reservation exception (Arkansas) · Go Syfert
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reservation exception in Arkansas

8 Arkansas opinions name it 2 courts 1897–2012 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

CaseFollowedCited
Buford v. Aldersongreen
arkctapp · 1998 · cited in 1 Arkansas opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012See Koonce v. Fordyce Lumber Co., 123 Ark. 85 , 184 S.W. 440 (1916) (affirming an award of damages to the grantee of standing timber after the grantor subsequently conveyed the land to a third party without reservation or exception of the timber); see also Buford v. Alderson, 61 Ark.

11
Koonce v. Fordyce Lumber Co.green
ark · 1916 · cited in 1 Arkansas opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
2 sentences

2012See Koonce v. Fordyce Lumber Co., 123 Ark. 85 , 184 S.W. 440 (1916) (affirming an award of damages to the grantee of standing timber after the grantor subsequently conveyed the land to a third party without reservation or exception of the timber); see also Buford v. Alderson, 61 Ark.

2012See Koonce v. Fordyce Lumber Co., 123 Ark. 85 , 184 S.W. 440 (1916) (affirming an award of damages to the grantee of standing timber after the grantor subsequently conveyed the land to a third party without reservation or exception of the timber); see also Buford v. Alderson, 61 Ark.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode green
ark · 1923
2 sentences

2010Arguments and discussion Appellant contends that (1) the three-eighths mineral interest was divided into a twenty-year term interest and a reversion-ary interest; (2) in reviewing the language of the Batson-Deltic deed, it cannot be reasonably concluded that a present rever-sionary right in |smineral interests was being reserved or excepted; (3) if the challenged language in the Batson-Deltic deed was intended as a reservation or exception of a reversionary right of mineral interests, the reservation or exception fails for lack of certainty; and (4) the trial court’s reliance on Bodcaw Lumber

2010Arguments and discussion Appellant contends that (1) the three-eighths mineral interest was divided into a twenty-year term interest and a reversion-ary interest; (2) in reviewing the language of the Batson-Deltic deed, it cannot be reasonably concluded that a present rever-sionary right in |smineral interests was being reserved or excepted; (3) if the challenged language in the Batson-Deltic deed was intended as a reservation or exception of a reversionary right of mineral interests, the reservation or exception fails for lack of certainty; and (4) the trial court’s reliance on Bodcaw Lumber

12010–2010
Cottrell v. Beard neutral
arkctapp · 2000
2 sentences

2010Cottrell v. Beard, 69 Ark.App. 87 , 9 S.W.3d 568 (2000).

2010Cottrell v. Beard, 69 Ark.App. 87 , 9 S.W.3d 568 (2000).

12010–2010
Wallner v. Johnson green
arkctapp · 1987
1 sentence

2000Wallner v. Johnson, 21 Ark.

12000–2000
Parker v. Parker neutral
ark · 1911
2 sentences

1987Parker v. Parker, 99 Ark. 244 , 138 S.W. 462 (1911).

1987Parker v. Parker, 99 Ark. 244 , 138 S.W. 462 (1911).

11987–1987
Guaranty Loan & Trust Co. v. Helena Improvement District neutral
ark · 1921
2 sentences

1959Dist., 148 Ark. 56 , 228 S.W. 1045, 1046 , this Court said: "A rule, apparently universal in its application, seems to be that—`A reservation or exception in favor of a stranger to a conveyance is void or inoperative,' and that a grantee in a deed `containing a reservation or exception in favor of a stranger to the conveyance is not estopped to deny its efficacy.'" Birkhahn, by virtue of time in possession and the other requisites heretofore set out having been met, obtained title to this one acre through adverse possession.

1959Dist., 148 Ark. 56 , 228 S.W. 1045, 1046 , this Court said: "A rule, apparently universal in its application, seems to be that—`A reservation or exception in favor of a stranger to a conveyance is void or inoperative,' and that a grantee in a deed `containing a reservation or exception in favor of a stranger to the conveyance is not estopped to deny its efficacy.'" Birkhahn, by virtue of time in possession and the other requisites heretofore set out having been met, obtained title to this one acre through adverse possession.

11959–1959
Beardslee v. New Berlin Light & Power Co. green
ny · 1912
1 sentence

1921A rule, apparently universal in its application, seems to be that “a reservation or exemption in favor of a stranger to a conveyance is void or inoperative,” and that a grantee in a deed “containing a reservation or exception in favor of a stranger to the conveyance is not estopped to deny its efficacy.” Beardslee v. New Berlin Light & Power Company, 207 N. Y. 34 , 32 Am. & Eng.

11921–1921
Stone v. Stone neutral
iowa · 1909
1 sentence

1911“A reservation is a clause in a deed whereby the grantor reserves some new thing to himself, issuing out of the thing granted and not in esse before; but'an exception is always part of the thing granted, or out of the general words or description of the grant.” 4 Kent, 468; Stone v. Stone, 141 Ia. 438 , 18 Am. & Eng.

11911–1911
Sinking-Fund Cases green
scotus · 1879
1 sentence

1897The reservation of power over the franchise,—that is, over that which is granted,—makes its grant a conditional or revocable contract, whose obligation is not impaired by its revocation or change.” In the Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700 , the question was whether Congress had the constitutional power to enact a law compelling the Union Pacific and Central Pacific Railroad Companies to set aside a portion of their current earnings as a sinking fund for the purpose of meeting a very large indebtedness secured by mortgage upon the roads, and payable at a future day.

11897–1897

Where else courts name it

TX 95 (1926–2026) NY 44 (1871–2024) PA 27 (1905–2025) AL 24 (1871–1993) OH 23 (1876–2026) ND 22 (1951–2023) CA 20 (1885–2021) WA 18 (1893–2018) WV 15 (1907–2021) OK 15 (1924–2016) GA 10 (1925–2023) KY 9 (1912–1964) IL 9 (1943–2025) AR 8 (1897–2012) CO 8 (1959–2022) MS 7 (1953–2016) CT 6 (1931–2012) WI 6 (1890–2024) LA 6 (1965–2014) FL 6 (1918–2025) MA 6 (1870–2001) IN 5 (1871–1994) MT 5 (1909–2022) AZ 5 (1966–2004) WY 5 (1925–1987) OR 5 (1913–1984) NJ 5 (1927–2010) ID 4 (1978–2019) MI 4 (1892–2004) KS 4 (1905–2019) MD 4 (1992–2002) ME 4 (1973–2019) TN 3 (1925–1999) HI 3 (1905–2025) VT 3 (1911–2012) VA 3 (1881–2025) IA 3 (1929–2021) MN 3 (1943–1992) NM 3 (1966–2007) AK 3 (1987–1998) SD 3 (1949–2021) MO 3 (1903–2010) UT 2 (1982–2002) NC 2 (2009–2023) SC 2 (1952–1999)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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