advice of counsel defense in Connecticut

2022In such instances, a client’s reliance on the advice of counsel is unreasonable regardless of whether the material facts would have altered counsel’s assessment of the validity of the claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rozbicki v. Sconyers, 198 Conn. App. 767 , 783–84, 234 A.3d 1061 (2020). ‘‘Whether there was a full and fair disclosure of mate- rial facts as required by the advice of counsel defense is a question of fact . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Verspyck v. Franco, 274 Conn. 105 , 112–13, 874 A.2d 249 (2005).

2022The court’s analysis of probable cause was supported by reference to appropriate legal principles and it does not appear to have been intertwined with its analysis of the advice of counsel defense raised by the defendants. ‘‘It is well settled that [we] do not presume error; the trial court’s ruling is entitled to the reasonable presumption that it is correct unless the party challenging the ruling has satisfied its burden demonstrating the contrary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ellen S. v. Katlyn F., 175 Conn. App. 559, 565 , 167 A.3d 1182 (2017). 10 Both the 1998 and 2006 surveys we

2022The court’s analysis of probable cause was supported by reference to appropriate legal principles and it does not appear to have been intertwined with its analysis of the advice of counsel defense raised by the defendants. ‘‘It is well settled that [we] do not presume error; the trial court’s ruling is entitled to the reasonable presumption that it is correct unless the party challenging the ruling has satisfied its burden demonstrating the contrary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ellen S. v. Katlyn F., 175 Conn. App. 559, 565 , 167 A.3d 1182 (2017). 10 Both the 1998 and 2006 surveys we

2022One of the counts was labeled ‘‘vexatious suit’’ and the other count was labeled ‘‘malicious vexatious suit.’’ 8 ‘‘The essential elements of adverse possession are that the owner shall be ousted from possession and kept out uninterruptedly for fifteen years under a claim of right by an open, visible and exclusive possession of the claimant without license or consent of the owner.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Poirier, 121 Conn. App. 748, 752 , 997 A.2d 604 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 904 , 3 A.3d 68 (2010). 9 In their brief, the defendants also argue, albeit in a conclusory m

2022One of the counts was labeled ‘‘vexatious suit’’ and the other count was labeled ‘‘malicious vexatious suit.’’ 8 ‘‘The essential elements of adverse possession are that the owner shall be ousted from possession and kept out uninterruptedly for fifteen years under a claim of right by an open, visible and exclusive possession of the claimant without license or consent of the owner.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Poirier, 121 Conn. App. 748, 752 , 997 A.2d 604 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 904 , 3 A.3d 68 (2010). 9 In their brief, the defendants also argue, albeit in a conclusory m

2022One of the counts was labeled ‘‘vexatious suit’’ and the other count was labeled ‘‘malicious vexatious suit.’’ 8 ‘‘The essential elements of adverse possession are that the owner shall be ousted from possession and kept out uninterruptedly for fifteen years under a claim of right by an open, visible and exclusive possession of the claimant without license or consent of the owner.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Poirier, 121 Conn. App. 748, 752 , 997 A.2d 604 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 904 , 3 A.3d 68 (2010). 9 In their brief, the defendants also argue, albeit in a conclusory m

2022One of the counts was labeled ‘‘vexatious suit’’ and the other count was labeled ‘‘malicious vexatious suit.’’ 8 ‘‘The essential elements of adverse possession are that the owner shall be ousted from possession and kept out uninterruptedly for fifteen years under a claim of right by an open, visible and exclusive possession of the claimant without license or consent of the owner.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Poirier, 121 Conn. App. 748, 752 , 997 A.2d 604 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 904 , 3 A.3d 68 (2010). 9 In their brief, the defendants also argue, albeit in a conclusory m

2016The fact that an attorney’s advice was unsound or erroneous will not affect the result.’’ Vandersluis v. Weil, 176 Conn. 353, 361 , 407 A.2d 982 (1978); see also Shea v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 64 Conn. App. 624, 630 , 781 A.2d 352 (2001).

2016The fact that an attorney’s advice was unsound or erroneous will not affect the result.’’ Vandersluis v. Weil, 176 Conn. 353, 361 , 407 A.2d 982 (1978); see also Shea v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 64 Conn. App. 624, 630 , 781 A.2d 352 (2001).

