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10 California opinions name it 2 courts 1942–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Olivera v. Gracegreen2 sentences1999As our Supreme Court explained in Olivera v. Grace (1942) 19 Cal.2d 570, 575 , 122 P.2d 564 : "`[W]here the legal judgment was obtained... through fraud, mistake, or accident, or where the defendant in the action, having a valid legal defense on the merits, was prevented in any manner from maintaining it by fraud, mistake, or accident, and there had been no negligence, laches, or other fault on his part, ... then a court of equity will interfere at his suit, and restrain proceedings on the judgment which cannot be conscientiously enforced.... 1999As our Supreme Court explained in Olivera v. Grace (1942) 19 Cal.2d 570, 575 , 122 P.2d 564 : "`[W]here the legal judgment was obtained... through fraud, mistake, or accident, or where the defendant in the action, having a valid legal defense on the merits, was prevented in any manner from maintaining it by fraud, mistake, or accident, and there had been no negligence, laches, or other fault on his part, ... then a court of equity will interfere at his suit, and restrain proceedings on the judgment which cannot be conscientiously enforced.... | 4 | 7 |
United States v. Throckmortongreen2 sentences1999The ground for the exercise of this jurisdiction is that there has been no fair adversary trial at law.' [Citation.]" However, the only type of fraud that can be the basis of Vacating a final judgment is extrinsic fraud. ( In re Marriage of Stevenot (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1068 , 202 Cal. Rptr. 116 .) As explained by our Supreme Court: "Extrinsic fraud usually arises when a party is denied a fair adversary hearing because he has been `deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.' [Citation.] `W 1999The ground for the exercise of this jurisdiction is that there has been no fair adversary trial at law.' [Citation.]" However, the only type of fraud that can be the basis of Vacating a final judgment is extrinsic fraud. ( In re Marriage of Stevenot (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1068 , 202 Cal. Rptr. 116 .) As explained by our Supreme Court: "Extrinsic fraud usually arises when a party is denied a fair adversary hearing because he has been `deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.' [Citation.] `W | 1 | 2 |
In Re Marriage of Stevenotgreen2 sentences1999The ground for the exercise of this jurisdiction is that there has been no fair adversary trial at law.' [Citation.]" However, the only type of fraud that can be the basis of Vacating a final judgment is extrinsic fraud. ( In re Marriage of Stevenot (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1068 , 202 Cal. Rptr. 116 .) As explained by our Supreme Court: "Extrinsic fraud usually arises when a party is denied a fair adversary hearing because he has been `deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.' [Citation.] `W 1999The ground for the exercise of this jurisdiction is that there has been no fair adversary trial at law.' [Citation.]" However, the only type of fraud that can be the basis of Vacating a final judgment is extrinsic fraud. ( In re Marriage of Stevenot (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1068 , 202 Cal. Rptr. 116 .) As explained by our Supreme Court: "Extrinsic fraud usually arises when a party is denied a fair adversary hearing because he has been `deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.' [Citation.] `W | 1 | 2 |
City and County of San Francisco v. Cartagenagreen2 sentences1999The ground for the exercise of this jurisdiction is that there has been no fair adversary trial at law.' [Citation.]" However, the only type of fraud that can be the basis of Vacating a final judgment is extrinsic fraud. ( In re Marriage of Stevenot (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1068 , 202 Cal. Rptr. 116 .) As explained by our Supreme Court: "Extrinsic fraud usually arises when a party is denied a fair adversary hearing because he has been `deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.' [Citation.] `W 1999The ground for the exercise of this jurisdiction is that there has been no fair adversary trial at law.' [Citation.]" However, the only type of fraud that can be the basis of Vacating a final judgment is extrinsic fraud. ( In re Marriage of Stevenot (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1068 , 202 Cal. Rptr. 116 .) As explained by our Supreme Court: "Extrinsic fraud usually arises when a party is denied a fair adversary hearing because he has been `deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.' [Citation.] `W | 1 | 2 |
