10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1925–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gilbert v. Richardsongreen2 sentences2023See also Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 747 (2) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (holding that, while the reservation of immunity clause of the Georgia Constitution, as amended in 1991, did not expressly refer to counties, “the 1991 amendment’s extension 9 of sovereign immunity to ‘the state and its departments and agencies’ must also apply to counties” (citations omitted)); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. 2023See also Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 747 (2) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (holding that, while the reservation of immunity clause of the Georgia Constitution, as amended in 1991, did not expressly refer to counties, “the 1991 amendment’s extension 9 of sovereign immunity to ‘the state and its departments and agencies’ must also apply to counties” (citations omitted)); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. | 2 | 2 |
Leonard v. FULTON NATL. BANK OF ATLANTAgreen2 sentences1998Bank of Atlanta, 86 Ga. App. 635, 638 ( 72 SE2d 93 ) (1952) (“[t]he right to inspect is not the equivalent of the right to possess premises, so as to make the landlord liable for the negligence ... by the tenant”). 1998Bank of Atlanta, 86 Ga. App. 635, 638 ( 72 SE2d 93 ) (1952) (“[t]he right to inspect is not the equivalent of the right to possess premises, so as to make the landlord liable for the negligence ... by the tenant”). | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Stategreen1 sentence1998As stated in Godwin, supra at 36 (2), “retention of. . . the right to enter the leased premises . . . during business hours for landlord-related purposes does not evidence such dominion and control of the premises so as to vitiate [landlord’s] limited liability under [OCGA § 44-7-14] and replace it with the liability imposed by [OCGA § 51-3-1]. [Cits.]” Ladson Investments v. Bagent, 151 Ga. App. 24, 25 (1) ( 258 SE2d 718 ) (1979) (“the duty to inspect arising from such a reservation clause is only commensurate with the scope of the obligation to repair”); Leonard v. Fulton Nat. | 1 | 1 |
Ladson Investments v. Bagentgreen2 sentences1998As stated in Godwin, supra at 36 (2), “retention of. . . the right to enter the leased premises . . . during business hours for landlord-related purposes does not evidence such dominion and control of the premises so as to vitiate [landlord’s] limited liability under [OCGA § 44-7-14] and replace it with the liability imposed by [OCGA § 51-3-1]. [Cits.]” Ladson Investments v. Bagent, 151 Ga. App. 24, 25 (1) ( 258 SE2d 718 ) (1979) (“the duty to inspect arising from such a reservation clause is only commensurate with the scope of the obligation to repair”); Leonard v. Fulton Nat. 1998As stated in Godwin, supra at 36 (2), “retention of. . . the right to enter the leased premises . . . during business hours for landlord-related purposes does not evidence such dominion and control of the premises so as to vitiate [landlord’s] limited liability under [OCGA § 44-7-14] and replace it with the liability imposed by [OCGA § 51-3-1]. [Cits.]” Ladson Investments v. Bagent, 151 Ga. App. 24, 25 (1) ( 258 SE2d 718 ) (1979) (“the duty to inspect arising from such a reservation clause is only commensurate with the scope of the obligation to repair”); Leonard v. Fulton Nat. | 1 | 1 |
Toombs County v. O'NEALgreen2 sentences1986See generally Toombs County v. O’Neal, 254 Ga. 390 (1) ( 330 SE2d 95 ) (1985); Nelson v. Spalding County’, 249 Ga. 334 (1) ( 290 SE2d 915 ) (1982). 1986See generally Toombs County v. O’Neal, 254 Ga. 390 (1) ( 330 SE2d 95 ) (1985); Nelson v. Spalding County’, 249 Ga. 334 (1) ( 290 SE2d 915 ) (1982). | 1 | 1 |
Kleinberg v. Lyonsgreen2 sentences1979See, e.g., Kleinberg v. Lyons, 39 Ga. App. 774 (2) ( 148 SE 535 ); Levy v. Logan, 99 Ga. App. 253 (2) ( 108 SE2d 307 ). 1979See, e.g., Kleinberg v. Lyons, 39 Ga. App. 774 (2) ( 148 SE 535 ); Levy v. Logan, 99 Ga. App. 253 (2) ( 108 SE2d 307 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Werner v. Rawson
green
2 sentences1947Code, §§ 37-211, 37-212; Werner v. Rawson, 89 Ga. 619 (2) ( 15 S. E. 813 ) ; Green v. Johnson, 153 Ga. 738 (3) ( 113 S. E. 402 ) ; J. 1947Code, §§ 37-211, 37-212; Werner v. Rawson, 89 Ga. 619 (2) ( 15 S. E. 813 ) ; Green v. Johnson, 153 Ga. 738 (3) ( 113 S. E. 402 ) ; J. | 2 | 1947–1947 |
