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10 California opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2025“When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical reasons rather than sheer neglect.” (Yarborough v. Gentry (2003) 540 U.S. 1, 8 [ 124 S.Ct. 1 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1 ]; see People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 498 [“Recognizing the importance of maintaining credibility before the jury, we have repeatedly rejected claims that counsel was ineffective in conceding various degrees of guilt.”]; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1150 [“It is within the permissible range of tactics for defense counsel to candidly recognize the 1997First, contrasting defendant’s insistence that “he didn’t do it” (i.e., the Cakewalk shooting), counsel mentioned, in passing, that “Barry Williams admitted the two murders [i.e., the Billingsley and Dunn murders] . . . .” As discussed, defendant’s actual admissions were to convictions, not, in so many words, to actual “guilt.” Nevertheless, “[i]t is within the permissible range of tactics for defense counsel to candidly recognize the weaknesses in the defense in the closing argument." (People v. Jones, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1150.) We cannot conclude defendant, with any reasonable probability | 3 | 3 |
Yarborough v. Gentrygreen2 sentences2025“When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical reasons rather than sheer neglect.” (Yarborough v. Gentry (2003) 540 U.S. 1, 8 [ 124 S.Ct. 1 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1 ]; see People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 498 [“Recognizing the importance of maintaining credibility before the jury, we have repeatedly rejected claims that counsel was ineffective in conceding various degrees of guilt.”]; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1150 [“It is within the permissible range of tactics for defense counsel to candidly recognize the 2025“When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical reasons rather than sheer neglect.” (Yarborough v. Gentry (2003) 540 U.S. 1, 8 [ 124 S.Ct. 1 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1 ]; see People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 498 [“Recognizing the importance of maintaining credibility before the jury, we have repeatedly rejected claims that counsel was ineffective in conceding various degrees of guilt.”]; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1150 [“It is within the permissible range of tactics for defense counsel to candidly recognize the | 1 | 1 |
People v. Freemangreen1 sentence2025“When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical reasons rather than sheer neglect.” (Yarborough v. Gentry (2003) 540 U.S. 1, 8 [ 124 S.Ct. 1 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1 ]; see People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 498 [“Recognizing the importance of maintaining credibility before the jury, we have repeatedly rejected claims that counsel was ineffective in conceding various degrees of guilt.”]; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1150 [“It is within the permissible range of tactics for defense counsel to candidly recognize the | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2021(See Williams, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1189 [rejecting claim of prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor’s “comments did not cast aspersions on defense counsel or imply that he was dishonest,” but rather focused on the weaknesses in the defense]; People v. Charles (2015) 61 Cal.4th 308, 328-329 [rejecting claim of prosecutorial 41 misconduct where comments were “aimed solely at the persuasive force of defense counsel’s closing argument, and not at counsel personally”].) 18 3. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Charlesgreen1 sentence2021(See Williams, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1189 [rejecting claim of prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor’s “comments did not cast aspersions on defense counsel or imply that he was dishonest,” but rather focused on the weaknesses in the defense]; People v. Charles (2015) 61 Cal.4th 308, 328-329 [rejecting claim of prosecutorial 41 misconduct where comments were “aimed solely at the persuasive force of defense counsel’s closing argument, and not at counsel personally”].) 18 3. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jacksongreen2 sentences1991It is within the permissible range of tactics for defense counsel to candidly recognize the weaknesses in the defense in closing argument. ( People v. Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 988, 998 [ 244 Cal. Rptr. 905 , 750 P.2d 794 ]; People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 292-293 [ 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 ].) Defendant has not demonstrated that counsel's representation was inadequate in this regard. 1991(People v. Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 988, 998 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 905 , 750 P.2d 794 ]; People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 292-293 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 ].) Defendant has not demonstrated that counsel’s representation was inadequate in this regard. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wadegreen2 sentences1991It is within the permissible range of tactics for defense counsel to candidly recognize the weaknesses in the defense in closing argument. ( People v. Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 988, 998 [ 244 Cal. Rptr. 905 , 750 P.2d 794 ]; People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 292-293 [ 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 ].) Defendant has not demonstrated that counsel's representation was inadequate in this regard. 1991It is within the permissible range of tactics for defense counsel to candidly recognize the weaknesses in the defense in closing argument. ( People v. Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 988, 998 [ 244 Cal. Rptr. 905 , 750 P.2d 794 ]; People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 292-293 [ 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 ].) Defendant has not demonstrated that counsel's representation was inadequate in this regard. | 1 | 1 |