California Teachers Ass'n v. Governing Board of Rialto Unified School Districtgreen2 sentences2011By the same token, section 1255.230 reasonably provides a more limited consequence for an owner that fails to object to a lender’s withdrawal application despite notice: the loss of any “claim against the plaintiff for compensation to the extent of the amount withdrawn . . . .” (§ 1255.230, subd. (c).) Although MTA has identified competing policy concerns that may support a different .rule, our role as a court is not to “ ‘sit in judgment of the Legislature’s wisdom in balancing such competing public policies. [Citation.]’ ” (Sunset Sky *1114 Ranch Pilots Assn. v. County of Sacramento (2009) 4 2011By the same token, section 1255.230 reasonably provides a more limited consequence for an owner that fails to object to a lender’s withdrawal application despite notice: the loss of any “claim against the plaintiff for compensation to the extent of the amount withdrawn . . . .” (§ 1255.230, subd. (c).) Although MTA has identified competing policy concerns that may support a different .rule, our role as a court is not to “ ‘sit in judgment of the Legislature’s wisdom in balancing such competing public policies. [Citation.]’ ” (Sunset Sky *1114 Ranch Pilots Assn. v. County of Sacramento (2009) 4 | 1 | 1 |
Sunset Sky Ranch Pilots Assn. v. County of Sacramentogreen2 sentences2011By the same token, section 1255.230 reasonably provides a more limited consequence for an owner that fails to object to a lender’s withdrawal application despite notice: the loss of any “claim against the plaintiff for compensation to the extent of the amount withdrawn . . . .” (§ 1255.230, subd. (c).) Although MTA has identified competing policy concerns that may support a different .rule, our role as a court is not to “ ‘sit in judgment of the Legislature’s wisdom in balancing such competing public policies. [Citation.]’ ” (Sunset Sky *1114 Ranch Pilots Assn. v. County of Sacramento (2009) 4 2011By the same token, section 1255.230 reasonably provides a more limited consequence for an owner that fails to object to a lender’s withdrawal application despite notice: the loss of any “claim against the plaintiff for compensation to the extent of the amount withdrawn . . . .” (§ 1255.230, subd. (c).) Although MTA has identified competing policy concerns that may support a different .rule, our role as a court is not to “ ‘sit in judgment of the Legislature’s wisdom in balancing such competing public policies. [Citation.]’ ” (Sunset Sky *1114 Ranch Pilots Assn. v. County of Sacramento (2009) 4 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sullivangreen2 sentences1996(People v. Sullivan (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1446, 1452 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 284 ].) Although the instruction may be flawed in some respects, it was a reasonable attempt to articulate a valid legal principle supported by the evidence. 1996(People v. Sullivan (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1446, 1452 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 284 ].) Although the instruction may be flawed in some respects, it was a reasonable attempt to articulate a valid legal principle supported by the evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Otani v. Kislinggreen2 sentences1968The ground for the exercise of this jurisdiction is that there has been no fair adversary trial at law. ’ ’ ’ The principle that an attorney’s neglect is usually not grounds for equitable relief from a judgment applies rigidly to a matter heard on the merits (Otani v. Kisling, 219 Cal.App.2d 438, 442 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 239 ]). 1968The ground for the exercise of this jurisdiction is that there has been no fair adversary trial at law. ’ ’ ’ The principle that an attorney’s neglect is usually not grounds for equitable relief from a judgment applies rigidly to a matter heard on the merits (Otani v. Kisling, 219 Cal.App.2d 438, 442 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 239 ]). | 1 | 1 |
