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8 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cynthia Larson v. United Healthcare Insurance Cogreen2 sentences2018In other words, the obligor is the proper defendant on an ERISA claim to recover plan benefits." Id. at 913 . 2018In other words, the obligor is the proper defendant on an ERISA claim to recover plan benefits." Id. at 913 . | 2 | 4 |
Ponsetti v. GE Pension Plangreen2 sentences2015We agree with the Seventh Circuit that, in cases such as this, because a section 1132(a)(1)(b) claim is “‘essentially a contract remedy under the terms of the plan,’†and “rests on contract obligations running directly from the insurers to the [plan participants or beneficiaries],†“the obligor is the proper party defendant on an ERISA claim to recover plan benefits.†Larson , 723 F.3d at 911 , 913 (quoting in part Ponsetti v. GE Pension Plan , 614 F.3d 684, 695 (7th Cir. 2010)) (emphasis in original). 2015We agree with the Seventh Circuit that, in cases such as this, because a section 1132(a)(1)(b) claim is “‘essentially a contract remedy under the terms of the plan,’†and “rests on contract obligations running directly from the insurers to the [plan participants or beneficiaries],†“the obligor is the proper party defendant on an ERISA claim to recover plan benefits.†Larson , 723 F.3d at 911 , 913 (quoting in part Ponsetti v. GE Pension Plan , 614 F.3d 684, 695 (7th Cir. 2010)) (emphasis in original). | 2 | 2 |
Gutierrez v. Mofidgreen2 sentences2007This would nullify [the statute of limitations]."); Bolduc v. Nat'l Semiconductor Corp., 35 F.Supp.2d 106, 120 (D.Me.1998)("It would belie logic to fashion a rule whereby a cause of action accrues on the date a claimant consults with an attorney and discovers *855 he or she may have an actionable claim rather than on the day he or she discovers the facts pertinent to this injury that may or may not give rise to the legal claim."); Gutierrez v. Mofid, 39 Cal.3d 892, 898 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 705 P.2d 886, 889 (1985)("[I]f one 'has suffered appreciable harm and knows or suspects that professiona 2007This would nullify [the statute of limitations]."); Bolduc v. Nat'l Semiconductor Corp., 35 F.Supp.2d 106, 120 (D.Me.1998)("It would belie logic to fashion a rule whereby a cause of action accrues on the date a claimant consults with an attorney and discovers *855 he or she may have an actionable claim rather than on the day he or she discovers the facts pertinent to this injury that may or may not give rise to the legal claim."); Gutierrez v. Mofid, 39 Cal.3d 892, 898 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 705 P.2d 886, 889 (1985)("[I]f one 'has suffered appreciable harm and knows or suspects that professiona | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. Heynegreen2 sentences2007See Wright v. Heyne, 349 F.3d 321, 330-31 (6th ("If the statute were tolled until an attorney informs the plaintiff that he or she has an ERISA claim, a plaintiff could delay accrual of a claim simply by waiting before consulting an attorney. 2007See Wright v. Heyne, 349 F.3d 321, 330-31 (6th ("If the statute were tolled until an attorney informs the plaintiff that he or she has an ERISA claim, a plaintiff could delay accrual of a claim simply by waiting before consulting an attorney. | 1 | 1 |
Bolduc v. National Semiconductor Corp.green2 sentences2007This would nullify [the statute of limitations]."); Bolduc v. Nat'l Semiconductor Corp., 35 F.Supp.2d 106, 120 (D.Me.1998)("It would belie logic to fashion a rule whereby a cause of action accrues on the date a claimant consults with an attorney and discovers *855 he or she may have an actionable claim rather than on the day he or she discovers the facts pertinent to this injury that may or may not give rise to the legal claim."); Gutierrez v. Mofid, 39 Cal.3d 892, 898 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 705 P.2d 886, 889 (1985)("[I]f one 'has suffered appreciable harm and knows or suspects that professiona 2007This would nullify [the statute of limitations]."); Bolduc v. Nat'l Semiconductor Corp., 35 F.Supp.2d 106, 120 (D.Me.1998)("It would belie logic to fashion a rule whereby a cause of action accrues on the date a claimant consults with an attorney and discovers *855 he or she may have an actionable claim rather than on the day he or she discovers the facts pertinent to this injury that may or may not give rise to the legal claim."); Gutierrez v. Mofid, 39 Cal.3d 892, 898 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 705 P.2d 886, 889 (1985)("[I]f one 'has suffered appreciable harm and knows or suspects that professiona | 1 | 1 |
Crowder v. Master Financial, Inc.green2 sentences2007This would nullify [the statute of limitations]."); Bolduc v. Nat'l Semiconductor Corp., 35 F.Supp.2d 106, 120 (D.Me.1998)("It would belie logic to fashion a rule whereby a cause of action accrues on the date a claimant consults with an attorney and discovers *855 he or she may have an actionable claim rather than on the day he or she discovers the facts pertinent to this injury that may or may not give rise to the legal claim."); Gutierrez v. Mofid, 39 Cal.3d 892, 898 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 705 P.2d 886, 889 (1985)("[I]f one 'has suffered appreciable harm and knows or suspects that professiona 2007This would nullify [the statute of limitations]."); Bolduc v. Nat'l Semiconductor Corp., 35 F.Supp.2d 106, 120 (D.Me.1998)("It would belie logic to fashion a rule whereby a cause of action accrues on the date a claimant consults with an attorney and discovers *855 he or she may have an actionable claim rather than on the day he or she discovers the facts pertinent to this injury that may or may not give rise to the legal claim."); Gutierrez v. Mofid, 39 Cal.3d 892, 898 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 705 P.2d 886, 889 (1985)("[I]f one 'has suffered appreciable harm and knows or suspects that professiona | 1 | 1 |
