10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Whartongreen2 sentences2010An exception to that general rule has developed, however, based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Wharton, 253 Ga. 82 ( 316 SE2d 749 ) (1984). 2010An exception to that general rule has developed, however, based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Wharton, 253 Ga. 82 ( 316 SE2d 749 ) (1984). | 1 | 2 |
HENDERSON v. THE STATE (Two Cases)green2 sentences2025“But there is an exception to that general rule: in felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, ‘the testimony of a single witness shall 14 not be sufficient,’ [OCGA § 24-14-8] (emphasis added), and a jury may not rely solely on an accomplice’s testimony to find any fact necessary to sustain a defendant’s felony conviction.” Henderson v. State, 317 Ga. 66, 81 (5) (b) ( 891 SE2d 884 ) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2025“But there is an exception to that general rule: in felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, ‘the testimony of a single witness shall 14 not be sufficient,’ [OCGA § 24-14-8] (emphasis added), and a jury may not rely solely on an accomplice’s testimony to find any fact necessary to sustain a defendant’s felony conviction.” Henderson v. State, 317 Ga. 66, 81 (5) (b) ( 891 SE2d 884 ) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Hammond v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2023Sys., 293 Ga. 268, 277 (2) (c) (744 SE2d 26) (2013) (“[W]hile the Constitution generally prohibits retroactive legislation, a constitutional amendment can expressly authorize an exception to that general rule.” (citation omitted)); id. at 277-278 (2) (d) (An amendment to the Constitution’s Redevelopment Powers Clause, as implemented by the subsequent revision of the Redevelopment Powers Law, both “established the rule for the future, and ratified what had been done in the past.” Accordingly, despite this Court’s previous holding that school taxes could not constitutionally be applied to a deve 2023Sys., 293 Ga. 268, 277 (2) (c) (744 SE2d 26) (2013) (“[W]hile the Constitution generally prohibits retroactive legislation, a constitutional amendment can expressly authorize an exception to that general rule.” (citation omitted)); id. at 277-278 (2) (d) (An amendment to the Constitution’s Redevelopment Powers Clause, as implemented by the subsequent revision of the Redevelopment Powers Law, both “established the rule for the future, and ratified what had been done in the past.” Accordingly, despite this Court’s previous holding that school taxes could not constitutionally be applied to a deve | 1 | 1 |
Sherman v. Atlanta Independent School Systemgreen2 sentences2023Sys., 293 Ga. 268, 277 (2) (c) (744 SE2d 26) (2013) (“[W]hile the Constitution generally prohibits retroactive legislation, a constitutional amendment can expressly authorize an exception to that general rule.” (citation omitted)); id. at 277-278 (2) (d) (An amendment to the Constitution’s Redevelopment Powers Clause, as implemented by the subsequent revision of the Redevelopment Powers Law, both “established the rule for the future, and ratified what had been done in the past.” Accordingly, despite this Court’s previous holding that school taxes could not constitutionally be applied to a deve 2023Sys., 293 Ga. 268, 277 (2) (c) (744 SE2d 26) (2013) (“[W]hile the Constitution generally prohibits retroactive legislation, a constitutional amendment can expressly authorize an exception to that general rule.” (citation omitted)); id. at 277-278 (2) (d) (An amendment to the Constitution’s Redevelopment Powers Clause, as implemented by the subsequent revision of the Redevelopment Powers Law, both “established the rule for the future, and ratified what had been done in the past.” Accordingly, despite this Court’s previous holding that school taxes could not constitutionally be applied to a deve | 1 | 1 |
Choisnet v. Stategreen2 sentences2023Under these circumstances, King has not carried his burden under the plain-error test’s third prong to show that the jury hearing that voluntary intoxication is not a defense, without the trial court giving a clarifying instruction about the exception to that general rule, “likely affected the outcome of the trial.” See Choisnet, 295 Ga. at 572-573 (holding that the trial court’s instruction on a delusional compulsion, “even granting” that it was incomplete, was “unlikely” to have affected the trial’s result because the defendant’s expert testified that the defendant “may have been” psychotic 2023Under these circumstances, King has not carried his burden under the plain-error test’s third prong to show that the jury hearing that voluntary intoxication is not a defense, without the trial court giving 21 a clarifying instruction about the exception to that general rule, “likely affected the outcome of the trial.” See Choisnet, 295 Ga. at 572-573 (holding that the trial court’s instruction on a delusional compulsion, “[e]ven granting” that it was incomplete, was “unlikely” to have affected the trial’s result because the defendant’s expert testified that the defendant “may have been” psych | 1 | 1 |
