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15 California opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Sortogreen2 sentences2026(Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 454.) In Bagsby, the Fourth District determined that there was no compelling reason to depart from Heard’s analysis on functional equivalence and its conclusion that no rational basis existed for section 1170, subdivision (d) to differentiate between those sentenced to LWOP and de facto LWOP. 2025(Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 447-448.) And Bagsby reaffirmed Heard’s analysis, again concluding that Franklin does not undermine Heard. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Bagsbygreen2 sentences2026(Bagsby, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1059.) Heard, Sorto, and Bagsby each involved a term-of-years sentence with a parole eligibility date that was unquestionably beyond the juvenile offender’s natural life expectancy. 2025(See Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 445–446; Bagsby, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1059–1060.) Those cases persuasively explain that Hardin and Heard are consistent: “Hardin holds the Legislature reasonably may disfavor explicit LWOP offenders based on the rationale that they are more culpable than functionally equivalent LWOP offenders. [Citation.] In Heard . . . the court considered the opposite situation, asking whether it is reasonable to grant relief to explicit LWOP offenders while denying the same relief to functionally equivalent LWOP offenders.” (Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at | 1 | 3 |
People v. Fraziergreen2 sentences2026(People v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858, 863-864.) A court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on an incorrect legal standard. 2026(People v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858, 863-864.) A court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on an incorrect legal standard. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Crittendenred2 sentences2007Although the trial court did not expressly describe that weighing process with respect to exhibits 9 and 10, the *189 record shows that the court heard defense counsel argue that each photograph was prejudicial, and the court indicated awareness of its duty to conduct the weighing process required by Evidence Code section 352. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 135 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474 , 885 P.2d 887 .) As to exhibit 15, which included multiple photographs, the trial court expressly stated it was excluding photograph "15-G" because the prejudicial effect of that image outweighed it 2007Although the trial court did not expressly describe that weighing process with respect to exhibits 9 and 10, the *189 record shows that the court heard defense counsel argue that each photograph was prejudicial, and the court indicated awareness of its duty to conduct the weighing process required by Evidence Code section 352. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 135 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474 , 885 P.2d 887 .) As to exhibit 15, which included multiple photographs, the trial court expressly stated it was excluding photograph "15-G" because the prejudicial effect of that image outweighed it | 1 | 2 |
People v. Isayevgreen2 sentences2026Heard’s analysis permitting relief under section 1170(d)(1)(A) because defendant “was sentenced” to the functional equivalent of LWOP “cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Franklin.” (Ortega, supra, 111 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1264, rev.gr.) Like the court in People v. Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117 , review granted Nov. 12, 2025, S292860 (Isayev), “we do not ascribe much significance to the fact that the statute refers to the offender’s sentence in the past tense” because, “[r]elative to the time when a petition for recall and resentencing is filed, a sentence will always 2026Heard’s analysis permitting relief under section 1170(d)(1)(A) because defendant “was sentenced” to the functional equivalent of LWOP “cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Franklin.” (Ortega, supra, 111 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1264, rev.gr.) Like the court in People v. Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117 , review granted Nov. 12, 2025, S292860 (Isayev), “we do not ascribe much significance to the fact that the statute refers to the offender’s sentence in the past tense” because, “[r]elative to the time when a petition for recall and resentencing is filed, a sentence will always | 1 | 1 |
People v. Smithgreen1 sentence2023(Cf. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 606 [rejecting a defendant’s claim “he ‘was denied the opportunity to develop a record sufficient for this court to review the error in light of all of the evidence,’ ” where “the court gave defendant full opportunity to air all of his complaints [in support of his motion for new counsel], and counsel to respond to them”].) Notably, there is no evidence or claim that 17 Ward himself believed there was a complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Perrygreen1 sentence2016(People v. Perry (2006) 38 Cal.4th 302, 311 (Perry).) “ ‘A defendant, however, “does not have a right to be present at every hearing held in the course of a trial.” [Citation.] A defendant’s presence is required if it “bears a reasonable and substantial relation to his full opportunity to defend against the charges.” [Citation.] The defendant must show that any violation of this right resulted in prejudice or violated the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial.’ ” (Lucero, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 717 .) Here, defendant was not present in the courtroom because the parties had not antic | 1 | 1 |