Ritter v. Salsberygreen2 sentences1967Code, § 140; Ritter v. Salsbery, 142 Cal.App.2d Supp. 847, 854 [ 298 P.2d 166 ] (on denial of rehearing); Mills v. Vista Pools, Inc., 184 Cal.App.2d 668, 672 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 545 ]; Haynes v. Hunt, 208 Cal.App.2d 331, 335 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 174 ] ; People v. Kinder, 122 Cal.App.2d 457, 463-464 [ 265 P.2d 24 ].) Nor did the prosecutor transgress beyond the limits of permissible advocacy when he put the weaknesses of the defense in interrogative form. 1967Code, § 140; Ritter v. Salsbery, 142 Cal.App.2d Supp. 847, 854 [ 298 P.2d 166 ] (on denial of rehearing); Mills v. Vista Pools, Inc., 184 Cal.App.2d 668, 672 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 545 ]; Haynes v. Hunt, 208 Cal.App.2d 331, 335 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 174 ] ; People v. Kinder, 122 Cal.App.2d 457, 463-464 [ 265 P.2d 24 ].) Nor did the prosecutor transgress beyond the limits of permissible advocacy when he put the weaknesses of the defense in interrogative form. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kindergreen2 sentences1967Code, § 140; Ritter v. Salsbery, 142 Cal.App.2d Supp. 847, 854 [ 298 P.2d 166 ] (on denial of rehearing); Mills v. Vista Pools, Inc., 184 Cal.App.2d 668, 672 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 545 ]; Haynes v. Hunt, 208 Cal.App.2d 331, 335 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 174 ] ; People v. Kinder, 122 Cal.App.2d 457, 463-464 [ 265 P.2d 24 ].) Nor did the prosecutor transgress beyond the limits of permissible advocacy when he put the weaknesses of the defense in interrogative form. 1967Code, § 140; Ritter v. Salsbery, 142 Cal.App.2d Supp. 847, 854 [ 298 P.2d 166 ] (on denial of rehearing); Mills v. Vista Pools, Inc., 184 Cal.App.2d 668, 672 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 545 ]; Haynes v. Hunt, 208 Cal.App.2d 331, 335 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 174 ] ; People v. Kinder, 122 Cal.App.2d 457, 463-464 [ 265 P.2d 24 ].) Nor did the prosecutor transgress beyond the limits of permissible advocacy when he put the weaknesses of the defense in interrogative form. | 1 | 1 |
Mills v. Vista Pools, Inc.green2 sentences1967Code, § 140; Ritter v. Salsbery, 142 Cal.App.2d Supp. 847, 854 [ 298 P.2d 166 ] (on denial of rehearing); Mills v. Vista Pools, Inc., 184 Cal.App.2d 668, 672 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 545 ]; Haynes v. Hunt, 208 Cal.App.2d 331, 335 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 174 ] ; People v. Kinder, 122 Cal.App.2d 457, 463-464 [ 265 P.2d 24 ].) Nor did the prosecutor transgress beyond the limits of permissible advocacy when he put the weaknesses of the defense in interrogative form. 1967Code, § 140; Ritter v. Salsbery, 142 Cal.App.2d Supp. 847, 854 [ 298 P.2d 166 ] (on denial of rehearing); Mills v. Vista Pools, Inc., 184 Cal.App.2d 668, 672 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 545 ]; Haynes v. Hunt, 208 Cal.App.2d 331, 335 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 174 ] ; People v. Kinder, 122 Cal.App.2d 457, 463-464 [ 265 P.2d 24 ].) Nor did the prosecutor transgress beyond the limits of permissible advocacy when he put the weaknesses of the defense in interrogative form. | 1 | 1 |
Haynes v. Huntgreen2 sentences1967Code, § 140; Ritter v. Salsbery, 142 Cal.App.2d Supp. 847, 854 [ 298 P.2d 166 ] (on denial of rehearing); Mills v. Vista Pools, Inc., 184 Cal.App.2d 668, 672 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 545 ]; Haynes v. Hunt, 208 Cal.App.2d 331, 335 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 174 ] ; People v. Kinder, 122 Cal.App.2d 457, 463-464 [ 265 P.2d 24 ].) Nor did the prosecutor transgress beyond the limits of permissible advocacy when he put the weaknesses of the defense in interrogative form. 1967Code, § 140; Ritter v. Salsbery, 142 Cal.App.2d Supp. 847, 854 [ 298 P.2d 166 ] (on denial of rehearing); Mills v. Vista Pools, Inc., 184 Cal.App.2d 668, 672 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 545 ]; Haynes v. Hunt, 208 Cal.App.2d 331, 335 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 174 ] ; People v. Kinder, 122 Cal.App.2d 457, 463-464 [ 265 P.2d 24 ].) Nor did the prosecutor transgress beyond the limits of permissible advocacy when he put the weaknesses of the defense in interrogative form. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Wharton
green
