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10 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1934–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Appelhans v. Kirkwoodgreen2 sentences1973The rule of law in Colorado is clearly set forth in Appelhans v. Kirkwood, 148 Colo. 92 , 365 P.2d 233 , and is as follows: ". . . [T]he question is whether ownership in and of itself is sufficient to justify application of the family car doctrine. 1973The rule of law in Colorado is clearly set forth in Appelhans v. Kirkwood, 148 Colo. 92 , 365 P.2d 233 , and is as follows: ". . . [T]he question is whether ownership in and of itself is sufficient to justify application of the family car doctrine. | 1 | 3 |
Hasegawa v. Daygreen2 sentences2008Hasegawa v. Day, 684 P.2d 936, 938 (Colo.App.1983), overruled, in part on other grounds by Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352 (Colo.1992). 1990Hasegawa v. Day, supra; Boyd v. Close, 82 Colo. 150 , 257 P. 1079 (1927); see CJI-Civ.2d 11:15 (1980). | 1 | 2 |
Casebolt ex rel. Casebolt v. Cowangreen2 sentences2008Hasegawa v. Day, 684 P.2d 936, 938 (Colo.App.1983), overruled, in part on other grounds by Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352 (Colo.1992). 1992See ch. 414, sec. 1, § 42-4-1202(2)(c), 1979 Colo.Sess.Laws 1579. [3] Chariot races are races in which the participants ride in horse-drawn vehicles. [4] No argument has been made that Donald Peterson and Penelope Peterson are not identically situated for the purpose of the summary judgment issue, and we do not consider that possibility in this opinion. [5] As we held in Casebolt, 829 P.2d at 360 , the relevant time for assessing negligent entrustment is the time at which the chattel is supplied to the entrustee. [6] We need not decide today whether to recognize the full scope of this definiti | 1 | 2 |
In Re the Marriage of Hallgreen1 sentence2011See In re Marriage of Hall, 241 P.3d at 542 n. 1; Salazar, 964 P.2d at 507 ; Colby, 928 P.2d at 1301 ; Committee for Better Health Care, 830 P.2d at 888 ; Crown Life Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Herman v. Magnusongreen1 sentence1990See Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 1979). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Boyd v. Close
green
2 sentences1990Hasegawa v. Day, supra; Boyd v. Close, 82 Colo. 150 , 257 P. 1079 (1927); see CJI-Civ.2d 11:15 (1980). 1990Hasegawa v. Day, supra; Boyd v. Close, 82 Colo. 150 , 257 P. 1079 (1927); see CJI-Civ.2d 11:15 (1980). | 4 | 1934–1990 |
Hutchins v. Haffner
green
2 sentences1969The family car doctrine was adopted in Colorado in Hutchins v. Haffner, 63 Colo. 365 , 167 P. 966 , 1918A L.R.A. 1008, where this Court held a husband liable for his wife’s negligent operation of a family automobile, “upon the theory that the wife was the husband’s agent in carrying out one of the purposes for which the car was purchased and owned.” Some years later, we imposed liability on a widow for the negligence of her son. 1952The first case, so far as we are advised, in which the family car doctrine was considered by our court was Hutchins v. Haffner, 63 Colo. 365 , 167 Pac. 966 . | 4 | 1934–1983 |
Boltz v. Bonner
neutral
2 sentences1969With the exception of Boltz v. Bonner, 95 Colo. 350 , 35 P.2d 1015 , where the question whether the defendant was the head of the household was not raised, we have in each other case involving the family car doctrine emphasized that the defendant was also the head of the household. 1969With the exception of Boltz v. Bonner, 95 Colo. 350 , 35 P.2d 1015 , where the question whether the defendant was the head of the household was not raised, we have in each other case involving the family car doctrine emphasized that the defendant was also the head of the household. | 2 | 1952–1969 |
Committee for Better Health Care for All Colorado Citizens v. Meyer
green
1 sentence2011See In re Marriage of Hall, 241 P.3d at 542 n. 1; Salazar, 964 P.2d at 507 ; Colby, 928 P.2d at 1301 ; Committee for Better Health Care, 830 P.2d at 888 ; Crown Life Ins. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Colby Ex Rel. Colby v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence2011See In re Marriage of Hall, 241 P.3d at 542 n. 1; Salazar, 964 P.2d at 507 ; Colby, 928 P.2d at 1301 ; Committee for Better Health Care, 830 P.2d at 888 ; Crown Life Ins. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Salazar
green
1 sentence2011See In re Marriage of Hall, 241 P.3d at 542 n. 1; Salazar, 964 P.2d at 507 ; Colby, 928 P.2d at 1301 ; Committee for Better Health Care, 830 P.2d at 888 ; Crown Life Ins. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Hamm v. Thompson
green
2 sentences1984In Hamm v. Thompson, 143 Colo. 298 , 353 P.2d 73 (1960), the court stated: “[T]he common law rule prohibiting contribution between joint tortfeasors does not apply to a master whose liability for the torts of his servant is based on re-spondeat superior, for even though the liability is joint and the two may be joined in one action, they are not joint' tortfeasors.” In applying the principles of Hamm v. Thompson here, we note that Everett’s liability for McCall’s injury was vicarious, based solely upon the family car doctrine. 1984In Hamm v. Thompson, 143 Colo. 298 , 353 P.2d 73 (1960), the court stated: “[T]he common law rule prohibiting contribution between joint tortfeasors does not apply to a master whose liability for the torts of his servant is based on re-spondeat superior, for even though the liability is joint and the two may be joined in one action, they are not joint' tortfeasors.” In applying the principles of Hamm v. Thompson here, we note that Everett’s liability for McCall’s injury was vicarious, based solely upon the family car doctrine. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
McCall v. Roper
green
2 sentences1984In McCall v. Roper, 32 Colo.App. 352 , 511 P.2d 541 (1973), we reversed and remanded with directions to conduct a new trial on the issue of the applicability of the family car doctrine. 1984In McCall v. Roper, 32 Colo.App. 352 , 511 P.2d 541 (1973), we reversed and remanded with directions to conduct a new trial on the issue of the applicability of the family car doctrine. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Ferguson v. Hurford
green
2 sentences1983Ferguson v. Hurford, 132 Colo. 507 , 290 P.2d 229 (1955); Boyd v. Close, supra; see Colo. J.I. 11:15 (2d ed. 1980). 1983Ferguson v. Hurford, 132 Colo. 507 , 290 P.2d 229 (1955); Boyd v. Close, supra; see Colo. J.I. 11:15 (2d ed. 1980). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Cewe v. Schuminski
neutral
2 sentences1969Cewe v. Schuminski, 182 Minn. 126 , 233 N.W. 805 . 1969Cewe v. Schuminski, 182 Minn. 126 , 233 N.W. 805 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Greenwood v. Kier
green
2 sentences1969In Greenwood v. Kier, 125 Colo. 333 , 243 P.2d 417 , the husband was involved in an accident while he was driving a corporate-owned vehicle. 1969In Greenwood v. Kier, 125 Colo. 333 , 243 P.2d 417 , the husband was involved in an accident while he was driving a corporate-owned vehicle. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.