time of the resentencing hearing in California

2024At the time of the resentencing hearing, our state Supreme Court had concluded in People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688 that a trial court could strike a 7 firearm enhancement under section 12022.53 and impose a lesser enhancement under that same section, where the facts supporting the lesser enhancement were alleged and found true by the jury.

2022In People v. Morrison (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 217 , a panel of Division Five of the First Appellate District concluded trial courts have “discretion to impose an enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (b) or (c) as a middle ground to a lifetime enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), if such an outcome [is] found to be in the interests of justice under section 1385.” (Id. at p. 223.) In People v. Tirado (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 637 , reversed with directions, Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th 688 , a panel of the Fifth Appellate District concluded section 12022.53(h) does not grant tr

2026The record thus supports that the court “ ‘balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law,’ ” and we therefore cannot reverse “ ‘even if we might have ruled differently in the first instance.’ [Citation.]” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378 .) Accordingly, we affirm. 8 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

2024As is widely recognized, “[t]rial counsel is not required to make futile objections, advance meritless arguments or undertake useless procedural challenges merely to create a record impregnable to assault for claimed inadequacy of counsel.” (People v. Jones (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 820, 827 .) Thus, “[c]ounsel does not render ineffective assistance by failing to make motions or objections that counsel reasonably determines would be futile.” ( Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th 12 at p. 387.) The record discloses that the trial court repeatedly expressed its view that defendant’s use of a firearm was particul

2024We agree with appellant that his youth and the remoteness of his prior strike were relevant considerations, particularly in light of the “increasing recognition that young adults are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes because of their diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform.” (People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134 , 1141-1142.) But given the severity of the current offense and appellant’s criminal history, we cannot say that the presence of these factors rendered the trial court’s ruling unreasonable.

2024As is widely recognized, “[t]rial counsel is not required to make futile objections, advance meritless arguments or undertake useless procedural challenges merely to create a record impregnable to assault for claimed inadequacy of counsel.” (People v. Jones (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 820, 827 .) Thus, “[c]ounsel does not render ineffective assistance by failing to make motions or objections that counsel reasonably determines would be futile.” ( Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th 12 at p. 387.) The record discloses that the trial court repeatedly expressed its view that defendant’s use of a firearm was particul

2023Dows v. Wood (9th Cir. 2000) 211 F.3d 480, 485 .) Respondent notes state and federal courts have also refused to presume prejudice from mental illness (Smith v. Ylst (9th Cir. 1987) 826 F.2d 872, 876 [“mental illness is too varied in its symptoms and effects to justify a per se reversal rule”]) or incompetency 8 from alcoholism (People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 786 [“a per se rule of deficiency for alcoholic attorneys is contrary to settled law”]).

2023(Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 658 .) Respondent claims Ruiz has not offered any evidence that Baker’s performance was affected by his medical condition at the time of the resentencing hearing, and that “[t]he mere fact that counsel may have suffered from some mental illness at the time of [the relevant proceedings] has never been recognized by the Supreme Court as grounds to automatically presume prejudice.” (See, e.g.

2023(See People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798 , 813 [“By allowing new evidence and providing for an evidentiary hearing, the Legislature plainly intended that the issues concerning whether the defendant was guilty under theories of murder not previously or necessarily decided would be resolved anew, through a factfinding process affording a degree of due process to the petitioner.”], italics added; Former § 1170.95, subd. (d)(3) [“At the hearing to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief, the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, tha

2023(See People v. Kendrick (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 769, 778-780 .) Therefore, 7 we elect to exercise our discretion to consider Adams’s claim notwithstanding any possible forfeiture.

2022Generally, “[a] party in a criminal case may not, on appeal, raise ‘claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices’ if the party did not object to the sentence at trial.” (People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 751 .) “In determining whether the significance of a change in the law excuses counsel’s failure to object at trial, we consider the ‘state of the law as it would have appeared to competent and knowledgeable counsel at the time of the trial.’ ” (People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 811 .) At the time of defendant’s 202

2022In People v. Morrison (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 217 , a panel of Division Five of the First Appellate District concluded trial courts have “discretion to impose an enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (b) or (c) as a middle ground to a lifetime enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), if such an outcome [is] found to be in the interests of justice under section 1385.” (Id. at p. 223.) In People v. Tirado (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 637 , reversed with directions, Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th 688 , a panel of the Fifth Appellate District concluded section 12022.53(h) does not grant tr

2022In People v. Morrison (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 217 , a panel of Division Five of the First Appellate District concluded trial courts have “discretion to impose an enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (b) or (c) as a middle ground to a lifetime enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), if such an outcome [is] found to be in the interests of justice under section 1385.” (Id. at p. 223.) In People v. Tirado (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 637 , reversed with directions, Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th 688 , a panel of the Fifth Appellate District concluded section 12022.53(h) does not grant tr

2022Generally, “[a] party in a criminal case may not, on appeal, raise ‘claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices’ if the party did not object to the sentence at trial.” (People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 751 .) “In determining whether the significance of a change in the law excuses counsel’s failure to object at trial, we consider the ‘state of the law as it would have appeared to competent and knowledgeable counsel at the time of the trial.’ ” (People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 811 .) At the time of defendant’s 202

2021(Cf. People v. Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485, 489 .) To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, “the defendant must first show counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.

2020(See Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 699 .) Consequently, the trial court had the power to exercise its discretion to strike or dismiss the serious felony enhancement, despite our limited remand.

2020He claimed that his 2008 judgment was not final because his sentence had been recalled under section 1170, subdivision (d), for the court to resentence him in light of Gonzalez, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th 1325 .

2020He claimed that his 2008 judgment was not final because his sentence had been recalled under section 1170, subdivision (d), for the court to resentence him in light of Gonzalez, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th 1325 .

2016“A trial court abuses its discretion when the factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the evidence. . . . ‘[I]t would seem obvious that, if there were no evidence to support the decision, there would be an abuse of discretion.’ ” (People v. Cluff, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 998 ; People v. Esparza, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 745 .) There was scant evidence in the record demonstrating Guzman was, at the time of the resentencing hearing, a current, active gang member.

2016“A trial court abuses its discretion when the factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the evidence. . . . ‘[I]t would seem obvious that, if there were no evidence to support the decision, there would be an abuse of discretion.’ ” (People v. Cluff, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 998 ; People v. Esparza, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 745 .) There was scant evidence in the record demonstrating Guzman was, at the time of the resentencing hearing, a current, active gang member.