Green v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1947Code, §§ 37-211, 37-212; Werner v. Rawson, 89 Ga. 619 (2) ( 15 S. E. 813 ) ; Green v. Johnson, 153 Ga. 738 (3) ( 113 S. E. 402 ) ; J. 1947Code, §§ 37-211, 37-212; Werner v. Rawson, 89 Ga. 619 (2) ( 15 S. E. 813 ) ; Green v. Johnson, 153 Ga. 738 (3) ( 113 S. E. 402 ) ; J. | 2 | 1947–1947 |
Nelson v. Spalding County
green
2 sentences1986See generally Toombs County v. O’Neal, 254 Ga. 390 (1) ( 330 SE2d 95 ) (1985); Nelson v. Spalding County’, 249 Ga. 334 (1) ( 290 SE2d 915 ) (1982). 1986See generally Toombs County v. O’Neal, 254 Ga. 390 (1) ( 330 SE2d 95 ) (1985); Nelson v. Spalding County’, 249 Ga. 334 (1) ( 290 SE2d 915 ) (1982). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Clark v. State of Georgia
green
2 sentences1982Clark v. State of Ga., 240 Ga. 188 ( 240 SE2d 5 ) (1977). 1982Clark v. State of Ga., 240 Ga. 188 ( 240 SE2d 5 ) (1977). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Ellis v. State
green
1 sentence1979"The Lessor shall have the right to enter in and upon said demised premises at all reasonable times for the purpose of (a) examination and inspection thereof, (b) making repairs, replacements ... to said demised premises. . .” While a landlord’s reservation of a right to enter leased premises for the purpose of inspecting and repairing, coupled with a landlord’s contractual or statutory obligation to keep certain conditions in repair may give rise to a duty to exercise ordinary care to inspect and keep the premises safe (see, e.g., City of Dalton v. Anderson, 72 Ga. App. 109 ( 33 SE2d 115 )), | 1 | 1979–1979 |
City of Dalton v. Anderson
green
1 sentence1979"The Lessor shall have the right to enter in and upon said demised premises at all reasonable times for the purpose of (a) examination and inspection thereof, (b) making repairs, replacements ... to said demised premises. . .” While a landlord’s reservation of a right to enter leased premises for the purpose of inspecting and repairing, coupled with a landlord’s contractual or statutory obligation to keep certain conditions in repair may give rise to a duty to exercise ordinary care to inspect and keep the premises safe (see, e.g., City of Dalton v. Anderson, 72 Ga. App. 109 ( 33 SE2d 115 )), | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Levy v. Logan
green
2 sentences1979See, e.g., Kleinberg v. Lyons, 39 Ga. App. 774 (2) ( 148 SE 535 ); Levy v. Logan, 99 Ga. App. 253 (2) ( 108 SE2d 307 ). 1979See, e.g., Kleinberg v. Lyons, 39 Ga. App. 774 (2) ( 148 SE 535 ); Levy v. Logan, 99 Ga. App. 253 (2) ( 108 SE2d 307 ). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Symmes v. Arnold
neutral
1 sentence1945Counsel for the plaintiff in error contends that the instrument, by reason of the reservation clause, is testamentary in character, is therefore not a deed, and that the grantor therein had a right to convey the timber to the defendants subsequently to the date of that instrument, and cites in support of this contenion, Symmes v. Arnold, 10 Ga. 506 , Johnson v. Yancey, 20 Ga. 707 ( 65 Am. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Johnson v. Yancey
neutral
1 sentence1945Counsel for the plaintiff in error contends that the instrument, by reason of the reservation clause, is testamentary in character, is therefore not a deed, and that the grantor therein had a right to convey the timber to the defendants subsequently to the date of that instrument, and cites in support of this contenion, Symmes v. Arnold, 10 Ga. 506 , Johnson v. Yancey, 20 Ga. 707 ( 65 Am. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Brewer v. Baxter
neutral
1 sentence1945D. 646 ), Brewer v. Baxter, 41 Ga. 212 (5 Am. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Arnold v. Arnold
green
1 sentence1945R. 530), Arnold v. Arnold, 62 Ga. 627 (4), Sperber v. Balster, 66 Ga. 317 , Blackstock *399 v. Mitchell, 67 Ga. 768 , Johnson v. Sirmans, 69 Ga. 617 , Ward v. Campbell, 73 Ga. 97 , and Barnes v. Stephens, 107 Ga. 436 ( 33 S. E. 399 ), all of which involved instruments containing a reservation clause similar to that contained in the instrument under consideration here, and held that the instruments there considered were testamentary in character. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Sperber v. Balster
green
1 sentence1945R. 530), Arnold v. Arnold, 62 Ga. 627 (4), Sperber v. Balster, 66 Ga. 317 , Blackstock *399 v. Mitchell, 67 Ga. 768 , Johnson v. Sirmans, 69 Ga. 617 , Ward v. Campbell, 73 Ga. 97 , and Barnes v. Stephens, 107 Ga. 436 ( 33 S. E. 399 ), all of which involved instruments containing a reservation clause similar to that contained in the instrument under consideration here, and held that the instruments there considered were testamentary in character. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Johnson v. Sirmans
