10 Virginia opinions name it 5 courts 1988–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Neely v. Whitegreen2 sentences2002There is, however, an exception to that general rule “when the breach did not go to the ‘root of the contract’ but only to a minor part of the consideration.” Horton, 254 Va. at 115 , 487 S.E.2d at 203 (quoting Federal Ins., 242 Va. at 468 , 410 S.E.2d at 689 ; Neely v. White, 177 Va. 358, 366 , 14 S.E.2d 337,340 (1941)). 2002There is, however, an exception to that general rule “when the breach did not go to the ‘root of the contract’ but only to a minor part of the consideration.” Horton, 254 Va. at 115 , 487 S.E.2d at 203 (quoting Federal Ins., 242 Va. at 468 , 410 S.E.2d at 689 ; Neely v. White, 177 Va. 358, 366 , 14 S.E.2d 337,340 (1941)). | 2 | 2 |
Singh v. Mooneygreen2 sentences2013In Singh, we held that an order that is void ab initio "may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, anywhere, at any time, or in any manner." 261 Va. at 52 , 541 S.E.2d at 551 (internal quotation marks omitted). 2013In Singh, we held that an order that is void ab initio "may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, anywhere, at any time, or in any manner." 261 Va. at 52 , 541 S.E.2d at 551 (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bogese v. STATE HWY. & TRANSP. COM'R
green
2 sentences2005Id. (citation omitted). 2005Id. (citation omitted). | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Federal Insurance v. Starr Electric Co.
green
2 sentences2002There is, however, an exception to that general rule “when the breach did not go to the ‘root of the contract’ but only to a minor part of the consideration.” Horton, 254 Va. at 115 , 487 S.E.2d at 203 (quoting Federal Ins., 242 Va. at 468 , 410 S.E.2d at 689 ; Neely v. White, 177 Va. 358, 366 , 14 S.E.2d 337,340 (1941)). 2002There is, however, an exception to that general rule “when the breach did not go to the ‘root of the contract’ but only to a minor part of the consideration.” Horton, 254 Va. at 115 , 487 S.E.2d at 203 (quoting Federal Ins., 242 Va. at 468 , 410 S.E.2d at 689 ; Neely v. White, 177 Va. 358, 366 , 14 S.E.2d 337,340 (1941)). | 2 | 2001–2002 |
Horton v. Horton
green
2 sentences2002There is, however, an exception to that general rule “when the breach did not go to the ‘root of the contract’ but only to a minor part of the consideration.” Horton, 254 Va. at 115 , 487 S.E.2d at 203 (quoting Federal Ins., 242 Va. at 468 , 410 S.E.2d at 689 ; Neely v. White, 177 Va. 358, 366 , 14 S.E.2d 337,340 (1941)). 2002There is, however, an exception to that general rule “when the breach did not go to the ‘root of the contract’ but only to a minor part of the consideration.” Horton, 254 Va. at 115 , 487 S.E.2d at 203 (quoting Federal Ins., 242 Va. at 468 , 410 S.E.2d at 689 ; Neely v. White, 177 Va. 358, 366 , 14 S.E.2d 337,340 (1941)). | 2 | 2001–2002 |
Bailey v. Bailey
green
1 sentence2021Although Virginia cases generally treat constructive service by publication as conferring only in rem, not in personam, jurisdiction, see, e.g., Cranford, 208 Va. at 690-91 , Bailey, 172 Va. at 21-22 , we have never specifically addressed whether evidence of willful evasion of service would allow for an exception to that general rule. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Cranford v. Hubbard
green
1 sentence2021Although Virginia cases generally treat constructive service by publication as conferring only in rem, not in personam, jurisdiction, see, e.g., Cranford, 208 Va. at 690-91 , Bailey, 172 Va. at 21-22 , we have never specifically addressed whether evidence of willful evasion of service would allow for an exception to that general rule. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Com Transp. Com'R v. Glass
neutral
2 sentences2019Generally, a landowner “is entitled to recover for the damage to the remainder of the parcel taken, but not for damage to separate independent tracts.” Id. at 147-48 . 10 “An exception to that general rule, the unity of lands doctrine, allows an owner to recover for damage to other tracts of land which are not part of the actual taking when three factors are present: unity of use, physical unity, and unity of ownership.” Id. at 148 . 2019Generally, a landowner “is entitled to recover for the damage to the remainder of the parcel taken, but not for damage to separate independent tracts.” Id. at 147-48 . 10 “An exception to that general rule, the unity of lands doctrine, allows an owner to recover for damage to other tracts of land which are not part of the actual taking when three factors are present: unity of use, physical unity, and unity of ownership.” Id. at 148 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Ficklen v. City of Danville
green
2 sentences2010But in one of those decisions, Ficklen v. City of Danville, 146 Va. 426 , 131 S.E. 689 (1926), the Court recognized and applied an exception to that general principle, which would apply by analogy here. 2010But in one of those decisions, Ficklen v. City of Danville, 146 Va. 426 , 131 S.E. 689 (1926), the Court recognized and applied an exception to that general principle, which would apply by analogy here. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Appalachian Power Co. v. Earline Virginia Sanders
green
2 sentences2003Some jurisdictions recognize an exception to that general rule in cases in which the property owner knows that the lessee intends to admit the public to the leased premises, Sanders, 232 Va. at 193 , but our Supreme Court has “never adopted [such an] exception.” Id. 2003Some jurisdictions recognize an exception to that general rule in cases in which the property owner knows that the lessee intends to admit the public to the leased premises, Sanders, 232 Va. at 193 , but our Supreme Court has “never adopted [such an] exception.” Id. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Naccash v. Burger
green
2 sentences1988Parents’ Emotional Distress Count III of the motion for judgment seeks to recover for the parents’ "severe emotional distress in witnessing the negligent acts of the defendants on March 30, 1984, during the birth of George Scott Tucker and the observation of the severely depressed medical and physical condition of their son . . . during the succeeding year." While Virginia generally does not recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress absent physical injury to the person seeking to recover, an exception to that general rule was stated in Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va 1988Parents’ Emotional Distress Count III of the motion for judgment seeks to recover for the parents’ "severe emotional distress in witnessing the negligent acts of the defendants on March 30, 1984, during the birth of George Scott Tucker and the observation of the severely depressed medical and physical condition of their son . . . during the succeeding year." While Virginia generally does not recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress absent physical injury to the person seeking to recover, an exception to that general rule was stated in Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.