family car doctrine in Connecticut

2013This court, citing our Supreme Court’s decision in Dibble v. Wolff, supra, 135 Conn. 428 , determined that the family car doctrine was applicable under the circumstances presented because the defendant had granted his son general authority to use the vehicle for his own pleasure and convenience, and, although the son’s friend was not a member of the defendant’s household, the defendant’s son had authorized the friend to use the vehicle, and therefore “[the friend’s] negligence could be considered that of the defendant s son under the family car doctrine.” Chen v. Bernadel, supra, 101 Conn. App

2001There, the court stated: "The basis of the family car doctrine is expressed in Cook v. Nye , supra [ 9 Conn. App. 221 , 225 , 518 A.2d 77 (1986)] and especially in its reference to older cases like Dibble v. Wolf , 135 Conn. 428 , 434 (1949).

2007This court noted, however, that “[a] parent’s retention of title to a car has frequently been sufficient justification for application of the family car doctrine when the doctrine is otherwise applicable, even if the vehicle has been completely paid for by the child in question and the child has beneficial ownership.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 227 .

2001There, the court stated: "The basis of the family car doctrine is expressed in Cook v. Nye , supra [ 9 Conn. App. 221 , 225 , 518 A.2d 77 (1986)] and especially in its reference to older cases like Dibble v. Wolf , 135 Conn. 428 , 434 (1949).

2005Plasky ... as his agent, servant and/or employee under the family car doctrine with full authority to drive said vehicle.” The family car doctrine is a common-law rule providing that, “when a motor-car is maintained by the paterfamilias for the general use and convenience of his family, he is liable for the negligence of a member of the family having general authority to drive it, while the car is being used as a family car . . . .” Stickney v. Epstein, 100 Conn. 170, 178-79 , 123 A. 1 (1923).

2005Plasky ... as his agent, servant and/or employee under the family car doctrine with full authority to drive said vehicle.” The family car doctrine is a common-law rule providing that, “when a motor-car is maintained by the paterfamilias for the general use and convenience of his family, he is liable for the negligence of a member of the family having general authority to drive it, while the car is being used as a family car . . . .” Stickney v. Epstein, 100 Conn. 170, 178-79 , 123 A. 1 (1923).

1986This court, however, has refused to extend the doctrine of parent-child immunity to bar a suit by a child against the employer of the parent whose negligence in the course of his employment caused the child to be injured; Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corporation, 111 Conn. 377, 380 , 150 A. 107 (1930); 2 by a mother against her husband based upon the negligence of their minor son in operating an automobile owned by the husband, whose liability was predicated upon the family car doctrine; Silverman v. Silverman, 145 Conn. 663, 666-68 , 145 A.2d 826 (1958); or by a child for injuries caused

1986This court, however, has refused to extend the doctrine of parent-child immunity to bar a suit by a child against the employer of the parent whose negligence in the course of his employment caused the child to be injured; Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corporation, 111 Conn. 377, 380 , 150 A. 107 (1930); 2 by a mother against her husband based upon the negligence of their minor son in operating an automobile owned by the husband, whose liability was predicated upon the family car doctrine; Silverman v. Silverman, 145 Conn. 663, 666-68 , 145 A.2d 826 (1958); or by a child for injuries caused

2005Stickney’s substantial adoption of Wolf , however, leaves no doubt that Wolf remains an authoritative source of the family car doctrine under the common law. 9 For purposes of the family car doctrine, a “family group is not necessarily confined to those of [the vehicle owner’s] own kindred; it includes all those members of the collective body of persons living in [the owner’s] household for whose convenience the car is actually maintained and who have general authority to use it.” Smart v. Bissonette, 106 Conn. 447, 452 , 138 A. 365 (1927). 10 The plaintiff indeed acknowledges that Plasky “may

2005Stickney’s substantial adoption of Wolf , however, leaves no doubt that Wolf remains an authoritative source of the family car doctrine under the common law. 9 For purposes of the family car doctrine, a “family group is not necessarily confined to those of [the vehicle owner’s] own kindred; it includes all those members of the collective body of persons living in [the owner’s] household for whose convenience the car is actually maintained and who have general authority to use it.” Smart v. Bissonette, 106 Conn. 447, 452 , 138 A. 365 (1927). 10 The plaintiff indeed acknowledges that Plasky “may

1986Maher v. Fahy, 112 Conn. 76, 80-81 , 151 A.2d 318 (1930); see also Hunt v. Richter, 163 Conn. 84, 89 , 302 A.2d 117 (1972).