neutral
1 sentence1945R. 530), Arnold v. Arnold, 62 Ga. 627 (4), Sperber v. Balster, 66 Ga. 317 , Blackstock *399 v. Mitchell, 67 Ga. 768 , Johnson v. Sirmans, 69 Ga. 617 , Ward v. Campbell, 73 Ga. 97 , and Barnes v. Stephens, 107 Ga. 436 ( 33 S. E. 399 ), all of which involved instruments containing a reservation clause similar to that contained in the instrument under consideration here, and held that the instruments there considered were testamentary in character. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Ward v. Campbell
green
1 sentence1945R. 530), Arnold v. Arnold, 62 Ga. 627 (4), Sperber v. Balster, 66 Ga. 317 , Blackstock *399 v. Mitchell, 67 Ga. 768 , Johnson v. Sirmans, 69 Ga. 617 , Ward v. Campbell, 73 Ga. 97 , and Barnes v. Stephens, 107 Ga. 436 ( 33 S. E. 399 ), all of which involved instruments containing a reservation clause similar to that contained in the instrument under consideration here, and held that the instruments there considered were testamentary in character. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Barnes v. Stephens
neutral
1 sentence1945R. 530), Arnold v. Arnold, 62 Ga. 627 (4), Sperber v. Balster, 66 Ga. 317 , Blackstock *399 v. Mitchell, 67 Ga. 768 , Johnson v. Sirmans, 69 Ga. 617 , Ward v. Campbell, 73 Ga. 97 , and Barnes v. Stephens, 107 Ga. 436 ( 33 S. E. 399 ), all of which involved instruments containing a reservation clause similar to that contained in the instrument under consideration here, and held that the instruments there considered were testamentary in character. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Smith v. City of Rome
neutral
1 sentence1945R. 530), Arnold v. Arnold, 62 Ga. 627 (4), Sperber v. Balster, 66 Ga. 317 , Blackstock *399 v. Mitchell, 67 Ga. 768 , Johnson v. Sirmans, 69 Ga. 617 , Ward v. Campbell, 73 Ga. 97 , and Barnes v. Stephens, 107 Ga. 436 ( 33 S. E. 399 ), all of which involved instruments containing a reservation clause similar to that contained in the instrument under consideration here, and held that the instruments there considered were testamentary in character. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Wynn v. Wynn
green
1 sentence1945This court, in Wynn v. Wynn, 112 Ga. 214 ( 37 S. E. 378 ), and again in Patellis v. Tanner, 197 Ga. 471 ( 29 S. E. 2d, 419 ), cited all the cases relied upon by the plaintiffs in error, and at the same time cited a large number of other decisions which dealt with similar instruments and held them to be deeds and not testamentary in character. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Fann v. State
green
1 sentence1945This court, in Wynn v. Wynn, 112 Ga. 214 ( 37 S. E. 378 ), and again in Patellis v. Tanner, 197 Ga. 471 ( 29 S. E. 2d, 419 ), cited all the cases relied upon by the plaintiffs in error, and at the same time cited a large number of other decisions which dealt with similar instruments and held them to be deeds and not testamentary in character. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Patellis v. Tanner
green
2 sentences1945This court, in Wynn v. Wynn, 112 Ga. 214 ( 37 S. E. 378 ), and again in Patellis v. Tanner, 197 Ga. 471 ( 29 S. E. 2d, 419 ), cited all the cases relied upon by the plaintiffs in error, and at the same time cited a large number of other decisions which dealt with similar instruments and held them to be deeds and not testamentary in character. 1945This court, in Wynn v. Wynn, 112 Ga. 214 ( 37 S. E. 378 ), and again in Patellis v. Tanner, 197 Ga. 471 ( 29 S. E. 2d, 419 ), cited all the cases relied upon by the plaintiffs in error, and at the same time cited a large number of other decisions which dealt with similar instruments and held them to be deeds and not testamentary in character. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Varnadoe v. State
green
1 sentence1945R. 530), Arnold v. Arnold, 62 Ga. 627 (4), Sperber v. Balster, 66 Ga. 317 , Blackstock *399 v. Mitchell, 67 Ga. 768 , Johnson v. Sirmans, 69 Ga. 617 , Ward v. Campbell, 73 Ga. 97 , and Barnes v. Stephens, 107 Ga. 436 ( 33 S. E. 399 ), all of which involved instruments containing a reservation clause similar to that contained in the instrument under consideration here, and held that the instruments there considered were testamentary in character. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Butler v. Gosling
green
1 sentence1925Butler v. Gosling, 130 Cal. 422 , 60 Pac. 596 .” When Ira M. | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.