People v. Raleyyellow2 sentences1994(See People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 178-179 ; People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 897; People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d 983, 1016-1017 .) During the course of the in limine review, the court also excluded a photograph that nearly duplicated another photograph depicting Katherine at the crime scene, ordered several other photographs withdrawn, ordered that the two autopsy photographs as well as the photograph of William’s face be presented in black and white, and, for example, ordered that a photograph be cropped to illustrate wounds inflicted upon William’s body without also 1994(See People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 178-179 ; People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 897; People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d 983, 1016-1017 .) During the course of the in limine review, the court also excluded a photograph that nearly duplicated another photograph depicting Katherine at the crime scene, ordered several other photographs withdrawn, ordered that the two autopsy photographs as well as the photograph of William’s face be presented in black and white, and, for example, ordered that a photograph be cropped to illustrate wounds inflicted upon William’s body without also | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ortegagreen2 sentences2025(Bagsby, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1056-1057; but see People v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252 , 1264 [disagreeing with Heard and concluding that “Heard cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Franklin”].) We agree with Heard, Sorto, and Bagsby that the relevant inquiry under section 1170(d)(1) “is the sentence that was originally imposed” (Valdez, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 800), and Franklin does not require a contrary result. 2025(Heard at pp. 633–634.) The Heard 3 In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 479 .) 5 court did not think Franklin applied to moot the constitutional issue because section 1170 (d) explicitly uses the phrase “was sentenced.” (Heard, at p. 629.) The court noted the procedure under section 1170 (d) is “a statutory resentencing opportunity, not a cure for Miller error.” (Ibid.) In our recently published opinion, Ortega, supra, | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miller v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2026So we don’t look at whether or not she is actually paroled; we look at whether or not she actually has a parole hearing date, and she actually does have a parole hearing date next year.” The court observed that, “in Franklin, the defendant was sentenced to 50 years to life, and the California Supreme Court held that because Section 3051 entitles Franklin to a youth offender parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration, his sentence, quote, ‘is neither LWOP nor its functional equivalent,’ thus gives no rise to any, quote, ‘Miller[6] claim.’” “Under the Heard analysis, what Heard address 2026So we don’t look at whether or not she is actually paroled; we look at whether or not she actually has a parole hearing date, and she actually does have a parole hearing date next year.” The court observed that, “in Franklin, the defendant was sentenced to 50 years to life, and the California Supreme Court held that because Section 3051 entitles Franklin to a youth offender parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration, his sentence, quote, ‘is neither LWOP nor its functional equivalent,’ thus gives no rise to any, quote, ‘Miller[6] claim.’” “Under the Heard analysis, what Heard address | 2 | 2025–2026 |
People v. Lofchie
green
1 sentence2026Heard’s analysis permitting relief under section 1170(d)(1)(A) because defendant “was sentenced” to the functional equivalent of LWOP “cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Franklin.” (Ortega, supra, 111 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1264, rev.gr.) Like the court in People v. Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117 , review granted Nov. 12, 2025, S292860 (Isayev), “we do not ascribe much significance to the fact that the statute refers to the offender’s sentence in the past tense” because, “[r]elative to the time when a petition for recall and resentencing is filed, a sentence will always | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Coronado
green
1 sentence2026Heard’s analysis permitting relief under section 1170(d)(1)(A) because defendant “was sentenced” to the functional equivalent of LWOP “cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Franklin.” (Ortega, supra, 111 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1264, rev.gr.) Like the court in People v. Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117 , review granted Nov. 12, 2025, S292860 (Isayev), “we do not ascribe much significance to the fact that the statute refers to the offender’s sentence in the past tense” because, “[r]elative to the time when a petition for recall and resentencing is filed, a sentence will always | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Allen
green
1 sentence2023The court’s lengthy discussion and resolution of that issue—i.e., ultimately seating No. 8 as a trial juror for the sake of “hav[ing] more people who look like this defendant on the panel”—clearly showed that the court was attentive to the issue at hand.8 This record stands in contrast to what happened in People v. Allen (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 542 , where the prosecutor justified a challenge to a potential juror merely by stating, “ ‘her very response to your answers, and her demeanor, and not only dress but how she took her seat,’ ” and the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to conduc | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Lucero