2 sentences2015A prosecutor is given wide latitude to comment on the evidence, “‘which can include reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom. [Citations.] It is also clear that counsel during summation may state matters not in evidence, but which are common knowledge or are illustrations drawn from common experience, history or literature.’” (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 567 .) “‘[T]he protective shield of the Fifth Amendment should [not] be converted into a sword that cuts back on the area of legitimate comment by the prosecutor on the weaknesses in the defense case.’” (United St 2015A prosecutor is given wide latitude to comment on the evidence, “‘which can include reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom. [Citations.] It is also clear that counsel during summation may state matters not in evidence, but which are common knowledge or are illustrations drawn from common experience, history or literature.’” (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 567 .) “‘[T]he protective shield of the Fifth Amendment should [not] be converted into a sword that cuts back on the area of legitimate comment by the prosecutor on the weaknesses in the defense case.’” (United St | 2 | 2015–2015 |
United States v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2015A prosecutor is given wide latitude to comment on the evidence, “‘which can include reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom. [Citations.] It is also clear that counsel during summation may state matters not in evidence, but which are common knowledge or are illustrations drawn from common experience, history or literature.’” (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 567 .) “‘[T]he protective shield of the Fifth Amendment should [not] be converted into a sword that cuts back on the area of legitimate comment by the prosecutor on the weaknesses in the defense case.’” (United St 2015A prosecutor is given wide latitude to comment on the evidence, “‘which can include reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom. [Citations.] It is also clear that counsel during summation may state matters not in evidence, but which are common knowledge or are illustrations drawn from common experience, history or literature.’” (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 567 .) “‘[T]he protective shield of the Fifth Amendment should [not] be converted into a sword that cuts back on the area of legitimate comment by the prosecutor on the weaknesses in the defense case.’” (United St | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2021Plaintiff also cites Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 272 (Peat Marwick), a case involving a battle of accountancy experts. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Cabaltero
green
2 sentences1991Appellants' Arguments for a Limitation of the Felony-murder Rule Are Inapplicable While disclaiming any attempt to make another frontal assault upon the validity of the felony-murder rule, and recognizing that People v. Dillon binds us in this respect, appellants nevertheless offer criticism of the weaknesses of the doctrine expounded in the cases cited in the previous section, beginning with People v. Cabaltero, supra, 31 Cal. App.2d 52 , which they contend was a wrongly decided case and the source of much mischief to follow; they suggest the asserted illogical and sometimes inequitable resul 1991Appellants ’ Arguments for a Limitation of the Felony-murder Rule Are Inapplicable While disclaiming any attempt to make another frontal assault upon the validity of the felony-murder rule, and recognizing that People v. Dillon binds us in this respect, appellants nevertheless offer criticism of the weaknesses of the doctrine expounded in the cases cited in the previous section, beginning with People v. Cabaltero, supra, 31 Cal.App.2d 52 , which they contend was a wrongly decided case and the source of much mischief to follow; they suggest the asserted illogical and sometimes inequitable resul | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Braeseke
green
2 sentences1991It is within the permissible range of tactics for defense counsel to candidly recognize the weaknesses in the defense in closing argument. ( People v. Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 988, 998 [ 244 Cal. Rptr. 905 , 750 P.2d 794 ]; People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 292-293 [ 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 ].) Defendant has not demonstrated that counsel's representation was inadequate in this regard. 1991It is within the permissible range of tactics for defense counsel to candidly recognize the weaknesses in the defense in closing argument. ( People v. Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 988, 998 [ 244 Cal. Rptr. 905 , 750 P.2d 794 ]; People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 292-293 [ 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 ].) Defendant has not demonstrated that counsel's representation was inadequate in this regard. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Dillon
green
2 sentences1991The Dillon precept that the felony-murder doctrine condemns as murder all killings perpetrated during a felony, even though the killings need not be probable or conceivably possible and may even be "wholly unforeseeable" ( 34 Cal.3d at p. 477 ), cannot be reconciled with appellants' theory. 1991Initially, we must observe that we are an intermediate appellate court; appellants’ suggestion is one not embraced by our Supreme Court and is in fact inconsistent with its language in People v. Dillon, supra. The Dillon precept that the felony-murder doctrine condemns as murder all killings perpetrated during a felony, even though the killings need not be probable or conceivably possible and may even be “wholly unforeseeable” ( 34 Cal.3d at p. 477 ), cannot be reconciled with appellants’ theory. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.