52 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1916–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Janecka v. Stategreen2 sentences2003See Janecka , 823 S.W.2d at 243 n.2 . 2003See Janecka, 823 S.W.2d at 243 n.2 . | 4 | 4 |
Sanders v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Id; also see Mikel v. State, 167 S.W. 3d 556, 558-59 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2005) and Sanders v. State, 785 S.W. 2d 445, 448 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1990). 2015However, the Court recognized that there was an exception to that general rule “...when the record affirmatively reflects that the enhancement itself was improper.” Id; also see Mikel v. State, 167 S.W. 3d 556, 558-59 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2005) and Sanders v. State, 8 785 S.W. 2d 445, 448 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1990). | 2 | 2 |
Mikel v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Id; also see Mikel v. State, 167 S.W. 3d 556, 558-59 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2005) and Sanders v. State, 785 S.W. 2d 445, 448 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1990). 2015However, the Court recognized that there was an exception to that general rule “...when the record affirmatively reflects that the enhancement itself was improper.” Id; also see Mikel v. State, 167 S.W. 3d 556, 558-59 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2005) and Sanders v. State, 8 785 S.W. 2d 445, 448 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1990). | 2 | 2 |
Morissette v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 , 72 S. Ct. 240, 244 (1952). 2014See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 , 72 S. Ct. 240, 244 (1952). | 2 | 2 |
Prescott v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Prescott v. State, 744 S.W.2d 128 , 130–31 (Tex. Crim. 2011Prescott v. State, 744 S.W.2d 128, 130-31 (Tex.Crim. | 1 | 5 |
Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wilkinsongreen2 sentences2007Wilkinson , 601 S.W.2d at 521-22 . 2004Wilkinson, 601 S.W.2d at 521-22 . | 1 | 5 |
Jones v. Stategreen1 sentence2019An exception to that general rule exists for those charged with capital offenses “when the proof is evident.” Id.; Jones v. State, 803 S.W.2d 712, 717 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Matthew Ryan Wilson v. Stategreen1 sentence2016ANN. art. 36.14 (West 2007). 14 That said, an exception to that general rule exists for “terms which have a known and established legal meaning, or which have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, as where the words 12 Where we have found error in the trial court’s jury charge, we next “evaluate whether sufficient harm resulted from the error to require reversal.” Wilson v. State, 391 S.W.3d 131, 138 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.) Where, as here, the defendant objected to the erroneous part of the charge, he must demonstrate only that he suffered some harm to obtain a re | 1 | 1 |
Arline v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Long v. Castle Texas Production Ltd. Partnershipgreen1 sentence2015However, the court explained that “if a remand does not require the trial court to reopen the record” or “if an appellate court renders the judgment the trial court should have rendered,” then an exception to that general rule applies, “and post-judgment interest will accrue from the date of the original, erroneous judgment.” Id. at 79-80 (discussing Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.3); see also Tex. R. | 1 | 1 |
Penson v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2015See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 , 109 S.Ct. 346 , 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988); Childress v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 768, 772 (5th Cir.1988). 2015See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 , 109 S.Ct. 346 , 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988); Childress v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 768, 772 (5th Cir.1988). | 1 | 1 |
Millard Eugene Childress, Cross-Appellant v. James A. Lynaugh, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Cross-Appelleegreen1 sentence2015See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 , 109 S.Ct. 346 , 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988); Childress v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 768, 772 (5th Cir.1988). | 1 | 1 |
Stary v. DeBordgreen1 sentence2015If a statute does not specifically provide an exception to that general rule, then “[a]n appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order.” Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 336 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam); see also Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352 , 352–53 (Tex. 1998) (“Appellate courts have jurisdiction to consider immediate appeals of interlocutory orders only if a statute explicitly provides appellate jurisdic- tion.”) (per curiam). | 1 | 1 |
Banda v. Garcia Ex Rel. Garciagreen1 sentence2015While it is generally true that statements made by attorneys must be made under oath to be considered as evidence, the Texas Supreme Court recognized an exception to that general rule in Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Qwest Communications Corp. v. AT & T CORP.green1 sentence2015If a statute does not specifically provide an exception to that general rule, then “[a]n appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order.” Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 336 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam); see also Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352 , 352–53 (Tex. 1998) (“Appellate courts have jurisdiction to consider immediate appeals of interlocutory orders only if a statute explicitly provides appellate jurisdic- tion.”) (per curiam). | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. Stategreen1 sentence2011Prescott v. State, 744 S.W.2d 128, 130-31 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Hall v. State, 161 S.W.3d 142, 156 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2005, pet. ref'd). | 1 | 1 |
Schweinle v. Stategreen1 sentence2007See Schweinle v. State , 915 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Longaker v. Evansgreen1 sentence2002See Longaker v. Evans, 32 S.W.3d 725 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. dism’d); Hall v. Rutherford, 911 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied). | 1 | 1 |
| Huffman v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Morris v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Manning v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hooker v. Williamsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Briddle v. State
green