Payne v. Stategreen2 sentences2023But there is an exception to that general rule: in felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, “the testimony of a single witness shall not be sufficient,” id. (em- phasis added), and “a jury may not rely solely on an accomplice’s 36 testimony to find any fact necessary to sustain a defendant’s convic- tion,” Payne, 314 Ga. at 326 (1). 2023But there is an exception to that general rule: in felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, “the testimony of a single witness shall not be sufficient,” id. (em- phasis added), and “a jury may not rely solely on an accomplice’s testimony to find any fact necessary to sustain a defendant’s felony conviction,” Payne, 314 Ga. at 326 (1). | 1 | 1 |
City of Atlanta v. Gowergreen2 sentences2023See City of Atlanta v. Gower, 216 Ga. 368, 372 (116 SE2d 738) (1960). 29 Under 29 In Gower, we held that an act, Ga. L. 1960, p. 2848, which purported to amend an act passed the previous year, Ga. L. 1959, p. 3251, pertaining to local taxation, “could not add anything of substance” to the 1959 act, because the earlier act was invalid and unconstitutional when enacted and, therefore, could not be corrected by amending the act. 2023See City of Atlanta v. Gower, 216 Ga. 368, 372 (116 SE2d 738) (1960). 29 Under 29 In Gower, we held that an act, Ga. L. 1960, p. 2848, which purported to amend an act passed the previous year, Ga. L. 1959, p. 3251, pertaining to local taxation, “could not add anything of substance” to the 1959 act, because the earlier act was invalid and unconstitutional when enacted and, therefore, could not be corrected by amending the act. | 1 | 1 |
Duhe v. Texaco, Inc.green1 sentence2010See also Duhe v. Texaco, supra ("The statute does not require that the notice [or demand] be given by each and every [class member] individually. [Cit.]"). | 1 | 1 |
Shetter v. Davis Bros.green2 sentences1993An exception to that general rule, however, is that a contractor who is an expert in the design of the type of work performed is not “entitled to put on blinders and ignore serious and dangerous defects in a design given to the contractor to execute.” Shetter v. Davis, 163 Ga. App. 230, 231 ( 293 SE2d 397 ) (1982). 1993An exception to that general rule, however, is that a contractor who is an expert in the design of the type of work performed is not “entitled to put on blinders and ignore serious and dangerous defects in a design given to the contractor to execute.” Shetter v. Davis, 163 Ga. App. 230, 231 ( 293 SE2d 397 ) (1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bentley v. State
green
1 sentence2025In Old Chief v. United States, 519 US 172 , 186– 87 (1997), the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the general rule that the State “is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice, or, more exactly, that a criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as the Government chooses to present it.” However, the Old Chief Court recognized an exception to that general rule, holding that “when the name or nature of the prior offense raises the risk of a verdict tainted by improper considerations, and when the purpose of the evidence | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Old Chief v. United States
green
2 sentences2025In Old Chief v. United States, 519 US 172 , 186– 87 (1997), the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the general rule that the State “is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice, or, more exactly, that a criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as the Government chooses to present it.” However, the Old Chief Court recognized an exception to that general rule, holding that “when the name or nature of the prior offense raises the risk of a verdict tainted by improper considerations, and when the purpose of the evidence 2025In Old Chief v. United States, 519 US 172 , 186– 87 (1997), the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the general rule that the State “is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice, or, more exactly, that a criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as the Government chooses to present it.” However, the Old Chief Court recognized an exception to that general rule, holding that “when the name or nature of the prior offense raises the risk of a verdict tainted by improper considerations, and when the purpose of the evidence | 1 | 2025–2025 |
United States v. Trenton R. Birchette
green
1 sentence2019This exception permits the admission of prior bad act evidence, that would not be admissible otherwise, "after the opposing party has 'opened the door' to its admission." United States v. Birchette , 908 F.3d 50 , 61 (III) (B) (4th Cir. 2018). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Barnes v. City of Atlanta
green
1 sentence2010An exception to that general rule is not mandated by any "`genuinely unique statutory requirements'" in former OCGA § 44-14-3, as that statute "neither prohibits utilization of a class action, nor expressly requires individual [satisfaction of the precondition for suit]. [Cits.]" Barnes II, supra at 258(1), 637 S.E.2d 4 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Argersinger v. Hamlin
green
1 sentence2010In Jones , the Supreme Court held that under Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (92 SC 2006, 32 LE2d 530) (1972), regardless of whether the charges are felony or misdemeanor charges, when an accused is put on trial and faces a term of imprisonment, he is constitutionally guaranteed the right to counsel. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.