R.D. | 3 | 3 |
Patton v. Denver Post Corp.green2 sentences2009Tise recognized the distinction between the alternate payee's interest in the pension plan proceeds, which is established by the state court DRO and the enforceability of that interest which requires a QDRO, stating: "Because a QDRO only renders enforceable an already-existing interest, there is no conceptual reason why a QDRO must be obtained before the plan participant's benefits become payable on account of his retirement or death." ( Id. at p. 421.) [6] Tise noted, but expressly did not address, the question "whether, as Hopkins [, supra, 105 F.3d 153 ] and Rivers [, supra, 186 F.3d 681 ] 2009Tise recognized the distinction between the alternate payee's interest in the pension plan proceeds, which is established by the state court DRO and the enforceability of that interest which requires a QDRO, stating: "Because a QDRO only renders enforceable an already-existing interest, there is no conceptual reason why a QDRO must be obtained before the plan participant's benefits become payable on account of his retirement or death." ( Id. at p. 421.) [6] Tise noted, but expressly did not address, the question "whether, as Hopkins [, supra, 105 F.3d 153 ] and Rivers [, supra, 186 F.3d 681 ] | 2 | 2 |
cluster 771363green2 sentences2009The Ninth Circuit held that a state court DRO obtained before a plan participant's retirement, death, or other benefit-triggering event, creates an enforceable interest in the participant's surviving spouse benefits even if the alternate payee (former spouse) is unable to qualify the DRO before the *843 participant's death. ( Id. at p. 423; see Carmona, supra, 544 F.3d at p. 1001 .) The plaintiff was therefore able to qualify the state court DRO as a QDRO in the 18 months following the plan participant's death. ( Tise, at pp. 425-426.) Tise reasoned that because the QDRO provision is an except 2009The Ninth Circuit held that a state court DRO obtained before a plan participant's retirement, death, or other benefit-triggering event, creates an enforceable interest in the participant's surviving spouse benefits even if the alternate payee (former spouse) is unable to qualify the DRO before the *843 participant's death. ( Id. at p. 423; see Carmona, supra, 544 F.3d at p. 1001 .) The plaintiff was therefore able to qualify the state court DRO as a QDRO in the 18 months following the plan participant's death. ( Tise, at pp. 425-426.) Tise reasoned that because the QDRO provision is an except | 2 | 2 |
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. City & County Of San Franciscogreen2 sentences2009(See Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. San Francisco (9th Cir. 1997) 121 F.3d 557 , 558 (Chase Manhattan v. San Francisco).) The district court dismissed the case after finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 28 United States Code section 1341 , which provides that “ ‘district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State *1208 law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.’ ” (Chase Manhattan v. San Francisco, at p. 558.) In a decision filed August 18, 1997, the Ninth Circuit Court of 2009(See Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. San Francisco (9th Cir. 1997) 121 F.3d 557 , 558 (Chase Manhattan v. San Francisco).) The district court dismissed the case after finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 28 United States Code section 1341 , which provides that “ ‘district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State *1208 law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.’ ” (Chase Manhattan v. San Francisco, at p. 558.) In a decision filed August 18, 1997, the Ninth Circuit Court of | 1 | 2 |
Louise Robichaud Samaroo v. Winston R. Samaroo, At&t Management Pension Plan v. Louise M. Robichaud, Louise M. Robichaud.green2 sentences2009Tise recognized the distinction between the alternate payee's interest in the pension plan proceeds, which is established by the state court DRO and the enforceability of that interest which requires a QDRO, stating: "Because a QDRO only renders enforceable an already-existing interest, there is no conceptual reason why a QDRO must be obtained before the plan participant's benefits become payable on account of his retirement or death." ( Id. at p. 421.) [6] Tise noted, but expressly did not address, the question "whether, as Hopkins [, supra, 105 F.3d 153 ] and Rivers [, supra, 186 F.3d 681 ] 2009Tise recognized the distinction between the alternate payee's interest in the pension plan proceeds, which is established by the state court DRO and the enforceability of that interest which requires a QDRO, stating: "Because a QDRO only renders enforceable an already-existing interest, there is no conceptual reason why a QDRO must be obtained before the plan participant's benefits become payable on account of his retirement or death." ( Id. at p. 421.) [6] Tise noted, but expressly did not address, the question "whether, as Hopkins [, supra, 105 F.3d 153 ] and Rivers [, supra, 186 F.3d 681 ] | 1 | 2 |
