express declaration requirement in California

2021(See Estate of Bibb (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 461, 468-469 [“since ‘grant’ is the historically operative word for transferring interests in real property, there is no doubt that Everett’s use of the word ‘grant’ to convey the real property into 11 joint tenancy satisfied the express declaration requirement of section 852, subdivision (a)”].) Even assuming the quitclaim deeds did not validly transmute the properties, that does not impact the enforceability of the 2017 settlement agreement.

2019Addressing the argument that the deed failed to meet the MacDonald standard, the Bibb court explained: “The deed is drafted in the statutory form required for expressing an intent to transfer an interest in real property. [Citations.] Since the MacDonald court held that the [proffered writings] would have been adequate for a valid transmutation had they said, ‘ “I give to the account holder any interest I have . . . ,” ’ and since ‘grant’ is the historically operative word for transferring interests in real property, there is no doubt that [the husband’s] use of the word ‘grant’ to convey the

2019Thus, in In re Marriage of Kushesh & Kushesh-Kaviani 27 Cal.App.5th 449 , the court reasoned that an “ ‘INTERSPOUSAL TRANSFER GRANT DEED’ ” presented a better case for finding an express declaration than the grant deed in Bibb, because “not only did the writing use the verb ‘grant’―the main point of Bibb―but the heading added the words ‘interspousal’―denoting a spouse-to-spouse transaction―and ‘transfer grant’―denoting that whoever was doing the granting was actually transferring something out of that person’s estate.” (Marriage of Kushesh, at pp. 454-455, italics added.) Absent an unambiguous

2018Thus, in In re Marriage of Kushesh & Kushesh-Kaviani 27 Cal.App.5th 449 , 238 Cal.Rptr.3d 174 , the court reasoned that an " 'INTERSPOUSAL TRANSFER GRANT DEED' " presented a better case for finding an express declaration than the grant deed in Bibb , because "not only did the writing use the verb 'grant'-the main point of Bibb-but the heading added the words 'interspousal'-denoting a spouse-to-spouse transaction-and 'transfer grant'-denoting that whoever was doing the granting was actually transferring something out of that person's estate." ( Marriage of Kushesh, at pp. 454-455, 238 Cal.Rptr.

2019Thus, in In re Marriage of Kushesh & Kushesh-Kaviani 27 Cal.App.5th 449 , the court reasoned that an “ ‘INTERSPOUSAL TRANSFER GRANT DEED’ ” presented a better case for finding an express declaration than the grant deed in Bibb, because “not only did the writing use the verb ‘grant’―the main point of Bibb―but the heading added the words ‘interspousal’―denoting a spouse-to-spouse transaction―and ‘transfer grant’―denoting that whoever was doing the granting was actually transferring something out of that person’s estate.” (Marriage of Kushesh, at pp. 454-455, italics added.) Absent an unambiguous

2018Thus, in In re Marriage of Kushesh & Kushesh-Kaviani 27 Cal.App.5th 449 , 238 Cal.Rptr.3d 174 , the court reasoned that an " 'INTERSPOUSAL TRANSFER GRANT DEED' " presented a better case for finding an express declaration than the grant deed in Bibb , because "not only did the writing use the verb 'grant'-the main point of Bibb-but the heading added the words 'interspousal'-denoting a spouse-to-spouse transaction-and 'transfer grant'-denoting that whoever was doing the granting was actually transferring something out of that person's estate." ( Marriage of Kushesh, at pp. 454-455, 238 Cal.Rptr.

2014It provides “a record from which the maximum term of physical confinement for an offense can be determined, particularly in the event of future adjudications.” (Manzy W. at p. 1205.) It “also serves the purpose of ensuring that the juvenile court is aware of, and actually exercises, its [statutory] discretion … .” (Id. at p. 1207.) The court summarized its earlier decision in In re Kenneth H. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 616 (Kenneth H.) with approval, reiterating “that neither the pleading, the minute order, nor the setting of a felony-level period of physical confinement may substitute for a declaration

2014It provides “a record from which the maximum term of physical confinement for an offense can be determined, particularly in the event of future adjudications.” (Manzy W. at p. 1205.) It “also serves the purpose of ensuring that the juvenile court is aware of, and actually exercises, its [statutory] discretion … .” (Id. at p. 1207.) The court summarized its earlier decision in In re Kenneth H. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 616 (Kenneth H.) with approval, reiterating “that neither the pleading, the minute order, nor the setting of a felony-level period of physical confinement may substitute for a declaration

2020(See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 2-3, 39 [form of title presumption in Evidence Code section 662 does not control the inquiry]; In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1406 [property titled in one spouse’s name 1 In re BRACE Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting must satisfy statutory transmutation requirements to overcome community property presumption].)1 Where I part ways with the majority is on the timing of this change in the governing law.

1976(Anderson v. Stansbury, 38 Cal.2d 707, 717 [ 242 P.2d 305 ]; California Chiropractic Assn. v. Board of Administration, 40 Cal.App.3d 701, 704 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 286 ].) Here, the parties’ summary judgment papers debated the constitutional question, and the court filed a notice of intended decision expressing the judge’s view that the statute was constitutional.

1976(Anderson v. Stansbury, 38 Cal.2d 707, 717 [ 242 P.2d 305 ]; California Chiropractic Assn. v. Board of Administration, 40 Cal.App.3d 701, 704 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 286 ].) Here, the parties’ summary judgment papers debated the constitutional question, and the court filed a notice of intended decision expressing the judge’s view that the statute was constitutional.

1976(Anderson v. Stansbury, 38 Cal.2d 707, 717 [ 242 P.2d 305 ]; California Chiropractic Assn. v. Board of Administration, 40 Cal.App.3d 701, 704 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 286 ].) Here, the parties’ summary judgment papers debated the constitutional question, and the court filed a notice of intended decision expressing the judge’s view that the statute was constitutional.

1976(Anderson v. Stansbury, 38 Cal.2d 707, 717 [ 242 P.2d 305 ]; California Chiropractic Assn. v. Board of Administration, 40 Cal.App.3d 701, 704 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 286 ].) Here, the parties’ summary judgment papers debated the constitutional question, and the court filed a notice of intended decision expressing the judge’s view that the statute was constitutional.