Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
8 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1959–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Mooregreen2 sentences2005Morrison v. Socolofsky, supra; see also Smith v. Moore, 172 Colo. 440 , 474 P.2d 794 (1970) (the reservation must be sufficient in clarity and certainty to qualify as a bargained-for reservation of the right to destroy the surface); Evans Fuel Co. v. Leyda, 77 Colo. 356 , 236 P. 1023 (1925) (although the right to destroy the surface may be reserved, the reservation of such a right must be made clear and expressed in terms so plain that there can be no doubt). 2005Morrison v. Socolofsky, supra; see also Smith v. Moore, 172 Colo. 440 , 474 P.2d 794 (1970) (the reservation must be sufficient in clarity and certainty to qualify as a bargained-for reservation of the right to destroy the surface); Evans Fuel Co. v. Leyda, 77 Colo. 356 , 236 P. 1023 (1925) (although the right to destroy the surface may be reserved, the reservation of such a right must be made clear and expressed in terms so plain that there can be no doubt). | 2 | 2 |
Calvat v. Juhangreen2 sentences2022See Mitchell v. Espinosa, 125 Colo. 267, 273-74 , 243 P.2d 412, 413 (1952); Calvat v. Juhan, 119 Colo. 561, 566 , 206 P.2d 600, 603 (1949). 2022See Mitchell v. Espinosa, 125 Colo. 267, 273-74 , 243 P.2d 412, 413 (1952); Calvat v. Juhan, 119 Colo. 561, 566 , 206 P.2d 600, 603 (1949). | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Espinosagreen2 sentences2022See Mitchell v. Espinosa, 125 Colo. 267, 273-74 , 243 P.2d 412, 413 (1952); Calvat v. Juhan, 119 Colo. 561, 566 , 206 P.2d 600, 603 (1949). 2022See Mitchell v. Espinosa, 125 Colo. 267, 273-74 , 243 P.2d 412, 413 (1952); Calvat v. Juhan, 119 Colo. 561, 566 , 206 P.2d 600, 603 (1949). | 1 | 1 |
Harlingen Irrigation District Cameron County No. 1 v. Caprock Communications Corp.green1 sentence2020No. 1 v. Caprock Commc’ns Corp., 49 S.W.3d 520, 533 (Tex. App. 2001) (“When both the granting clause and reservation clause cannot be given effect, the granting clause prevails and the reservation clause fails.”). ¶ 40 In short, I would, consistent with O’Brien and Brown, hold that, whatever the grantors may have been attempting to do by adding a reservation clause to the 1964 Deed, they could not reserve any more of the mineral estate than what they already owned. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Kirkgreen1 sentence2020See id. at 456-57 , 257 9 P.2d at 1046-47. | 1 | 1 |
Scott v. Lawsgreen2 sentences1959Compare Scott v. Laws, 1919, 185 Ky. 440 , 215 S.W.81,13A.L.R. 369. 1959Compare Scott v. Laws (1919), 185 Ky. 440 , 215 S.W. 81 , 13 A.L.R. 369 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Evans Fuel Co. v. Leyda
neutral
2 sentences2005Morrison v. Socolofsky, supra; see also Smith v. Moore, 172 Colo. 440 , 474 P.2d 794 (1970) (the reservation must be sufficient in clarity and certainty to qualify as a bargained-for reservation of the right to destroy the surface); Evans Fuel Co. v. Leyda, 77 Colo. 356 , 236 P. 1023 (1925) (although the right to destroy the surface may be reserved, the reservation of such a right must be made clear and expressed in terms so plain that there can be no doubt). 2005Morrison v. Socolofsky, supra; see also Smith v. Moore, 172 Colo. 440 , 474 P.2d 794 (1970) (the reservation must be sufficient in clarity and certainty to qualify as a bargained-for reservation of the right to destroy the surface); Evans Fuel Co. v. Leyda, 77 Colo. 356 , 236 P. 1023 (1925) (although the right to destroy the surface may be reserved, the reservation of such a right must be made clear and expressed in terms so plain that there can be no doubt). | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences2020That approach was consistent with the author judge’s preferred reasoning2 in Duhig, which concluded that “the intention 2Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940), was unusual in that the author judge essentially specially concurred by explaining his own distinct reasons for affirming the 17 of the parties to the deed was to invest the grantee with title to the surface and a one-half interest in the minerals,” while withdrawing via the reservation clause the half that the grantor did not own. 144 S.W.2d at 879 ; see also Patrick H. 2020That approach was consistent with the author judge’s preferred reasoning2 in Duhig, which concluded that “the intention 2Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940), was unusual in that the author judge essentially specially concurred by explaining his own distinct reasons for affirming the 17 of the parties to the deed was to invest the grantee with title to the surface and a one-half interest in the minerals,” while withdrawing via the reservation clause the half that the grantor did not own. 144 S.W.2d at 879 ; see also Patrick H. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Hanna v. Print Expediters Inc.
green
2 sentences2011Although, as employer's counsel noted in oral argument, the division went on to observe that the ALJ order at issue in Honna "did not contain any clause that reserved the issue of medical benefits," id. (emphasis added), we do not interpret that statement as requiring that a reservation clause specify the precise issues reserved. 2011Although, as employer's counsel noted in oral argument, the division went on to observe that the ALJ order at issue in Hanna "did not contain any clause that reserved the issue of medical benefits," id. (emphasis added), we do not interpret that statement as requiring that a reservation clause specify the precise issues reserved. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Brown & Root, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office
green
2 sentences2011As to the second of these contentions, we see nothing in Hanna (or in Brown & Root, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 833 P.2d 780 (Colo.App.1991), on which Hanna relied) to support employer's contention that a reservation clause must specifically list the issues being reserved. 2011As to the second of these contentions, we see nothing in Hanna (or in Brown & Root, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 833 P.2d 780 (Colo.App.1991), on which Hanna relied) to support employer's contention that a reservation clause must specifically list the issues being reserved. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Berman v. Sinclair Refining Co.
green
2 sentences1984Absent a specific reservation or exception contained in the deed, “a grantor conveys his entire right, title and interest, subject, of course, to any outstanding leases or encumbrances.” Berman v. Sinclair Refining Co., 168 Colo. 332 , 451 P.2d 742 (1969). 1984Absent a specific reservation or exception contained in the deed, “a grantor conveys his entire right, title and interest, subject, of course, to any outstanding leases or encumbrances.” Berman v. Sinclair Refining Co., 168 Colo. 332 , 451 P.2d 742 (1969). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Rule v. Link
neutral
2 sentences1979Rule v. Link, 84 Colo. 82 , 267 P. 1005 (1928); Eychaner v. Springer, 34 Colo.App. 412 , 527 P.2d 903 (1974). 1979Rule v. Link, 84 Colo. 82 , 267 P. 1005 (1928); Eychaner v. Springer, 34 Colo.App. 412 , 527 P.2d 903 (1974). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.