exception to that general rule in New York

2023There is an exception to that general rule, however, "where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of [its] duties, launche[s] a force or instrument of harm" ( Espinal , 98 NY2d at 140 [internal quotation marks omitted]), thereby "creat[ing] an unreasonable risk of harm to others, or increas[ing] that risk" ( Church v Callanan Indus. , 99 NY2d 104, 111 [2002]).

2022There is an exception to that general rule, however, "where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of [its] duties, 'launche[s] a force or instrument of harm' " ( Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs. , 98 NY2d 136, 140 [2002]), thereby "creat[ing] an unreasonable risk of harm to others, or increas[ing] that risk" ( Church v Callanan Indus. , 99 NY2d 104, 111 [2002]).

2014We reject that contention because the instrument of harm doctrine does not apply to the facts of this case (see generally id. at 111-112; Cooper v Time Warner Entertainment-Advance/Newhouse Partnership, 16 AD3d 1037, 1038-1039 [2005]).

2014We reject that contention because the instrument of harm doctrine does not apply to the facts of this case (see generally id. at 111-112; Cooper v Time Warner Entertainment-Advance/Newhouse Partnership, 16 AD3d 1037, 1038-1039 [2005]).

2023There is an exception to that general rule, however, "where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of [its] duties, launche[s] a force or instrument of harm" ( Espinal , 98 NY2d at 140 [internal quotation marks omitted]), thereby "creat[ing] an unreasonable risk of harm to others, or increas[ing] that risk" ( Church v Callanan Indus. , 99 NY2d 104, 111 [2002]).

2022There is an exception to that general rule, however, "where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of [its] duties, 'launche[s] a force or instrument of harm' " ( Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs. , 98 NY2d 136, 140 [2002]), thereby "creat[ing] an unreasonable risk of harm to others, or increas[ing] that risk" ( Church v Callanan Indus. , 99 NY2d 104, 111 [2002]).

2019An exception to that general rule exists when parties have "acted with disinterested malevolence [and have] . . . intentionally [sought] to inflict economic injury on [another party] by forcing [him or her] to engage legal counsel" ( Brook Shopping Ctrs. v Bass , 107 AD2d 615 , 615 [1st Dept 1985], appeal dismissed 65 NY2d 923 [1985]; see Palermo v Taccone , 79 AD3d 1616 [4th Dept 2010] [attorneys' fees denied in conversion even where the defendant locked up the plaintiff's equipment to intentionally prevent access]; Anniszkiewicz v Harrison , 291 AD2d 829, 830 [4th Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY

2019An exception to that general rule exists when parties have "acted with disinterested malevolence [and have] . . . intentionally [sought] to inflict economic injury on [another party] by forcing [him or her] to engage legal counsel" ( Brook Shopping Ctrs. v Bass , 107 AD2d 615 , 615 [1st Dept 1985], appeal dismissed 65 NY2d 923 [1985]; see Palermo v Taccone , 79 AD3d 1616 [4th Dept 2010] [attorneys' fees denied in conversion even where the defendant locked up the plaintiff's equipment to intentionally prevent access]; Anniszkiewicz v Harrison , 291 AD2d 829, 830 [4th Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY

2019An exception to that general rule exists when parties have "acted with disinterested malevolence [and have] . . . intentionally [sought] to inflict economic injury on [another party] by forcing [him or her] to engage legal counsel" ( Brook Shopping Ctrs. v Bass , 107 AD2d 615 , 615 [1st Dept 1985], appeal dismissed 65 NY2d 923 [1985]; see Palermo v Taccone , 79 AD3d 1616 [4th Dept 2010] [attorneys' fees denied in conversion even where the defendant locked up the plaintiff's equipment to intentionally prevent access]; Anniszkiewicz v Harrison , 291 AD2d 829, 830 [4th Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY

2019An exception to that general rule exists when parties have "acted with disinterested malevolence [and have] . . . intentionally [sought] to inflict economic injury on [another party] by forcing [him or her] to engage legal counsel" ( Brook Shopping Ctrs. v Bass , 107 AD2d 615 , 615 [1st Dept 1985], appeal dismissed 65 NY2d 923 [1985]; see Palermo v Taccone , 79 AD3d 1616 [4th Dept 2010] [attorneys' fees denied in conversion even where the defendant locked up the plaintiff's equipment to intentionally prevent access]; Anniszkiewicz v Harrison , 291 AD2d 829, 830 [4th Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY

2010An exception to that general rule exists when parties have “acted with ‘disinterested malevolence’ [and have] . . . ‘intentionally [sought] to inflict economic injury on [another party] by forcing [him or her] to engage legal counsel’ ” (Anniszkiewicz v Harrison, 291 AD2d 829, 830 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 611 [2002]; see Rinaudo v City of Rochester, 148 AD2d 984 [1989]).

