Governor brief in California

2013In Shaputis II, the Supreme Court stressed the differing roles of a parole authority and the courts: “It bears emphasis that while ‘subjective analysis’ is an inherent aspect of the parole suitability determination, it plays a proper role only in the parole authority’s determination. [Citation.] The courts’ function is one of objective review, limited to ensuring that the Board’s or Governor’s analysis of the public safety risk entailed in a grant of parole is based on- a modicum of evidence, not mere guesswork. [Citation.] It is the parole authority’s duty to conduct an individualized inquiry

2012In discussing the insight issue, the court made exactly that clear: “It bears emphasis that while ‘subjective analysis’ is an inherent aspect of the parole suitability determination, it plays a proper role only in the parole authority’s determination. [Citation.] The courts’ function is one of objective review, limited to ensuring that the Board’s or Governor’s analysis of the public safety risk entailed in a grant of parole is based on a modicum of evidence, not mere guesswork. [Citation.] It is the parole authority’s duty to conduct an individualized inquiry into the inmate’s suitability for

2024A. The PRA “The PRA and the California Constitution provide the public with a broad right of access to government information.” (Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 282, 290 (Bd. of Supervisors).) “Modeled after the federal Freedom of Information Act ( 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq.), the PRA was enacted for the purpose of increasing freedom of information by giving members of the public access to records in the possession of state and local agencies. [Citation.] Such ‘access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business,’ the Legislature declared,

2024Furthermore, the Governor argued, although the calendars and schedules contain ‘facts’ rather than opinions or advice, they necessarily reflect the Governor's ‘deliberative judgment’ as to those persons, issues or events he considers to be of sufficient significance to occupy his time, and those he does not.” (Id. at pp. 1331–1332.) To assess the Governor’s claim of what our high court referred to as the “deliberative process or ‘executive’ privilege,” the court looked to federal cases interpreting exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act ( 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(5)), which protects from disc

2013In denying the Governor’s motion, the three-judge court found, among other things, that the state had failed to take many of the measures identified in the court’s prior order and opinion, specifically including the “ ‘release or diversion of certain [s]ub-populations, such as women, the elderly and the sick from prison to community-based facilities.’ ” (Coleman v. Brown (2013) 922 F.Supp.2d 1004, 1051 .) Citing the Stanford Study, the three-judge court lamented the fact that “despite their low risk of recidivism,” very few lifers have been released.

2010As we stated in In re Elkins (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 475 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 503 ], “acceptance of responsibility works in favor of release ‘[n]o matter how *1308 longstanding or recent it is,’ so long as the inmate ‘genuinely accepts responsibility ....’” (Id. at p. 495 [finding there was “no rational support for the astounding conclusion” that the petitioner’s decade-long acceptance of responsibility did not even weigh in favor of his parole].) In any event, this evidence of taking responsibility and expressing remorse contradicts the Governor’s claim that Moses maintained he acted in self-defen

2010As we stated in In re Elkins (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 475 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 503 ], “acceptance of responsibility works in favor of release ‘[n]o matter how *1308 longstanding or recent it is,’ so long as the inmate ‘genuinely accepts responsibility ....’” (Id. at p. 495 [finding there was “no rational support for the astounding conclusion” that the petitioner’s decade-long acceptance of responsibility did not even weigh in favor of his parole].) In any event, this evidence of taking responsibility and expressing remorse contradicts the Governor’s claim that Moses maintained he acted in self-defen

2010The Governor’s analysis regarding Moses’s version of events is very similar to his approach in Vasquez, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th 370 , in which he asserted that Vasquez “ ‘claims to accept responsibility and be remorseful for his actions, yet maintains, including most recently at his 2006 hearing, that he acted in self-defense.’ ” (Id. at p. 385.) The Vasquez court, finding both that Vasquez did not actually claim self-defense and showed uncontradicted signs of remorse, rejected the Governor’s argument as not supported by some evidence of current dangerousness.

2009Such a decision, however, would be arbitrary and capricious and, because it affected a protected liberty interest, would violate established principles of due process of law.” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 665 .) In the present case, appellant contends that the matter must be remanded to the Governor even though the superior court found that there was no evidence to support the Governor’s reversal of the Board’s parole decision, a finding the Governor does not challenge.

1983Article V, section 8, provides that “. . . the Governor, on conditions the Governor deems proper, may grant a reprieve, pardon, and commutation, after sentence, except in case of impeachment.” It is urged by the Governor that the power to pardon is similiar to the power to parole (citing In re Peterson (1939) 14 Cal.2d 82, 85 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 694 ]) 7 and that since his authority to revoke a conditional pardon has been judicially recognized (In re Marks (1883) 64 Cal. 29 [ 28 P. 109 ]; In re Wilson (1916) 29 Cal.App. 702 [ 157 P. 529 ]), so too should the court acknowledge the Governor’s power n

1983Article V, section 8, provides that "... the Governor, on conditions the Governor deems proper, may grant a reprieve, pardon, and commutation, after sentence, except in case of impeachment." It is urged by the Governor that the power to pardon is similiar to the power to parole (citing In re Peterson (1939) 14 Cal.2d 82, 85 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 694 ]) [7] and that since his authority to revoke a conditional pardon has been judicially recognized ( In re Marks (1883) 64 Cal. 29 [ 28 P. 109 ]; In re Wilson (1916) 29 Cal. App. 702 [ 157 P. 529 ]), so too should the court acknowledge the Governor's powe