Evry v. Tremblegreen2 sentences1962Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570 [ 122 P.2d 564 , 140 A.L.R. 1328 ] : “One who has been prevented by extrinsic factors from presenting his case to the court may bring an independent action in equity to secure relief from the judgment entered against him. [Citation.] Where the court that has rendered the judgment possesses a general jurisdiction in law and in equity, the jurisdiction or equity may be invoked by means of a motion addressed to that court.” (Pp. 575-576.) At page 575, the opinion states that “ ‘where the legal judgment was obtained or entered through fraud, mistake or accident, or 1962Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570 [ 122 P.2d 564 , 140 A.L.R. 1328 ] : “One who has been prevented by extrinsic factors from presenting his case to the court may bring an independent action in equity to secure relief from the judgment entered against him. [Citation.] Where the court that has rendered the judgment possesses a general jurisdiction in law and in equity, the jurisdiction or equity may be invoked by means of a motion addressed to that court.” (Pp. 575-576.) At page 575, the opinion states that “ ‘where the legal judgment was obtained or entered through fraud, mistake or accident, or | 1 | 1 |
Champion v. Woodsgreen1 sentence1962Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570 [ 122 P.2d 564 , 140 A.L.R. 1328 ] : “One who has been prevented by extrinsic factors from presenting his case to the court may bring an independent action in equity to secure relief from the judgment entered against him. [Citation.] Where the court that has rendered the judgment possesses a general jurisdiction in law and in equity, the jurisdiction or equity may be invoked by means of a motion addressed to that court.” (Pp. 575-576.) At page 575, the opinion states that “ ‘where the legal judgment was obtained or entered through fraud, mistake or accident, or | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kulchar v. Kulchar
green
2 sentences1999The ground for the exercise of this jurisdiction is that there has been no fair adversary trial at law.' [Citation.]" However, the only type of fraud that can be the basis of Vacating a final judgment is extrinsic fraud. ( In re Marriage of Stevenot (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1068 , 202 Cal. Rptr. 116 .) As explained by our Supreme Court: "Extrinsic fraud usually arises when a party is denied a fair adversary hearing because he has been `deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.' [Citation.] `W 1999The ground for the exercise of this jurisdiction is that there has been no fair adversary trial at law.' [Citation.]" However, the only type of fraud that can be the basis of Vacating a final judgment is extrinsic fraud. ( In re Marriage of Stevenot (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1068 , 202 Cal. Rptr. 116 .) As explained by our Supreme Court: "Extrinsic fraud usually arises when a party is denied a fair adversary hearing because he has been `deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.' [Citation.] `W | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Bacon v. Bacon
green
2 sentences1962Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570 [ 122 P.2d 564 , 140 A.L.R. 1328 ] : “One who has been prevented by extrinsic factors from presenting his case to the court may bring an independent action in equity to secure relief from the judgment entered against him. [Citation.] Where the court that has rendered the judgment possesses a general jurisdiction in law and in equity, the jurisdiction or equity may be invoked by means of a motion addressed to that court.” (Pp. 575-576.) At page 575, the opinion states that “ ‘where the legal judgment was obtained or entered through fraud, mistake or accident, or 1942(A nglo California Trust Co. v. Kelley, 117 Cal.App. 692 [ 4 P.2d 604 ]; Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323 [ 67 P. 282 , 87 Am.St.Rep. 98 ]; Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [ 89 P. 317 ] ; Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank, 192 Cal. 651 [ 221 P. 368 ] ; Clavey v. Loney, 80 Cal.App. 20 [ 251 P. 232 ] ; Jeffords v. Young, 98 Cal.App. 400 [ 277 P. 163 ].) In the recent ease of Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575 [ 122 P.2d 564 ], the Supreme Court stated the rule as follows, quoting from 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (Equitable Remedies [2d ed.]), pages 4671, 4672: “. . . where the legal judgment | 2 | 1942–1962 |