2005She relies on DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 258-60 , 597 A.2d 807 (1991), for the proposition that a duty to investigate potentially material information for the purposes of the advice of counsel defense arises only where the information is readily attainable and there is reason to believe that certain material facts are inaccurate.

2005She relies on DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 258-60 , 597 A.2d 807 (1991), for the proposition that a duty to investigate potentially material information for the purposes of the advice of counsel defense arises only where the information is readily attainable and there is reason to believe that certain material facts are inaccurate.

2005Whether there was a full and fair disclosure of material facts as required by the advice of counsel defense is a question of fact; see Mulligan v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 716, 748 , 643 A.2d 1226 (1994) (“jury was free to conclude that the defendants had not made ‘a full and fair disclosure’ of the material facts within their knowledge to the prosecuting attorneys”); and “ [a]ppellate review of findings of fact is limited to deciding whether such findings were clearly erroneous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D'Angelo v. McGoldrick, 239 Conn. 356, 363 , 685 A.2d 319 (1996).

2005Whether there was a full and fair disclosure of material facts as required by the advice of counsel defense is a question of fact; see Mulligan v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 716, 748 , 643 A.2d 1226 (1994) (“jury was free to conclude that the defendants had not made ‘a full and fair disclosure’ of the material facts within their knowledge to the prosecuting attorneys”); and “ [a]ppellate review of findings of fact is limited to deciding whether such findings were clearly erroneous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D'Angelo v. McGoldrick, 239 Conn. 356, 363 , 685 A.2d 319 (1996).

2005While this court has never specifically defined “material” as it applies in the context of the advice of counsel defense, we have characterized it in the context of probable cause as “facts which would likely be given weight by a person considering the question of probable cause.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ham v. Greene, 248 Conn. 508, 525 , 729 A.2d 740 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 929 , 120 S. Ct. 326 , 145 L.

2005While this court has never specifically defined “material” as it applies in the context of the advice of counsel defense, we have characterized it in the context of probable cause as “facts which would likely be given weight by a person considering the question of probable cause.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ham v. Greene, 248 Conn. 508, 525 , 729 A.2d 740 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 929 , 120 S. Ct. 326 , 145 L.

2005“We do not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 397 , 852 A.2d 643 (2004).

2005“We do not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 397 , 852 A.2d 643 (2004).

2005Accordingly, the Appellate Court should have applied the clearly erroneous standard of review to the trial court’s conclusions regarding the defendant’s use of the advice of counsel defense, instead of conducting a de novo review of the case. 8 “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sargent v. Smith, 272 Conn. 722, 728-29 , 865

2005Accordingly, the Appellate Court should have applied the clearly erroneous standard of review to the trial court’s conclusions regarding the defendant’s use of the advice of counsel defense, instead of conducting a de novo review of the case. 8 “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sargent v. Smith, 272 Conn. 722, 728-29 , 865

2005While this court has never specifically defined “material” as it applies in the context of the advice of counsel defense, we have characterized it in the context of probable cause as “facts which would likely be given weight by a person considering the question of probable cause.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ham v. Greene, 248 Conn. 508, 525 , 729 A.2d 740 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 929 , 120 S. Ct. 326 , 145 L.

2005While this court has never specifically defined “material” as it applies in the context of the advice of counsel defense, we have characterized it in the context of probable cause as “facts which would likely be given weight by a person considering the question of probable cause.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ham v. Greene, 248 Conn. 508, 525 , 729 A.2d 740 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 929 , 120 S. Ct. 326 , 145 L.

2005While this court has never specifically defined “material” as it applies in the context of the advice of counsel defense, we have characterized it in the context of probable cause as “facts which would likely be given weight by a person considering the question of probable cause.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ham v. Greene, 248 Conn. 508, 525 , 729 A.2d 740 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 929 , 120 S. Ct. 326 , 145 L.

1997DISCUSSION "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint, counterclaim, or cross complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Waters v. Autouri , 236 Conn. 820 , 825 , 676 A.2d 357 (1996).

1997DISCUSSION "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint, counterclaim, or cross complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Waters v. Autouri , 236 Conn. 820 , 825 , 676 A.2d 357 (1996).

1996It is also true that any expert opinion only has force if the underlying facts it is based on are established, Nash v. Hunt, 166 Conn. 418 , 426 (1974).