1983Article V, section 8, provides that “. . . the Governor, on conditions the Governor deems proper, may grant a reprieve, pardon, and commutation, after sentence, except in case of impeachment.” It is urged by the Governor that the power to pardon is similiar to the power to parole (citing In re Peterson (1939) 14 Cal.2d 82, 85 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 694 ]) 7 and that since his authority to revoke a conditional pardon has been judicially recognized (In re Marks (1883) 64 Cal. 29 [ 28 P. 109 ]; In re Wilson (1916) 29 Cal.App. 702 [ 157 P. 529 ]), so too should the court acknowledge the Governor’s power n

1983Article V, section 8, provides that "... the Governor, on conditions the Governor deems proper, may grant a reprieve, pardon, and commutation, after sentence, except in case of impeachment." It is urged by the Governor that the power to pardon is similiar to the power to parole (citing In re Peterson (1939) 14 Cal.2d 82, 85 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 694 ]) [7] and that since his authority to revoke a conditional pardon has been judicially recognized ( In re Marks (1883) 64 Cal. 29 [ 28 P. 109 ]; In re Wilson (1916) 29 Cal. App. 702 [ 157 P. 529 ]), so too should the court acknowledge the Governor's powe

1983Article V, section 8, provides that “. . . the Governor, on conditions the Governor deems proper, may grant a reprieve, pardon, and commutation, after sentence, except in case of impeachment.” It is urged by the Governor that the power to pardon is similiar to the power to parole (citing In re Peterson (1939) 14 Cal.2d 82, 85 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 694 ]) 7 and that since his authority to revoke a conditional pardon has been judicially recognized (In re Marks (1883) 64 Cal. 29 [ 28 P. 109 ]; In re Wilson (1916) 29 Cal.App. 702 [ 157 P. 529 ]), so too should the court acknowledge the Governor’s power n

1983Article V, section 8, provides that "... the Governor, on conditions the Governor deems proper, may grant a reprieve, pardon, and commutation, after sentence, except in case of impeachment." It is urged by the Governor that the power to pardon is similiar to the power to parole (citing In re Peterson (1939) 14 Cal.2d 82, 85 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 694 ]) [7] and that since his authority to revoke a conditional pardon has been judicially recognized ( In re Marks (1883) 64 Cal. 29 [ 28 P. 109 ]; In re Wilson (1916) 29 Cal. App. 702 [ 157 P. 529 ]), so too should the court acknowledge the Governor's powe

1983Article V, section 8, provides that “. . . the Governor, on conditions the Governor deems proper, may grant a reprieve, pardon, and commutation, after sentence, except in case of impeachment.” It is urged by the Governor that the power to pardon is similiar to the power to parole (citing In re Peterson (1939) 14 Cal.2d 82, 85 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 694 ]) 7 and that since his authority to revoke a conditional pardon has been judicially recognized (In re Marks (1883) 64 Cal. 29 [ 28 P. 109 ]; In re Wilson (1916) 29 Cal.App. 702 [ 157 P. 529 ]), so too should the court acknowledge the Governor’s power n

1983Article V, section 8, provides that “. . . the Governor, on conditions the Governor deems proper, may grant a reprieve, pardon, and commutation, after sentence, except in case of impeachment.” It is urged by the Governor that the power to pardon is similiar to the power to parole (citing In re Peterson (1939) 14 Cal.2d 82, 85 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 694 ]) 7 and that since his authority to revoke a conditional pardon has been judicially recognized (In re Marks (1883) 64 Cal. 29 [ 28 P. 109 ]; In re Wilson (1916) 29 Cal.App. 702 [ 157 P. 529 ]), so too should the court acknowledge the Governor’s power n

1981Deukmejian v. Brown (1981) ante, page 150 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 478 , 624 P.2d 1206 ].

1981Deukmejian v. Brown (1981) ante, page 150 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 478 , 624 P.2d 1206 ].

1978I am eliminating the following language in this item because it raised a serious constitutional issue of the separation of powers.” (Stats. 1977, ch. 219.) Responding to the Governor’s challenge, the Legislature adopted Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 55 (1977 res., ch. 112, filed with the Secretary of State on Sept. 15, 1977), stating in part: “Whereas, The Legislature believes that the elimination of such control language is improper and constitutes an encroachment upon the powers of the Legislature and raises very serious questions in this regard; now, therefore, be it “Resolved by the Sen

1978I am eliminating the following language in this item because it raised a serious constitutional issue of the separation of powers.” (Stats. 1977, ch. 219.) Responding to the Governor’s challenge, the Legislature adopted Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 55 (1977 res., ch. 112, filed with the Secretary of State on Sept. 15, 1977), stating in part: “Whereas, The Legislature believes that the elimination of such control language is improper and constitutes an encroachment upon the powers of the Legislature and raises very serious questions in this regard; now, therefore, be it “Resolved by the Sen