Caldwell v. Taylor
green
2 sentences1942The ground for the exercise of this jurisdiction is.that there has been no fair adversary trial at law.” (5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (Equitable Remedies [2d ed.]), pp. 4671, 4672.) Typical of the situations in which equity has interfered with final judgments are the cases where the lack of a fair adversary hearing in the original action is attributable to matters outside the issues adjudicated therein which prevented one party from presenting his case to the court, as for example, where there is extrinsic fraud (Caldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471 [ 23 Pac. (2d) 758 , 88 A. L. 1942The ground for the exercise of this jurisdiction is.that there has been no fair adversary trial at law.” (5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (Equitable Remedies [2d ed.]), pp. 4671, 4672.) Typical of the situations in which equity has interfered with final judgments are the cases where the lack of a fair adversary hearing in the original action is attributable to matters outside the issues adjudicated therein which prevented one party from presenting his case to the court, as for example, where there is extrinsic fraud (Caldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471 [ 23 Pac. (2d) 758 , 88 A. L. | 2 | 1942–1942 |
Hernández v. Foote
neutral
1 sentence1962Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570 [ 122 P.2d 564 , 140 A.L.R. 1328 ] : “One who has been prevented by extrinsic factors from presenting his case to the court may bring an independent action in equity to secure relief from the judgment entered against him. [Citation.] Where the court that has rendered the judgment possesses a general jurisdiction in law and in equity, the jurisdiction or equity may be invoked by means of a motion addressed to that court.” (Pp. 575-576.) At page 575, the opinion states that “ ‘where the legal judgment was obtained or entered through fraud, mistake or accident, or | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Sohler v. Sohler
green
2 sentences1942(A nglo California Trust Co. v. Kelley, 117 Cal.App. 692 [ 4 P.2d 604 ]; Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323 [ 67 P. 282 , 87 Am.St.Rep. 98 ]; Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [ 89 P. 317 ] ; Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank, 192 Cal. 651 [ 221 P. 368 ] ; Clavey v. Loney, 80 Cal.App. 20 [ 251 P. 232 ] ; Jeffords v. Young, 98 Cal.App. 400 [ 277 P. 163 ].) In the recent ease of Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575 [ 122 P.2d 564 ], the Supreme Court stated the rule as follows, quoting from 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (Equitable Remedies [2d ed.]), pages 4671, 4672: “. . . where the legal judgment 1942(A nglo California Trust Co. v. Kelley, 117 Cal.App. 692 [ 4 P.2d 604 ]; Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323 [ 67 P. 282 , 87 Am.St.Rep. 98 ]; Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [ 89 P. 317 ] ; Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank, 192 Cal. 651 [ 221 P. 368 ] ; Clavey v. Loney, 80 Cal.App. 20 [ 251 P. 232 ] ; Jeffords v. Young, 98 Cal.App. 400 [ 277 P. 163 ].) In the recent ease of Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575 [ 122 P.2d 564 ], the Supreme Court stated the rule as follows, quoting from 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (Equitable Remedies [2d ed.]), pages 4671, 4672: “. . . where the legal judgment | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Campbell-Kawannanakoa v. Campbell
green
2 sentences1942The ground for the exercise of this jurisdiction is that there has been no fair adversary trial at law. ’ ’ Süeh an action is a direct attack on the judgment (Hammell v. Britton, 19 Cal.2d 72 [ 119 P.2d 333 ]; Campbell-Kawannanakoa v. Campbell, 152 Cal. 201 [ 92 P. 184 ] ; Goldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471 [ 23 P.2d 758 , 88 A.L.R. 1194 ]; Walsh v. Majors, 4 Cal.2d 384 [ 49 P.2d 598 ]), and the fact that the complainant applied for and was denied relief under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not a bar to equitable relief. 1942The ground for the exercise of this jurisdiction is that there has been no fair adversary trial at law. ’ ’ Süeh an action is a direct attack on the judgment (Hammell v. Britton, 19 Cal.2d 72 [ 119 P.2d 333 ]; Campbell-Kawannanakoa v. Campbell, 152 Cal. 201 [ 92 P. 184 ] ; Goldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471 [ 23 P.2d 758 , 88 A.L.R. 1194 ]; Walsh v. Majors, 4 Cal.2d 384 [ 49 P.2d 598 ]), and the fact that the complainant applied for and was denied relief under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not a bar to equitable relief. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Hammell v. Britton