Pilot Life Insurance v. Dedeauxred2 sentences1994See Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 , 107 S.Ct. 1549 , 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (Congress did not intend for remedies which it had rejected in ERISA to become available under state law claims); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir.1992) (“While we are not unmindful of the fact that our interpretation of the preemption clause leaves a gap in remedies within a statute intended to protect participants in employee benefit plans, the lack of an ERISA remedy does not affect a preemption analysis.”); cf. Sanson v. General Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 618 (11th Cir. 1994See Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 , 107 S.Ct. 1549 , 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (Congress did not intend for remedies which it had rejected in ERISA to become available under state law claims); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir.1992) (“While we are not unmindful of the fact that our interpretation of the preemption clause leaves a gap in remedies within a statute intended to protect participants in employee benefit plans, the lack of an ERISA remedy does not affect a preemption analysis.”); cf. Sanson v. General Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 618 (11th Cir. | 1 | 1 |
Pierce v. Capitol Life Insurance Co.green2 sentences1994They base this contention on the statement by this court in Pierce v. Capitol Life Insurance Co., 806 P.2d 388, 390 (Colo.App.1990) that “[i]n order for a plaintiffs state law [tort] claim to be preempted, he or she must be entitled to bring an ERISA claim.” Plaintiffs misapprehend the significance of this phrase. 1994They base this contention on the statement by this court in Pierce v. Capitol Life Insurance Co., 806 P.2d 388, 390 (Colo.App.1990) that “[i]n order for a plaintiffs state law [tort] claim to be preempted, he or she must be entitled to bring an ERISA claim.” Plaintiffs misapprehend the significance of this phrase. | 1 | 1 |
Florence B. Corcoran Wife Of/and Wayne D. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc.red1 sentence1994See Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 , 107 S.Ct. 1549 , 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (Congress did not intend for remedies which it had rejected in ERISA to become available under state law claims); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir.1992) (“While we are not unmindful of the fact that our interpretation of the preemption clause leaves a gap in remedies within a statute intended to protect participants in employee benefit plans, the lack of an ERISA remedy does not affect a preemption analysis.”); cf. Sanson v. General Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 618 (11th Cir. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
OSF Healthcare System v. Insperity Group Health Plan
green
2 sentences2015In this case, the only obligor was Unum. ¶32       We recognize that in OSF , ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2015 WL 1117776 , the district court recently read Larson not to preclude a claim against a plan where an insurer makes all benefits decisions and has the obligation to pay benefits, but merely to allow a claim against the insurer in addition to the plan in such circumstances. 2015In this case, the only obligor was Unum. ¶32       We recognize that in OSF , ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2015 WL 1117776 , the district court recently read Larson not to preclude a claim against a plan where an insurer makes all benefits decisions and has the obligation to pay benefits, but merely to allow a claim against the insurer in addition to the plan in such circumstances. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust of Illinois v. Gorman Brothers Ready Mix
green
2 sentences2012Teamsters & Emp'rs, 283 F.3d at 879 . 2012Teamsters & Emp'rs, 283 F.3d at 879 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Chester C. Sanson v. General Motors Corporation
green
1 sentence1994See Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 , 107 S.Ct. 1549 , 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (Congress did not intend for remedies which it had rejected in ERISA to become available under state law claims); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir.1992) (“While we are not unmindful of the fact that our interpretation of the preemption clause leaves a gap in remedies within a statute intended to protect participants in employee benefit plans, the lack of an ERISA remedy does not affect a preemption analysis.”); cf. Sanson v. General Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 618 (11th Cir. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Dodd v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
green
2 sentences1990Dodd v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 688 F.Supp. 564 (E.D.Cal.1988). 1990Dodd v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 688 F.Supp. 564 (E.D.Cal.1988). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.