2002To invoke that exception, however, it must also be found that defendant “intentionally [sought] to inflict economic injury on plaintiff! ] by forcing [her] to engage legal counsel” (Brook Shopping Ctrs. v Bass, 107 AD2d 615, 615 ; see, Rinaudo v City of Rochester, 148 AD2d 984, 984-985 ).

2025Gonzalez involved an exception to that general rule, known as the " Nieves " exception, articulated in Nieves v Bartlett (587 US 391 [2019]).

2025Gonzalez involved an exception to that general rule, known as the " Nieves " exception, articulated in Nieves v Bartlett (587 US 391 [2019]).

2024However, an exception to that general rule applies "'where the allegations include [the accountant's] knowledge and concealment of illegal acts and diversion of funds and failure to with draw in the face of a conflict of interest,"' (Gerzog v Goldfarb, 206 AD3d 554 , 555 [I st Dept 2022] [quoting Nate B. & Frances Spingold Found v Wallin, Simon, Black and Co., 184 AD2d 464, 465-66 [1 st Dept 1992]]).

2024Stated differently, although the general rule requires that a SEQRA challenger demonstrate that it will suffer an injury that is environmental and not solely economic in nature, there is an exception to that general rule under which "the owner of property that is the subject of rezoning need not allege the likelihood of environmental harm" ( Gernatt , 87 NY2d at 687 ; see Mobil Oil Corp. , 76 NY2d at 434-435 ; Har , 74 NY2d at 529 ).

2023Here, the sole defect in the walkway area identified by plaintiff as causing her accident was the allegedly dim lighting, which prevented her from seeing the step-down off a curb ( see generally Stempien v Walls , 193 AD3d 1383, 1384 [4th Dept 2021]; Bissett v 30 Merrick Plaza, LLC , 156 AD3d 751 , [*2]751 [2d Dept 2017]; Twersky v Incorporated Vil. of Great Neck , 127 AD3d 739, 740 [2d Dept 2015]).

2023Here, the sole defect in the walkway area identified by plaintiff as causing her accident was the allegedly dim lighting, which prevented her from seeing the step-down off a curb ( see generally Stempien v Walls , 193 AD3d 1383, 1384 [4th Dept 2021]; Bissett v 30 Merrick Plaza, LLC , 156 AD3d 751 , [*2]751 [2d Dept 2017]; Twersky v Incorporated Vil. of Great Neck , 127 AD3d 739, 740 [2d Dept 2015]).

2022That exception does not apply when "the breach of contract consists 'merely in withholding a benefit . . . where inaction is at most a refusal to become an instrument for good' " ( id. at 112 ; see Mesler v PODD LLC , 89 AD3d 1533, 1535 [4th Dept 2011]).

2021Here, even assuming, arguendo, that the allegations in the pleadings are sufficient to require Patnode to negate the possible applicability of that exception in establishing its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, we conclude that Patnode met its initial burden of establishing that it did not launch a force or instrument of harm by creating or exacerbating a [*2]dangerous condition ( see Lingenfelter v Delevan Terrace Assoc. , 149 AD3d 1522 , 1523 [4th Dept 2017]; see generally Morris v Ontario County , 152 AD3d 1185, 1187 [4th Dept 2017]).

2021In addition, although Thomas's reservation of the rights to visit or to inspect the premises and to approve certain alterations, additions, or improvements made to the manufactured homes on its land does not by itself establish the requisite degree of control to support the imposition of liability ( see Addeo v Clarit Realty, Ltd. , 176 AD3d 1581 , 1582 [4th Dept 2019]; Ferro v Burton , 45 AD3d 1454, 1454-1455 [4th Dept 2007]), an exception to that general principle applies where, as here, the plaintiff has alleged the existence of specific statutory violations with respect to the alleged defe

2021In addition, although Thomas's reservation of the rights to visit or to inspect the premises and to approve certain alterations, additions, or improvements made to the manufactured homes on its land does not by itself establish the requisite degree of control to support the imposition of liability ( see Addeo v Clarit Realty, Ltd. , 176 AD3d 1581 , 1582 [4th Dept 2019]; Ferro v Burton , 45 AD3d 1454, 1454-1455 [4th Dept 2007]), an exception to that general principle applies where, as here, the plaintiff has alleged the existence of specific statutory violations with respect to the alleged defe

2021School Dist. , 91 NY2d 577, 584 [1998] [internal quotation marks omitted]), unless such application would "impair vested rights or bestow additional rights" ( Matter of City of New York [Long Is.