juiy instruction in Connecticut

2009This is in accord with the “public policy of allowing trial counsel to conduct the case according to his or her own strategy . . . .” Id.; see also Chao v. Slate, 604 A.2d 1351 , 1358 n.4 (Del. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Williams v. State, 818 A.2d 906 (Del. 2002); Hagans v. State, 316 Md. 429, 455 , 559 A.2d 792 (1989) (“The better view ... is that the trial court ordinarily should not give a juiy an instruction on an uncharged lesser included offense where neither side requests or affirmatively agrees to such instruction.

2009The defendant states: “The prosecutor’s actions were a clear and calculated attempt to directly circumvent the [court’s evidentiary] order and the rules of evidence in order to win her case at all costs.” The defendant argues that the fact that his counsel objected to the state’s questioning of both physicians, as described previously, caused the jury to believe that he had prevented the juiy from hearing evidence unfavorable to his case and, thus, unfairly prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury. 4 Our Supreme Court previously has recognized that “a claim of prosecutorial impropriety, even in

2009The defendant states: “The prosecutor’s actions were a clear and calculated attempt to directly circumvent the [court’s evidentiary] order and the rules of evidence in order to win her case at all costs.” The defendant argues that the fact that his counsel objected to the state’s questioning of both physicians, as described previously, caused the jury to believe that he had prevented the juiy from hearing evidence unfavorable to his case and, thus, unfairly prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury. 4 Our Supreme Court previously has recognized that “a claim of prosecutorial impropriety, even in

2006State v. Silveira, 198 Conn. 454, 471 , 503 A.2d 599 (1986).

2006State v. Silveira, 198 Conn. 454, 471 , 503 A.2d 599 (1986).

2005In determining whether it was . . . reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the trial court’s instructions, the charge to the jury is not to be critically dissected for the purpose of discovering possible inaccuracies of statement, but it is to be considered rather as to its probable effect upon the jury in guiding [it] to a correct verdict in the case. ” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 255 Conn. 782, 798 , 772 A.2d 559 (2001).

2005In determining whether it was . . . reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the trial court’s instructions, the charge to the jury is not to be critically dissected for the purpose of discovering possible inaccuracies of statement, but it is to be considered rather as to its probable effect upon the jury in guiding [it] to a correct verdict in the case. ” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 255 Conn. 782, 798 , 772 A.2d 559 (2001).

1999The court held that “[although we disapprove of the challenged language and, pursuant to our supervisory authority over the administration of justice, direct our trial courts to refrain from using the challenged language in future cases, we nevertheless reject the defendant’s constitutional claim.” Id., 168 .

1997State v. Joyner, 225 Conn. 450, 471 , 625 A.2d 791 (1993); see also State v. Person, supra, 353 (applying standard to affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance).

1997State v. Joyner, 225 Conn. 450, 471 , 625 A.2d 791 (1993); see also State v. Person, supra, 353 (applying standard to affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance).

1997In Giles v. New Haven, 228 Conn. 441 , 636 A.2d 1335 (1994), this court reviewed the circumstances that must exist in order to entitle a plaintiff to a jury instruction on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

1997In Giles v. New Haven, 228 Conn. 441 , 636 A.2d 1335 (1994), this court reviewed the circumstances that must exist in order to entitle a plaintiff to a jury instruction on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

1996A jury found the defendant, Raul Ivan Diaz, guilty of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), 1 conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 2 and 53a-54a (a), two counts of attempted murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 3 and 53a-54a (a), and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35 (a). 4 On appeal 5 from the judgment of the trial court, 6 the defendant claims that the court improperly: (1) instructed the juiy on the principle of vicarious liability of a conspirator under Pinkerton v. United States, 328

1996A jury found the defendant, Raul Ivan Diaz, guilty of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), 1 conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 2 and 53a-54a (a), two counts of attempted murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 3 and 53a-54a (a), and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35 (a). 4 On appeal 5 from the judgment of the trial court, 6 the defendant claims that the court improperly: (1) instructed the juiy on the principle of vicarious liability of a conspirator under Pinkerton v. United States, 328

1995Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 , 87 S. Ct. 1920 , 18 L.

1995Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 , 87 S. Ct. 1920 , 18 L.