1972In O’Keefe v. Fitzgerald, 106 Conn. 294, 299 , 137 A. 858 , it was emphasized that one limitation in our family car doctrine not found in other states was that the operator must be shown to have had from the owner “ ‘general authority to drive the car while it is being used as such family car, that is, for the pleasure or convenience of the family or a member of it.’ ” In Maher v. Fahy, 112 Conn. 76 , 151 A. 318 , decided in 1930, this court again emphasized the limitation in our family car doctrine as stated in the O’Keefe case — that an essential element of the rule was proof of “general aut

1972The doctrine was restated in Haugh v. Kirsch, 105 Conn. 429, 431 , 135 A. 568 : “[W]hen an automobile is maintained by 'the owner thereof for the general use and convenience of his or her family, such owner is liable for the negligence of a member of the family, having general authority to drive the car.” The case of Smart v. Bissonette, 106 Conn. 447, 452 , 138 A. 365 , defined the word “family,” as used in the family car doctrine, as follows: “The owner of the car may be the ‘paterfamilias,’ the head of the household, who maintains the car for the general use and convenience of his family, b

1972The doctrine was restated in Haugh v. Kirsch, 105 Conn. 429, 431 , 135 A. 568 : “[W]hen an automobile is maintained by 'the owner thereof for the general use and convenience of his or her family, such owner is liable for the negligence of a member of the family, having general authority to drive the car.” The case of Smart v. Bissonette, 106 Conn. 447, 452 , 138 A. 365 , defined the word “family,” as used in the family car doctrine, as follows: “The owner of the car may be the ‘paterfamilias,’ the head of the household, who maintains the car for the general use and convenience of his family, b

2013“The family car doctrine is a common-law rule providing that, when a motor-car is maintained by the paterfamilias for the general use and convenience of his family, he is liable for the negligence of a member of the family having general authority to drive it, while the car is being used as a family car . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., 276 Conn. 1, 9 , 882 A.2d 597 (2005).

2013“The family car doctrine is a common-law rule providing that, when a motor-car is maintained by the paterfamilias for the general use and convenience of his family, he is liable for the negligence of a member of the family having general authority to drive it, while the car is being used as a family car . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., 276 Conn. 1, 9 , 882 A.2d 597 (2005).

2001At common law no punitive or exemplary damages were assessable against owners for the acts of their agents if the owner's liability was purely vicarious, Maisenbacher v. Society Concordia , 71 Conn. 369 , 379 (1899).

1997CT Page 7223 At common law no punitive or exemplary damages were assessable against owners for the acts of their agents if the owner's liability was purely vicarious, Maisenbacher v. Society Concordia, 71 Conn. 369 , 379 (1899).

1999(Revised Complaint, Counts One and Three, ¶ 6.) However, the plaintiffs fail to incorporate the allegation of John Barath's negligence in counts two and four, which attempt to state a claim for vicarious liability against the defendant under the "family car doctrine." The family car doctrine provides that "when an automobile is maintained by an owner thereof for the general use and convenience of his or her family, such owner is liable for the negligence of a member of the family, having general authority to drive the car, while it is being used as such family car, that is, for the pleasure or

1999(Revised Complaint, Counts One and Three, ¶ 6.) However, the plaintiffs fail to incorporate the allegation of John Barath's negligence in counts two and four, which attempt to state a claim for vicarious liability against the defendant under the "family car doctrine." The family car doctrine provides that "when an automobile is maintained by an owner thereof for the general use and convenience of his or her family, such owner is liable for the negligence of a member of the family, having general authority to drive the car, while it is being used as such family car, that is, for the pleasure or

1996The plaintiff argues that the Connecticut Supreme Court has applied § 14-295 vicariously through statutes § 14-154a in Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc, 192 Conn. 280 , 472 A.2d 306 (1984).

1996The plaintiff argues that the Connecticut Supreme Court has applied § 14-295 vicariously through statutes § 14-154a in Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc, 192 Conn. 280 , 472 A.2d 306 (1984).

1975Bronson & Townsend Co. v. Battistoni, 167 Conn. 321, 326 .

1975Bronson Townsend Co. v. Battistoni, 167 Conn. 321 , 326 .

1972Cozzolino, Inc., 128 Conn. 24, 26 , 20 A.2d 392 , Smart v. Bissonette, supra; except where the opera *89 tor is under the immediate direction of a member for whose benefit the vehicle was furnished, for whom he is driving with the approval and consent of the owner.

1947Even in Durso v. Cozzolino, Inc., 128 Conn. 24 , where the family-car doctrine was liberally extended and applied, there is repeated several times in the course of the opinion such phrases as “for the general use of his household” and “for the general use of a family.” There seems to be implicit in the meaning of the phrase that the car is kept for the general use of two or more persons constituting a household group.

2020Flannery was operating during the accident. ‘‘The family car doctrine is a common-law rule providing that, when a motor-car is maintained by the paterfamilias for the general use and convenience of his family, he is liable for the negligence of a member of the family having general authority to drive it, while the car is being used as a family car . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cima v. Sciaretta, 140 Conn. App. 167 , 170 n.3, 58 A.3d 345 , cert. denied, 308 Conn. 912 , 61 A.3d 532 (2013).