green
2 sentences1942The ground for the exercise of this jurisdiction is that there has been no fair adversary trial at law. ’ ’ Süeh an action is a direct attack on the judgment (Hammell v. Britton, 19 Cal.2d 72 [ 119 P.2d 333 ]; Campbell-Kawannanakoa v. Campbell, 152 Cal. 201 [ 92 P. 184 ] ; Goldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471 [ 23 P.2d 758 , 88 A.L.R. 1194 ]; Walsh v. Majors, 4 Cal.2d 384 [ 49 P.2d 598 ]), and the fact that the complainant applied for and was denied relief under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not a bar to equitable relief. 1942The ground for the exercise of this jurisdiction is that there has been no fair adversary trial at law. ’ ’ Süeh an action is a direct attack on the judgment (Hammell v. Britton, 19 Cal.2d 72 [ 119 P.2d 333 ]; Campbell-Kawannanakoa v. Campbell, 152 Cal. 201 [ 92 P. 184 ] ; Goldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471 [ 23 P.2d 758 , 88 A.L.R. 1194 ]; Walsh v. Majors, 4 Cal.2d 384 [ 49 P.2d 598 ]), and the fact that the complainant applied for and was denied relief under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not a bar to equitable relief. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Walsh v. Majors
green
2 sentences1942The ground for the exercise of this jurisdiction is that there has been no fair adversary trial at law. ’ ’ Süeh an action is a direct attack on the judgment (Hammell v. Britton, 19 Cal.2d 72 [ 119 P.2d 333 ]; Campbell-Kawannanakoa v. Campbell, 152 Cal. 201 [ 92 P. 184 ] ; Goldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471 [ 23 P.2d 758 , 88 A.L.R. 1194 ]; Walsh v. Majors, 4 Cal.2d 384 [ 49 P.2d 598 ]), and the fact that the complainant applied for and was denied relief under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not a bar to equitable relief. 1942The ground for the exercise of this jurisdiction is that there has been no fair adversary trial at law. ’ ’ Süeh an action is a direct attack on the judgment (Hammell v. Britton, 19 Cal.2d 72 [ 119 P.2d 333 ]; Campbell-Kawannanakoa v. Campbell, 152 Cal. 201 [ 92 P. 184 ] ; Goldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471 [ 23 P.2d 758 , 88 A.L.R. 1194 ]; Walsh v. Majors, 4 Cal.2d 384 [ 49 P.2d 598 ]), and the fact that the complainant applied for and was denied relief under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not a bar to equitable relief. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Jeffords v. Young
green
2 sentences1942(A nglo California Trust Co. v. Kelley, 117 Cal.App. 692 [ 4 P.2d 604 ]; Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323 [ 67 P. 282 , 87 Am.St.Rep. 98 ]; Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [ 89 P. 317 ] ; Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank, 192 Cal. 651 [ 221 P. 368 ] ; Clavey v. Loney, 80 Cal.App. 20 [ 251 P. 232 ] ; Jeffords v. Young, 98 Cal.App. 400 [ 277 P. 163 ].) In the recent ease of Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575 [ 122 P.2d 564 ], the Supreme Court stated the rule as follows, quoting from 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (Equitable Remedies [2d ed.]), pages 4671, 4672: “. . . where the legal judgment 1942(A nglo California Trust Co. v. Kelley, 117 Cal.App. 692 [ 4 P.2d 604 ]; Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323 [ 67 P. 282 , 87 Am.St.Rep. 98 ]; Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [ 89 P. 317 ] ; Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank, 192 Cal. 651 [ 221 P. 368 ] ; Clavey v. Loney, 80 Cal.App. 20 [ 251 P. 232 ] ; Jeffords v. Young, 98 Cal.App. 400 [ 277 P. 163 ].) In the recent ease of Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575 [ 122 P.2d 564 ], the Supreme Court stated the rule as follows, quoting from 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (Equitable Remedies [2d ed.]), pages 4671, 4672: “. . . where the legal judgment | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Anglo California Trust Co. v. Kelley
green
