sufficient basis presumption in California

2016(People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 980-981 .) If the legal meaning of a statutory term differs from its meaning in " 'common parlance,' " the trial court should provide clarifying instructions.

2015(People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 980-981 .) If the legal meaning of a statutory term differs from its meaning in " 'common parlance,' " the trial court should provide clarifying instructions.

1955She insists upon the five factors 1 mentioned in Estate of Lombardi, 128 Cal.App.2d 606, 610-611 [ 276 P.2d 67 ], and in 26 Cal.Jur. 647, § 19; or as somewhat differently expressed in Estate of Llewellyn, 83 Cal.App.2d 534, 562-563 [ 189 P.2d 822 , 191 P.2d 419 ], or in Estate of Welch, 43 Cal.2d 173 [ 272 P.2d 512 ].

1955She insists upon the five factors 1 mentioned in Estate of Lombardi, 128 Cal.App.2d 606, 610-611 [ 276 P.2d 67 ], and in 26 Cal.Jur. 647, § 19; or as somewhat differently expressed in Estate of Llewellyn, 83 Cal.App.2d 534, 562-563 [ 189 P.2d 822 , 191 P.2d 419 ], or in Estate of Welch, 43 Cal.2d 173 [ 272 P.2d 512 ].

2016(Ibid.; People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1311 .) The language of a statute defining a crime is generally a sufficient basis for an instruction.

2015(People v. Butler (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 998, 1013 .) The language of a statute defining a crime is generally a sufficient basis for an instruction.

1999Chaides Const. (N.D.Cal. 1994) 847 F.Supp. 1452, 1458 .) However, liability can only be found if the inducement is “active”; that is, a party must “purposefully cause, urge or encourage another to infringe.” (Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke (7th Cir. 1975) 509 F.2d 1137, 1142 .) Something more is required than simply the advertising of a product for sale.

1999Cir. 1990) 917 F.2d 544, 553 , italics omitted.) Unlike direct infringement, it is possible for inducement to infringe to occur during the course of advertising activities; indeed, advertising has *867 been found to be a sufficient basis for a claim of inducement. 9 (U.S. Fidelity & Guar. v. Star Technologies (D.Ore. 1996) 935 F.Supp. 1110, 1116 ; New Hampshire Ins. v. R.L.

1999Cir. 1990) 917 F.2d 544, 553 , italics omitted.) Unlike direct infringement, it is possible for inducement to infringe to occur during the course of advertising activities; indeed, advertising has *867 been found to be a sufficient basis for a claim of inducement. 9 (U.S. Fidelity & Guar. v. Star Technologies (D.Ore. 1996) 935 F.Supp. 1110, 1116 ; New Hampshire Ins. v. R.L.

1999Chaides Const. (N.D.Cal. 1994) 847 F.Supp. 1452, 1458 .) However, liability can only be found if the inducement is “active”; that is, a party must “purposefully cause, urge or encourage another to infringe.” (Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke (7th Cir. 1975) 509 F.2d 1137, 1142 .) Something more is required than simply the advertising of a product for sale.

1978(Rules 2-111(A)(4) and (5).) In addition, even if an attorney is a material witness on behalf of his client, withdrawal by him and his firm is not required if it "would work a substantial hardship on the client because of the distinctive value of the lawyer or his firm as *201 counsel in the particular case." (Rule 2-111(A)(4)(d); see text preceding fn. 7, ante. ) If the rule were based on considerations of honesty, morality or potential misuse of confidential information or conflict of interest, hardship to the client would hardly be a sufficient basis for an exception. (6) Thus, rule 2-111(A

1978Thus, rule 2-111(A)(4) is not a rule proscribing deceptive, dishonest, immoral or even unethical conduct in the true sense; it is, rather, a rule of professional propriety or etiquette resulting from the balancing of a number of competing interests 17 (see Comden v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 915 ; Comment, supra, 45 Cin.L.Rev. at pp. 272-273; see also Sutton, supra, 41 Texas L.Rev. at p. 483 [text preceding fn. 23]).

1969Defendant tended to visit female rather than male neighbors of the deceased in the early morning hours of August 2, 1966. (16) A showing of less than actual rape constitutes a sufficient basis for an instruction on first degree murder in the attempt to perpetrate rape, particularly upon proof of injury to the genital area. ( People v. Hillery, supra, 62 Cal.2d 692, 704-705 .) *398 (17) As to possession of stolen property, the trial court gave the following instruction: "The mere fact that a person was in conscious possession of recently stolen property is not enough to justify his conviction o

1969(People v. Hillery, supra, 62 Cal.2d 692, 704-705 .) As to possession of stolen property, the trial court gave the following instruction: “The mere fact that a person was in conscious possession of recently stolen property is not enough to justify his conviction of burglary or robbery.

1951Respondent’s daughter testified that her mother did not discuss business with her, and that discussion of business affairs by respondent with appellant were carried on “behind closed doors.” The evidence of a confidential relationship by no means stops there, since appellant made an admission, referred to in respondent’s brief and on oral argument, which, perhaps, furnished a sufficient basis for a presumption of a confidential relationship of more than five years duration under the holding in Holmes v. Holmes, 98 Cal.App.2d 536, 538 [ 220 P.2d 60 .3] (which cites Fieg v. Gjurich, 163 Cal. 740

1951Respondent’s daughter testified that her mother did not discuss business with her, and that discussion of business affairs by respondent with appellant were carried on “behind closed doors.” The evidence of a confidential relationship by no means stops there, since appellant made an admission, referred to in respondent’s brief and on oral argument, which, perhaps, furnished a sufficient basis for a presumption of a confidential relationship of more than five years duration under the holding in Holmes v. Holmes, 98 Cal.App.2d 536, 538 [ 220 P.2d 60 .3] (which cites Fieg v. Gjurich, 163 Cal. 740

1880That is to say, each essential independent fact in the chain or series of facts relied upon to establish the main fact must be established to a moral certainty, beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the entire satisfaction of the jury, or they must acquit.” It was held by this Court in the case of People v. Phipps, 39 Cal. 326 , that the above instruction is a correct statement of the law as the same is applicable to circumstantial evidence in criminal cases ; and it was, therefore, error in the Court to refuse it, unless it was substantially given in the charge or in some other instruction.