2020Flannery was operating during the accident. ‘‘The family car doctrine is a common-law rule providing that, when a motor-car is maintained by the paterfamilias for the general use and convenience of his family, he is liable for the negligence of a member of the family having general authority to drive it, while the car is being used as a family car . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cima v. Sciaretta, 140 Conn. App. 167 , 170 n.3, 58 A.3d 345 , cert. denied, 308 Conn. 912 , 61 A.3d 532 (2013).

2013In making his argument, the defendant references our Supreme Court’s decision in Koops v. Gregg, 130 Conn. 185 , 32 A.2d 653 (1943), but fails to provide analysis that explains how that opinion supports his claim that the court was obliged to direct a verdict for the defendant on the count alleging vicarious liability pursuant to the family car doctrine when it directed a verdict on the negligence count brought against the defendant’s son.

2013In making his argument, the defendant references our Supreme Court’s decision in Koops v. Gregg, 130 Conn. 185 , 32 A.2d 653 (1943), but fails to provide analysis that explains how that opinion supports his claim that the court was obliged to direct a verdict for the defendant on the count alleging vicarious liability pursuant to the family car doctrine when it directed a verdict on the negligence count brought against the defendant’s son.

2003Rangel v. Parkhurst , 64 Conn. App. 372 , 375 n. 3, 779 A.2d 1277 (2001).

2003Rangel v. Parkhurst , 64 Conn. App. 372 , 375 n. 3, 779 A.2d 1277 (2001).

2003As we previously have observed with respect to the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior, “ ‘[i]n the course of his employment’ means while engaged in the service of the master, and it is not synonymous with the phrase ‘during the period covered by his employment.’ ” Levitz v. Jewish Home for the Aged, Inc., 156 Conn. 193, 198 , 239 A.2d 490 (1968).

2003As we previously have observed with respect to the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior, “ ‘[i]n the course of his employment’ means while engaged in the service of the master, and it is not synonymous with the phrase ‘during the period covered by his employment.’ ” Levitz v. Jewish Home for the Aged, Inc., 156 Conn. 193, 198 , 239 A.2d 490 (1968).

2000Specifically, in order to recover under the family car doctrine the plaintiff must offer evidence to prove that Reed falls within the class of persons covered by the statute or that he was a member of the household at the time of the accident. 3 Under the theory of negligent supervision, liability will lie with the parents "if created by statute . . . or by independently negligent behavior on the part of the parents." (Citations omitted.) Kaminski v. Fairfield , 216 Conn. 29 , 34 , 578 A.2d 1048 (1990) .

2000Specifically, in order to recover under the family car doctrine the plaintiff must offer evidence to prove that Reed falls within the class of persons covered by the statute or that he was a member of the household at the time of the accident. 3 Under the theory of negligent supervision, liability will lie with the parents "if created by statute . . . or by independently negligent behavior on the part of the parents." (Citations omitted.) Kaminski v. Fairfield , 216 Conn. 29 , 34 , 578 A.2d 1048 (1990) .

2000See Trichilo v. Trichilo , 190 Conn. 774 , 779 , 462 A.2d 1048 (1983); Kurimai v. Malinosky , 17 Conn. Sup. 72 , 73 (1950).

1999"Galloway v. Thomas, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 371814 (September 26, 1995, Corradino, J.) ( 15 Conn. L.

1997Summary judgment "is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way." Miller v. United Technologies Corp., supra. The defendants argue that Jeffrey's parents may not be held liable under the family car doctrine. 1 In support of their contention, Jeffrey and his parents have all submitted affidavits.

1997Several other cases are in accord including Hamilton v. Zarrelli, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 145033 (October 27, 1995, D'Andrea, J.) (1 Conn. Ops. 1258) (stating that "the superior courts which have decided this issue have concluded that neither General Statutes § 52-182 , nor common law, impose punitive damages on the owner for the reckless conduct of the operator."); Pappalardo v. Pellicci, Superior Court of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 112723 (July 19, 1995, Dean, J.) ( 14 Conn. L.

1995At CT Page 10110 common law the owner of a car could be held responsible only under the family car doctrine, respondeat superior or, if the owner entrusted or rented the vehicle to a person the owner knew or had reason to know was incompetent by reason of inexperience or for some other cause, Greeley v. Cunningham, 116 Conn. 515 , 518 (1933).

1995In support of the position that vicarious liability should extend to the defendant, the plaintiffs cite Knowling v. Severns , Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 311246 (January 9, 1987, Noren, J.), and, Rodrigues v. Woodland , 3 CSCR 21 (November 4, 1987, Hale, J.).