equally familiar principle in Connecticut

2005We apply this familiar and deferential scope of review, however, in light of *774 the equally familiar principle that the plaintiff[s] must produce sufficient evidence to remove the jury’s function of examining inferences and finding facts from the realm of speculation.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc., 274 Conn. 33, 50 , 873 A.2d 929 (2005).

2005We apply this familiar and deferential scope of review, however, in light of *774 the equally familiar principle that the plaintiff[s] must produce sufficient evidence to remove the jury’s function of examining inferences and finding facts from the realm of speculation.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc., 274 Conn. 33, 50 , 873 A.2d 929 (2005).

2024The jury’s verdict cannot be upheld if the jury reasonably and legally could not have reached the determination that [it] did in fact reach or if, without conjecture, [it] could not have found a required element of the cause of action . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Burke v. Mesniaeff, 334 Conn. 100 , 127, 220 A.3d 777 (2019); see also Fisher v. Big Y Foods, Inc., 298 Conn. 414, 440 , 3 A.3d 919 (2010) (‘‘Although it is the jury’s right to draw logical deductions and make reasonable inferences from the facts proven . . . it may not resort to mere conjecture and

2024The jury’s verdict cannot be upheld if the jury reasonably and legally could not have reached the determination that [it] did in fact reach or if, without conjecture, [it] could not have found a required element of the cause of action . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Burke v. Mesniaeff, 334 Conn. 100 , 127, 220 A.3d 777 (2019); see also Fisher v. Big Y Foods, Inc., 298 Conn. 414, 440 , 3 A.3d 919 (2010) (‘‘Although it is the jury’s right to draw logical deductions and make reasonable inferences from the facts proven . . . it may not resort to mere conjecture and

2024Co., 262 Conn. 433, 442 , 815 A.2d 119 (2003). ‘‘We continually have held that in order to prevail on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that that distress, 14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 C.

2024Co., 262 Conn. 433, 442 , 815 A.2d 119 (2003). ‘‘We continually have held that in order to prevail on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that that distress, 14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 C.

2019We apply this familiar and deferential scope of review, however, in light of the equally familiar principle that the [defendant] must produce sufficient evidence to remove the [fact finder’s] function of examining inferences and finding facts from the realm of speculation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reyes v. Chetta, 143 Conn. App. 758, 765 , 71 A.3d 1255 (2013). ‘‘Moreover, with respect to the trial court’s refusal to set aside the verdict, we accord great deference to the vantage of the trial judge, who possesses a unique opportunity to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. . . .

2019We apply this familiar and deferential scope of review, however, in light of the equally familiar principle that the [defendant] must produce sufficient evidence to remove the [fact finder’s] function of examining inferences and finding facts from the realm of speculation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reyes v. Chetta, 143 Conn. App. 758, 765 , 71 A.3d 1255 (2013). ‘‘Moreover, with respect to the trial court’s refusal to set aside the verdict, we accord great deference to the vantage of the trial judge, who possesses a unique opportunity to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. . . .

2007We apply this familiar and deferential scope of review, however, in light of the equally familiar principle that the plaintifffs] must produce sufficient evidence to remove the [court]’s function of examining inferences and finding facts from the realm of speculation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2007We apply this familiar and deferential scope of review, however, in light of the equally familiar principle that the plaintiffs] must produce sufficient evidence to remove the [court]’s function of examining inferences and finding facts from the realm of speculation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Greenwich, 278 Conn. 428, 440-41 , 899 A.2d 563 (2006).

2007We apply this familiar and deferential scope of review, however, in light of the equally familiar principle that the plaintiffs] must produce sufficient evidence to remove the [court]’s function of examining inferences and finding facts from the realm of speculation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Greenwich, 278 Conn. 428, 440-41 , 899 A.2d 563 (2006).

2006We apply this familiar and deferential scope of review, however, in light of the equally familiar principle that the plaintiffs] must produce sufficient evidence to remove the jury’s function of examining inferences and finding facts from the realm of speculation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Margolin v. Kleban & Samor, P.C., 275 Conn. 765, 773-74 , 882 A.2d 653 (2005).

2006We apply this familiar and deferential scope of review, however, in light of the equally familiar principle that the plaintiffs] must produce sufficient evidence to remove the jury’s function of examining inferences and finding facts from the realm of speculation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Margolin v. Kleban & Samor, P.C., 275 Conn. 765, 773-74 , 882 A.2d 653 (2005).