Charles Wetzel v. Lou Ehlers Cadillac Group Long Term Disability Insurance Program Reliance Standard Life Insurance Companygreen2 sentences2011(Wetzel, supra, pp. 648, 650 .) In Flynn v. Paul Revere Ins. 2011(Wetzel, supra, pp. 648, 650 .) In Flynn v. Paul Revere Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Carmona v. Carmonagreen2 sentences2009The Ninth Circuit held that a state court DRO obtained before a plan participant's retirement, death, or other benefit-triggering event, creates an enforceable interest in the participant's surviving spouse benefits even if the alternate payee (former spouse) is unable to qualify the DRO before the *843 participant's death. ( Id. at p. 423; see Carmona, supra, 544 F.3d at p. 1001 .) The plaintiff was therefore able to qualify the state court DRO as a QDRO in the 18 months following the plan participant's death. ( Tise, at pp. 425-426.) Tise reasoned that because the QDRO provision is an except 2009The Ninth Circuit held that a state court DRO obtained before a plan participant's retirement, death, or other benefit-triggering event, creates an enforceable interest in the participant's surviving spouse benefits even if the alternate payee (former spouse) is unable to qualify the DRO before the *843 participant's death. ( Id. at p. 423; see Carmona, supra, 544 F.3d at p. 1001 .) The plaintiff was therefore able to qualify the state court DRO as a QDRO in the 18 months following the plan participant's death. ( Tise, at pp. 425-426.) Tise reasoned that because the QDRO provision is an except | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
cluster 18507
green
2 sentences2009Tise recognized the distinction between the alternate payee’s interest in the pension plan proceeds, which is established by the state court DRO and the enforceability of that interest which requires a QDRO, stating: “Because a QDRO only renders enforceable an already-existing interest, there is no conceptual reason why a QDRO must be obtained before the plan participant’s benefits become payable on account of his retirement or death.” (Id. at p. 421.) 6 Tise noted, but expressly did not address, the question “whether, as Hopkins[, supra, 105 F.3d 153 ] and Rivers[, supra, 186 F.3d 681 ] deter 2009Tise recognized the distinction between the alternate payee's interest in the pension plan proceeds, which is established by the state court DRO and the enforceability of that interest which requires a QDRO, stating: "Because a QDRO only renders enforceable an already-existing interest, there is no conceptual reason why a QDRO must be obtained before the plan participant's benefits become payable on account of his retirement or death." ( Id. at p. 421.) [6] Tise noted, but expressly did not address, the question "whether, as Hopkins [, supra, 105 F.3d 153 ] and Rivers [, supra, 186 F.3d 681 ] | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Vera Mae Hopkins v. At & T Global Information Solutions Company, Formerly Known as Ncr Corporation
green
2 sentences2009Tise recognized the distinction between the alternate payee's interest in the pension plan proceeds, which is established by the state court DRO and the enforceability of that interest which requires a QDRO, stating: "Because a QDRO only renders enforceable an already-existing interest, there is no conceptual reason why a QDRO must be obtained before the plan participant's benefits become payable on account of his retirement or death." ( Id. at p. 421.) [6] Tise noted, but expressly did not address, the question "whether, as Hopkins [, supra, 105 F.3d 153 ] and Rivers [, supra, 186 F.3d 681 ] 2009Tise recognized the distinction between the alternate payee's interest in the pension plan proceeds, which is established by the state court DRO and the enforceability of that interest which requires a QDRO, stating: "Because a QDRO only renders enforceable an already-existing interest, there is no conceptual reason why a QDRO must be obtained before the plan participant's benefits become payable on account of his retirement or death." ( Id. at p. 421.) [6] Tise noted, but expressly did not address, the question "whether, as Hopkins [, supra, 105 F.3d 153 ] and Rivers [, supra, 186 F.3d 681 ] | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Torres v. Torres
green
