Hofsheier defendant in California

2012In People v. Ranscht (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1371 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 800 ], the Hofsheier analysis was applied to a conviction under section 289, subdivision (h), sexual penetration of a minor.

2012In People v. Ranscht (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1371 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 800 ], the Hofsheier analysis was applied to a conviction under section 289, subdivision (h), sexual penetration of a minor.

2015(See People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 239 , 226 P.3d 348 ].) The superior court denied the petition in reliance on People v. Manchel (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1108 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 194 ] (Manchel), a case that had rejected a Hofsheier claim by a 29-year-old defendant convicted of section 288a(b)(2), the same felony oral copulation offense at issue here.

2015(See People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 239 , 226 P.3d 348 ].) The superior court denied the petition in reliance on People v. Manchel (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1108 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 194 ] (Manchel), a case that had rejected a Hofsheier claim by a 29-year-old defendant convicted of section 288a(b)(2), the same felony oral copulation offense at issue here.

2010The trial court denied his Hofsheier challenge, stating that it was compelled to follow Manchel although that decision "`really bother[ed the trial court] a lot.'" ( Luansing, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 679 .) Division Two reversed, stating that it "agree[d] with the subsequent appellate decisions criticizing Manchel 's analysis." ( Luansing, at p. 684.) The Luansing court additionally noted that even if it were to apply the Manchel court's analysis, it would not change its conclusion, since in 1979 when Luansing was convicted, "his conduct did not come within section 288 because at that tim

2010The trial court denied his Hofsheier challenge, stating that it was compelled to follow Manchel although that decision "`really bother[ed the trial court] a lot.'" ( Luansing, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 679 .) Division Two reversed, stating that it "agree[d] with the subsequent appellate decisions criticizing Manchel 's analysis." ( Luansing, at p. 684.) The Luansing court additionally noted that even if it were to apply the Manchel court's analysis, it would not change its conclusion, since in 1979 when Luansing was convicted, "his conduct did not come within section 288 because at that tim

2012In People v. Anderson, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th 135 , the defendant was convicted of lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 years by a person at least 10 years older (§ 288, subd. (c)(1)).

2012In People v. Anderson, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th 135 , the defendant was convicted of lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 years by a person at least 10 years older (§ 288, subd. (c)(1)).

2013(Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 , 883 P.2d 960 ].) 17 Both Shoemaker and respondent agree that this court may reach the merits of Shoemaker’s Hofsheier challenge.

2013(Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 , 883 P.2d 960 ].) 17 Both Shoemaker and respondent agree that this court may reach the merits of Shoemaker’s Hofsheier challenge.

2013Although “[a]n appeal is ‘limited to the four comers of the [underlying] record on appealwhile “[h]abeas corpus is not” (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 703, fn. 1 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396 , 996 P.2d 46 ], citation omitted), in this case we discern no significant difference in the record.

2013Although “[a]n appeal is ‘limited to the four comers of the [underlying] record on appealwhile “[h]abeas corpus is not” (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 703, fn. 1 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396 , 996 P.2d 46 ], citation omitted), in this case we discern no significant difference in the record.

2013(See Escamilla v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 498, 511 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 408 ] [“The label given a petition, action or other pleading is not determinative” of court’s jurisdiction to address merits of claim.].) And they agree that our review is de novo.

2013(See Escamilla v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 498, 511 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 408 ] [“The label given a petition, action or other pleading is not determinative” of court’s jurisdiction to address merits of claim.].) And they agree that our review is de novo.

2013“This requirement avoids a collateral attack on the conviction and relitigation of issues of probable cause and guilt, and protects the strong judicial policy against inconsistent resolutions arising from identical facts.” (Susag v. City of Lake Forest (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1408-1409 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 ].) In light of these factors, there remains a question whether the statement in Picklesimer , that a petition for writ of habeas corpus is the “preferred method” for a Hofsheier challenge by one who remains in constructive custody, should be interpreted to preclude the use of other pro

2013“This requirement avoids a collateral attack on the conviction and relitigation of issues of probable cause and guilt, and protects the strong judicial policy against inconsistent resolutions arising from identical facts.” (Susag v. City of Lake Forest (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1408-1409 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 ].) In light of these factors, there remains a question whether the statement in Picklesimer , that a petition for writ of habeas corpus is the “preferred method” for a Hofsheier challenge by one who remains in constructive custody, should be interpreted to preclude the use of other pro

2009Hofsheier The defendant in Hofsheier was a 22-year-old man who pled guilty to voluntary oral copulation with a 16-year-old girl. 5 (Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1192 .) The trial court imposed an order of mandatory sex offender registration, pursuant to former section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(A). 6 (Hofsheier, at p. 1192.) The defendant challenged the registration requirement, arguing that “he was denied the constitutionally guaranteed equal protection of the laws because a person convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor [citation] under the same circumstances would not be su

2009Hofsheier The defendant in Hofsheier was a 22-year-old man who pled guilty to voluntary oral copulation with a 16-year-old girl. 5 (Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1192 .) The trial court imposed an order of mandatory sex offender registration, pursuant to former section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(A). 6 (Hofsheier, at p. 1192.) The defendant challenged the registration requirement, arguing that “he was denied the constitutionally guaranteed equal protection of the laws because a person convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor [citation] under the same circumstances would not be su

2009Because the sex offender registration statutes are regulatory and not punitive (People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 792 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346 , 982 P.2d 211 ]), civil and not criminal (Smith v. Doe (2003) 538 U.S. 84 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 164 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 ]), and a continuing obligation of a defendant, there are no ex post facto issues presented by subjecting appellant to the changes in the registration requirements that have been made since his conviction.