2005“In general, the plaintiff in an attorney malpractice action must establish: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the attorney’s wrongful act or omission; (3) causation; and (4) damages.” Mayer v. Biafore, Florek & O'Neill, 245 Conn. 88, 92 , 713 A.2d 1267 (1998). 8 The plaintiff here sought to establish causation and damages in part by proof that he had obtained a default judgment of a specific amount against Jaquith, upon which he could not recover because of the defendants’ negligent failure to obtain a prejudgment remedy.

2005“In general, the plaintiff in an attorney malpractice action must establish: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the attorney’s wrongful act or omission; (3) causation; and (4) damages.” Mayer v. Biafore, Florek & O'Neill, 245 Conn. 88, 92 , 713 A.2d 1267 (1998). 8 The plaintiff here sought to establish causation and damages in part by proof that he had obtained a default judgment of a specific amount against Jaquith, upon which he could not recover because of the defendants’ negligent failure to obtain a prejudgment remedy.

2004Although we recognize that damages for lost profits may be difficult to prove with exactitude . . . such damages are recoverable only to the extent that the evidence affords a sufficient basis for estimating their amount with reasonable certainty.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, Ribicoff & Kotkin, 247 Conn. 48, 69 , 717 A.2d 724 (1998). “[T]he plaintiff cannot recover for the mere possibility of making a profit. ...

2004Although we recognize that damages for lost profits may be difficult to prove with exactitude . . . such damages are recoverable only to the extent that the evidence affords a sufficient basis for estimating their amount with reasonable certainty.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, Ribicoff & Kotkin, 247 Conn. 48, 69 , 717 A.2d 724 (1998). “[T]he plaintiff cannot recover for the mere possibility of making a profit. ...

2003Andrew’s Roman Catholic Church Corp., 250 Conn. 14, 17-18 , 734 A.2d 85 (1999).

2003Andrew’s Roman Catholic Church Corp., 250 Conn. 14, 17-18 , 734 A.2d 85 (1999).

1923Ceffarelli v. Landino, 82 Conn. 126 , 72 Atl. 564 , lays down the equally familiar rule that at common law this right to lateral support does not extend to buildings, saying: “But if there are buildings upon the neighbor’s land, and these increase the lateral pressure, and if the giving way is due to this added burden, the person excavating *45 is not liable, in the absence of negligence in conducting the work, for the damage so resulting to the owner.” In Barnes v. Waterbury, 82 Conn. 518 , 74 Atl. 902 , a retaining wall was undermined in the construction of a sewer alongside of the plaintiff

1923Ceffarelli v. Landino, 82 Conn. 126 , 72 Atl. 564 , lays down the equally familiar rule that at common law this right to lateral support does not extend to buildings, saying: “But if there are buildings upon the neighbor’s land, and these increase the lateral pressure, and if the giving way is due to this added burden, the person excavating *45 is not liable, in the absence of negligence in conducting the work, for the damage so resulting to the owner.” In Barnes v. Waterbury, 82 Conn. 518 , 74 Atl. 902 , a retaining wall was undermined in the construction of a sewer alongside of the plaintiff

1923Ceffarelli v. Landino, 82 Conn. 126 , 72 Atl. 564 , lays down the equally familiar rule that at common law this right to lateral support does not extend to buildings, saying: “But if there are buildings upon the neighbor’s land, and these increase the lateral pressure, and if the giving way is due to this added burden, the person excavating *45 is not liable, in the absence of negligence in conducting the work, for the damage so resulting to the owner.” In Barnes v. Waterbury, 82 Conn. 518 , 74 Atl. 902 , a retaining wall was undermined in the construction of a sewer alongside of the plaintiff

1923Ceffarelli v. Landino, 82 Conn. 126 , 72 Atl. 564 , lays down the equally familiar rule that at common law this right to lateral support does not extend to buildings, saying: “But if there are buildings upon the neighbor’s land, and these increase the lateral pressure, and if the giving way is due to this added burden, the person excavating *45 is not liable, in the absence of negligence in conducting the work, for the damage so resulting to the owner.” In Barnes v. Waterbury, 82 Conn. 518 , 74 Atl. 902 , a retaining wall was undermined in the construction of a sewer alongside of the plaintiff