2 sentences2009Tise recognized the distinction between the alternate payee's interest in the pension plan proceeds, which is established by the state court DRO and the enforceability of that interest which requires a QDRO, stating: "Because a QDRO only renders enforceable an already-existing interest, there is no conceptual reason why a QDRO must be obtained before the plan participant's benefits become payable on account of his retirement or death." ( Id. at p. 421.) [6] Tise noted, but expressly did not address, the question "whether, as Hopkins [, supra, 105 F.3d 153 ] and Rivers [, supra, 186 F.3d 681 ] 2009Tise recognized the distinction between the alternate payee's interest in the pension plan proceeds, which is established by the state court DRO and the enforceability of that interest which requires a QDRO, stating: "Because a QDRO only renders enforceable an already-existing interest, there is no conceptual reason why a QDRO must be obtained before the plan participant's benefits become payable on account of his retirement or death." ( Id. at p. 421.) [6] Tise noted, but expressly did not address, the question "whether, as Hopkins [, supra, 105 F.3d 153 ] and Rivers [, supra, 186 F.3d 681 ] | 1 | 2009–2009 |
No. 04-2390
green
1 sentence2009Tise recognized the distinction between the alternate payee's interest in the pension plan proceeds, which is established by the state court DRO and the enforceability of that interest which requires a QDRO, stating: "Because a QDRO only renders enforceable an already-existing interest, there is no conceptual reason why a QDRO must be obtained before the plan participant's benefits become payable on account of his retirement or death." ( Id. at p. 421.) [6] Tise noted, but expressly did not address, the question "whether, as Hopkins [, supra, 105 F.3d 153 ] and Rivers [, supra, 186 F.3d 681 ] | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Jones v. O'HIGGINS
green
2 sentences1994To support her position, Marlene cites a federal decision dealing with attorney fees issues under an ERISA provision ( 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (g)) that authorizes such fees to prevailing parties in ERISA actions. ( Jones v. O'Higgins (N.D.N.Y. 1990) 736 F. Supp. 1243 .) [16] In that case, the district court exercised its discretion in refusing to award attorney fees against a plaintiff who had demonstrated a prima facie *271 case of an ERISA violation. 1994To support her position, Marlene cites a federal decision dealing with attorney fees issues under an ERISA provision ( 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (g)) that authorizes such fees to prevailing parties in ERISA actions. ( Jones v. O'Higgins (N.D.N.Y. 1990) 736 F. Supp. 1243 .) [16] In that case, the district court exercised its discretion in refusing to award attorney fees against a plaintiff who had demonstrated a prima facie *271 case of an ERISA violation. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Hydrostorage, Inc. v. Northern California Boilermakers Local Joint Apprenticeship Committee
green
1 sentence1992In deciding the ERISA issue, the Court of Appeal wrote: “We cannot reconcile the Council’s position, that it retains the power under state law to prevent employee benefit plans from providing benefits except pursuant to the Council’s regulatory dictates, with decisions by the Ninth Circuit in Hydro-storage [v. Northern Cal. Boilermakers (9th Cir. 1989) 891 F.2d 719 , cert. denied (1990) 498 U.S. 822 (112 L.Ed 2d 46, 111 S.Ct. 72 )], the Third District in [Operating Engineers & Participating Employees Etc. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Carter v. Antoci
green
1 sentence1992In deciding the ERISA issue, the Court of Appeal wrote: “We cannot reconcile the Council’s position, that it retains the power under state law to prevent employee benefit plans from providing benefits except pursuant to the Council’s regulatory dictates, with decisions by the Ninth Circuit in Hydro-storage [v. Northern Cal. Boilermakers (9th Cir. 1989) 891 F.2d 719 , cert. denied (1990) 498 U.S. 822 (112 L.Ed 2d 46, 111 S.Ct. 72 )], the Third District in [Operating Engineers & Participating Employees Etc. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Larsen v. Department of the Navy
green
1 sentence1992In deciding the ERISA issue, the Court of Appeal wrote: “We cannot reconcile the Council’s position, that it retains the power under state law to prevent employee benefit plans from providing benefits except pursuant to the Council’s regulatory dictates, with decisions by the Ninth Circuit in Hydro-storage [v. Northern Cal. Boilermakers (9th Cir. 1989) 891 F.2d 719 , cert. denied (1990) 498 U.S. 822 (112 L.Ed 2d 46, 111 S.Ct. 72 )], the Third District in [Operating Engineers & Participating Employees Etc. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.