green
2 sentences2016(People v. Perry (2006) 38 Cal.4th 302, 311 (Perry).) “ ‘A defendant, however, “does not have a right to be present at every hearing held in the course of a trial.” [Citation.] A defendant’s presence is required if it “bears a reasonable and substantial relation to his full opportunity to defend against the charges.” [Citation.] The defendant must show that any violation of this right resulted in prejudice or violated the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial.’ ” (Lucero, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 717 .) Here, defendant was not present in the courtroom because the parties had not antic 2016Voluntary absence from the proceedings Finally, defendant contends that the trial court violated his constitutional rights to be present at a critical stage of the proceedings when the court heard defense counsel’s doubts as to his competency outside his presence. “ ‘A criminal defendant’s right to be personally present at trial is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution . . . . [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692 , 716–717 (Lucero).) A defendant also has a state constitutional and statutory right to be present at critical proceedings. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Price
yellow
2 sentences2007Nor were the photographs inadmissible as cumulative of witness testimony ( People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 441 , 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 ), or of other photographs ( People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1199 , 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 , 95 P.3d 811 ). 2007Nor were the photographs inadmissible as cumulative of witness testimony ( People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 441 , 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 ), or of other photographs ( People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1199 , 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 , 95 P.3d 811 ). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Cole
green
2 sentences2007Nor were the photographs inadmissible as cumulative of witness testimony ( People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 441 , 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 ), or of other photographs ( People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1199 , 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 , 95 P.3d 811 ). 2007Nor were the photographs inadmissible as cumulative of witness testimony ( People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 441 , 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 ), or of other photographs ( People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1199 , 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 , 95 P.3d 811 ). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
German v. Killeen
green
1 sentence1996Lockheed also cites German v. Killeen (E.D.Mich. 1980) 495 F.Supp. 822 to support its “similarly situated” instruction. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Garceau
red
2 sentences1994(See People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 178-179 ; People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 897; People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d 983, 1016-1017 .) During the course of the in limine review, the court also excluded a photograph that nearly duplicated another photograph depicting Katherine at the crime scene, ordered several other photographs withdrawn, ordered that the two autopsy photographs as well as the photograph of William’s face be presented in black and white, and, for example, ordered that a photograph be cropped to illustrate wounds inflicted upon William’s body without also 1994(See People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 178-179 ; People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 897 ; People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d 983, 1016-1017 .) *136 During the course of the in limine review, the court also excluded a photograph that nearly duplicated another photograph depicting Katherine at the crime scene, ordered several other photographs withdrawn, ordered that the two autopsy photographs as well as the photograph of William's face be presented in black and white, and, for example, ordered that a photograph be cropped to illustrate wounds inflicted upon William's body withou | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Edelbacher
red
2 sentences1994(See People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 178-179 ; People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 897; People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d 983, 1016-1017 .) During the course of the in limine review, the court also excluded a photograph that nearly duplicated another photograph depicting Katherine at the crime scene, ordered several other photographs withdrawn, ordered that the two autopsy photographs as well as the photograph of William’s face be presented in black and white, and, for example, ordered that a photograph be cropped to illustrate wounds inflicted upon William’s body without also 1994(See People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 178-179 ; People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 897 ; People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d 983, 1016-1017 .) *136 During the course of the in limine review, the court also excluded a photograph that nearly duplicated another photograph depicting Katherine at the crime scene, ordered several other photographs withdrawn, ordered that the two autopsy photographs as well as the photograph of William's face be presented in black and white, and, for example, ordered that a photograph be cropped to illustrate wounds inflicted upon William's body withou | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.