2009Because the sex offender registration statutes are regulatory and not punitive (People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 792 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346 , 982 P.2d 211 ]), civil and not criminal (Smith v. Doe (2003) 538 U.S. 84 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 164 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 ]), and a continuing obligation of a defendant, there are no ex post facto issues presented by subjecting appellant to the changes in the registration requirements that have been made since his conviction.

2009This assumption overlooks the fact that unlawful sexual intercourse is a general intent offense ( People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 876 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 757 ]) whereas convictions under section 288, subdivision (a) or subdivision (c)(1) require the specific intent to "arous[e], appeal[] to, or gratify[] the lust, passions, or sexual desires of [the offender] or the child." (§ 288, subd. (a).) (See People v. *1374 Anderson (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 135, 142 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 ] [refusing to apply Hofsheier to defendant convicted of committing a lewd act on a child, which requires specifi

2009This assumption overlooks the fact that unlawful sexual intercourse is a general intent offense ( People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 876 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 757 ]) whereas convictions under section 288, subdivision (a) or subdivision (c)(1) require the specific intent to "arous[e], appeal[] to, or gratify[] the lust, passions, or sexual desires of [the offender] or the child." (§ 288, subd. (a).) (See People v. *1374 Anderson (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 135, 142 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 ] [refusing to apply Hofsheier to defendant convicted of committing a lewd act on a child, which requires specifi

2009This assumption overlooks the fact that unlawful sexual intercourse is a general intent offense ( People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 876 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 757 ]) whereas convictions under section 288, subdivision (a) or subdivision (c)(1) require the specific intent to "arous[e], appeal[] to, or gratify[] the lust, passions, or sexual desires of [the offender] or the child." (§ 288, subd. (a).) (See People v. *1374 Anderson (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 135, 142 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 ] [refusing to apply Hofsheier to defendant convicted of committing a lewd act on a child, which requires specifi

2009This assumption overlooks the fact that unlawful sexual intercourse is a general intent offense ( People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 876 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 757 ]) whereas convictions under section 288, subdivision (a) or subdivision (c)(1) require the specific intent to "arous[e], appeal[] to, or gratify[] the lust, passions, or sexual desires of [the offender] or the child." (§ 288, subd. (a).) (See People v. *1374 Anderson (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 135, 142 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 ] [refusing to apply Hofsheier to defendant convicted of committing a lewd act on a child, which requires specifi

2009Hofsheier The defendant in Hofsheier was a 22-year-old man who pled guilty to voluntary oral copulation with a 16-year-old girl. 5 (Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1192 .) The trial court imposed an order of mandatory sex offender registration, pursuant to former section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(A). 6 (Hofsheier, at p. 1192.) The defendant challenged the registration requirement, arguing that “he was denied the constitutionally guaranteed equal protection of the laws because a person convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor [citation] under the same circumstances would not be su

2009Hofsheier The defendant in Hofsheier was a 22-year-old man who pled guilty to voluntary oral copulation with a 16-year-old girl. 5 (Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1192 .) The trial court imposed an order of mandatory sex offender registration, pursuant to former section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(A). 6 (Hofsheier, at p. 1192.) The defendant challenged the registration requirement, arguing that “he was denied the constitutionally guaranteed equal protection of the laws because a person convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor [citation] under the same circumstances would not be su

2009Hofsheier The defendant in Hofsheier was a 22-year-old man who pled guilty to voluntary oral copulation with a 16-year-old girl. 5 (Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1192 .) The trial court imposed an order of mandatory sex offender registration, pursuant to former section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(A). 6 (Hofsheier, at p. 1192.) The defendant challenged the registration requirement, arguing that “he was denied the constitutionally guaranteed equal protection of the laws because a person convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor [citation] under the same circumstances would not be su

2009Hofsheier The defendant in Hofsheier was a 22-year-old man who pled guilty to voluntary oral copulation with a 16-year-old girl. 5 (Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1192 .) The trial court imposed an order of mandatory sex offender registration, pursuant to former section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(A). 6 (Hofsheier, at p. 1192.) The defendant challenged the registration requirement, arguing that “he was denied the constitutionally guaranteed equal protection of the laws because a person convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor [citation] under the same circumstances would not be su