2 sentences2005Briddle , 742 S.W.2d at 389 . 2002Briddle, 742 S.W.2d at 389 . | 5 | 2002–2005 |
Le Sage v. Smith
green
2 sentences1963A lookout to the rear is not required in those cases, but Le-Sage v. Smith, supra, states the exception to that general rule. 1962A lookout to the rear is not required in those cases, but LeSage v. Smith, supra, states the exception to that general rule. | 3 | 1962–1966 |
Medford v. State
green
2 sentences2015On the other hand, although it is generally impermissible to instruct on the meanings of terms that are not statutorily defined, an exception to that general rule exists for “‘terms which have a known and established legal meaning, or which have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, as where the words used have a well-known common law Green - 9 meaning.’” Kirsch, 357 S.W.3d at 650 (quoting Medford, 13 S.W.3d at 772 ). 2015On the other hand, although it is generally impermissible to instruct on the meanings of terms that are not statutorily defined, an exception to that general rule exists for “ ‘terms which have a known and established legal meaning, or which have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, as where the words used have a well-known common law meaning.’ ” Kirsch, 357 S.W.3d at 650 (quoting Medford, 13 S.W.3d at 772 ). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Kirsch, Scott Alan
green
2 sentences2015On the other hand, although it is generally impermissible to instruct on the meanings of terms that are not statutorily defined, an exception to that general rule exists for “‘terms which have a known and established legal meaning, or which have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, as where the words used have a well-known common law Green - 9 meaning.’” Kirsch, 357 S.W.3d at 650 (quoting Medford, 13 S.W.3d at 772 ). 2015On the other hand, although it is generally impermissible to instruct on the meanings of terms that are not statutorily defined, an exception to that general rule exists for “ ‘terms which have a known and established legal meaning, or which have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, as where the words used have a well-known common law meaning.’ ” Kirsch, 357 S.W.3d at 650 (quoting Medford, 13 S.W.3d at 772 ). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
General Motors Corp. v. Simmons
green
2 sentences1980General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.1977). 1979General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977). | 2 | 1979–1980 |
Faour v. Faour
green
1 sentence2025Appellants urge, however, that applicable here is an exception to that general rule, which applies “when the conduct in question breaches a specific duty owed by the actor to the individual shareholder, such as when the conduct gives rise to a breach of contract claim.” See Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 888 n.55; Faour, 789 S.W.2d at 621–22 (“A corporate officer owes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders collectively, i.e. the corporation, but he does not occupy a fiduciary relationship with an individual shareholder, unless some contract or special relationship exists between them in addition to the | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Lee C. Ritchie v. Ann Caldwell Rupe, as Trustee for the Dallas Gordon Rupe, III 1995 Family Trust
green
1 sentence2025Appellants urge, however, that applicable here is an exception to that general rule, which applies “when the conduct in question breaches a specific duty owed by the actor to the individual shareholder, such as when the conduct gives rise to a breach of contract claim.” See Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 888 n.55; Faour, 789 S.W.2d at 621–22 (“A corporate officer owes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders collectively, i.e. the corporation, but he does not occupy a fiduciary relationship with an individual shareholder, unless some contract or special relationship exists between them in addition to the | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Moss, Jecia Javette
green
1 sentence2023The exception to that general rule was articulated in Ex parte Moss, 446 S.W.3d 786 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Pharris v. State
green
1 sentence2020Id. at 687-88 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Martinez v. Ryan
green
2 sentences2016In Martinez , the Court observed that, although federal habeas courts are generally barred from considering any claim that has not first been properly presented and adjudicated in state court, an exception to that general rule was required under these circumstances in order to “protect prisoners with a potentially legitimate claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.” Id. at 1315 . 2016It’was within the context of this recognition — that a convicted person cannot rea sonably be expected--to raise a viable pro se challenge to the effectiveness of his trial attorney without the assistance of counsel — that the Supreme Court crafted the equitable remedy in Martinez and Trevino that would permit such litigants to raise their substantial claims for the first time in a federal habeas proceeding.' See id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Williams v. State
green
1 sentence2015Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Hall v. Rutherford
green
1 sentence2002See Longaker v. Evans, 32 S.W.3d 725 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. dism’d); Hall v. Rutherford, 911 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Rogers v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Redinger v. Living, Inc. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| White v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Henderson v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Castro v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Garza v. Alviar green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Lewis v. Hill green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Montgomery v. Burch green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Dossey v. Oehler green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Morris Plan Bank of Fort Worth v. Ogden green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Berry v. Sunshine Laundries & Dry Cleaning Corp. green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Jones v. Downey neutral | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Riles v. Reichardt green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Valley Film Service v. Cruz neutral | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Scott v. McElroy green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Ross v. Smith green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Matthews v. Thatcher green | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.