2 sentences1942(A nglo California Trust Co. v. Kelley, 117 Cal.App. 692 [ 4 P.2d 604 ]; Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323 [ 67 P. 282 , 87 Am.St.Rep. 98 ]; Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [ 89 P. 317 ] ; Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank, 192 Cal. 651 [ 221 P. 368 ] ; Clavey v. Loney, 80 Cal.App. 20 [ 251 P. 232 ] ; Jeffords v. Young, 98 Cal.App. 400 [ 277 P. 163 ].) In the recent ease of Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575 [ 122 P.2d 564 ], the Supreme Court stated the rule as follows, quoting from 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (Equitable Remedies [2d ed.]), pages 4671, 4672: “. . . where the legal judgment 1942(A nglo California Trust Co. v. Kelley, 117 Cal.App. 692 [ 4 P.2d 604 ]; Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323 [ 67 P. 282 , 87 Am.St.Rep. 98 ]; Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [ 89 P. 317 ] ; Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank, 192 Cal. 651 [ 221 P. 368 ] ; Clavey v. Loney, 80 Cal.App. 20 [ 251 P. 232 ] ; Jeffords v. Young, 98 Cal.App. 400 [ 277 P. 163 ].) In the recent ease of Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575 [ 122 P.2d 564 ], the Supreme Court stated the rule as follows, quoting from 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (Equitable Remedies [2d ed.]), pages 4671, 4672: “. . . where the legal judgment | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Clavey v. Loney
green
2 sentences1942(A nglo California Trust Co. v. Kelley, 117 Cal.App. 692 [ 4 P.2d 604 ]; Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323 [ 67 P. 282 , 87 Am.St.Rep. 98 ]; Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [ 89 P. 317 ] ; Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank, 192 Cal. 651 [ 221 P. 368 ] ; Clavey v. Loney, 80 Cal.App. 20 [ 251 P. 232 ] ; Jeffords v. Young, 98 Cal.App. 400 [ 277 P. 163 ].) In the recent ease of Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575 [ 122 P.2d 564 ], the Supreme Court stated the rule as follows, quoting from 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (Equitable Remedies [2d ed.]), pages 4671, 4672: “. . . where the legal judgment 1942(A nglo California Trust Co. v. Kelley, 117 Cal.App. 692 [ 4 P.2d 604 ]; Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323 [ 67 P. 282 , 87 Am.St.Rep. 98 ]; Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [ 89 P. 317 ] ; Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank, 192 Cal. 651 [ 221 P. 368 ] ; Clavey v. Loney, 80 Cal.App. 20 [ 251 P. 232 ] ; Jeffords v. Young, 98 Cal.App. 400 [ 277 P. 163 ].) In the recent ease of Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575 [ 122 P.2d 564 ], the Supreme Court stated the rule as follows, quoting from 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (Equitable Remedies [2d ed.]), pages 4671, 4672: “. . . where the legal judgment | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Simonton v. Los Angeles Trust & Savings Bank
green
2 sentences1942(A nglo California Trust Co. v. Kelley, 117 Cal.App. 692 [ 4 P.2d 604 ]; Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323 [ 67 P. 282 , 87 Am.St.Rep. 98 ]; Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [ 89 P. 317 ] ; Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank, 192 Cal. 651 [ 221 P. 368 ] ; Clavey v. Loney, 80 Cal.App. 20 [ 251 P. 232 ] ; Jeffords v. Young, 98 Cal.App. 400 [ 277 P. 163 ].) In the recent ease of Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575 [ 122 P.2d 564 ], the Supreme Court stated the rule as follows, quoting from 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (Equitable Remedies [2d ed.]), pages 4671, 4672: “. . . where the legal judgment 1942(A nglo California Trust Co. v. Kelley, 117 Cal.App. 692 [ 4 P.2d 604 ]; Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323 [ 67 P. 282 , 87 Am.St.Rep. 98 ]; Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [ 89 P. 317 ] ; Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank, 192 Cal. 651 [ 221 P. 368 ] ; Clavey v. Loney, 80 Cal.App. 20 [ 251 P. 232 ] ; Jeffords v. Young, 98 Cal.App. 400 [ 277 P. 163 ].) In the recent ease of Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575 [ 122 P.2d 564 ], the Supreme Court stated the rule as follows, quoting from 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (Equitable Remedies [2d ed.]), pages 4671, 4672: “. . . where the legal judgment | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.