reservation exception in West Virginia

2021“A reservation or an exception in favor of a stranger to a conveyance does not serve to recognize or confirm a right which does not exist in his favor when the conveyance which contains such reservation or exception is made.” Syl. pt. 3, Erwin v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 134 W.

2021Va. at 909 , 62 S.E.2d at 343 , this Court expounded upon the rule, noting that at the time it was “elementary law, stated in every text book on the subject, that a reservation or exception in favor of a stranger to a conveyance is void or inoperative.” Our review of the law led us to conclude that it is evident that an exception or a reservation in favor of a stranger to a conveyance is void or inoperative to the extent that it may undertake to create or vest a new right or interest in his favor, or to enlarge or extend his then existing right or interest, and that it can operate only to reco

2016The Hoge court recognized the hazards associated with CBM and remarked: “Although the unrestricted term ‘gas’ was used in the reservation clause, in light of the conditions existing at the time of its execution [1920] we find it inconceivable that the parties intended a reservation of all types of gas.,,.” Hoge, 503 Pa. at 149-50 , 468 A.2d at 1384-85 .

2016The Hoge court recognized the hazards associated with CBM and remarked: “Although the unrestricted term ‘gas’ was used in the reservation clause, in light of the conditions existing at the time of its execution [1920] we find it inconceivable that the parties intended a reservation of all types of gas.,,.” Hoge, 503 Pa. at 149-50 , 468 A.2d at 1384-85 .

2016Va. 136 , 144 S.E.2d 434 (1965), that 5 The petitioners assigned as error the circuit court’s findings that the clause pertaining to the heirs of the grantor was not a reservation or exception but rather a conveyance; an interest in real property could pass to a stranger to the deed; the naming of the predominant mineral in a region meant all minerals; and language pertaining to oil royalty meant the oil and gas in place. 4 [u]nder Section 11, Article 1, Chapter 36, 1931, when any real estate is conveyed to any person, and no words of limitation are used in the conveyance, such conveyance oper

2010We acknowledged a similar issue in State v. King, 183 W.Va. 440 , 396 S.E.2d 402 (1990).

2010We acknowledged a similar issue in State v. King, 183 W.Va. 440 , 396 S.E.2d 402 (1990).

2006Considering such possible effect and the unlikely event that any grantee would agree to such breadth of its meaning, we are inclined to agree with the circuit court that the “to use” phrase in the context of the reservation clause in the deed and the opposing contentions of the Appellants and the Appellee as to what it meant to them at the time of the closing is ambiguous in that it is “of such doubtful meaning that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning.” Syl. pt. 4, Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, L.L.C., 219 W.Va. 266 , 633 S.E.2d 22 (2006).

2006Considering such possible effect and the unlikely event that any grantee would agree to such breadth of its meaning, we are inclined to agree with the circuit court that the “to use” phrase in the context of the reservation clause in the deed and the opposing contentions of the Appellants and the Appellee as to what it meant to them at the time of the closing is ambiguous in that it is “of such doubtful meaning that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning.” Syl. pt. 4, Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, L.L.C., 219 W.Va. 266 , 633 S.E.2d 22 (2006).

2004Id. 503 Pa. at 149-50 , 468 A.2d at 1384-85 .

2002In support of this assertion, the appellees cite to our decision in Bennett v. Smith, 136 W.Va. 903 , 69 S.E.2d 42 (1952), for the proposition that reference to an extraneous document cannot create a reservation or exception if that is not the clearly stated purpose of the reference.

2002In support of this assertion, the appellees cite to our decision in Bennett v. Smith, 136 W.Va. 903 , 69 S.E.2d 42 (1952), for the proposition that reference to an extraneous document cannot create a reservation or exception if that is not the clearly stated purpose of the reference.

1997As authority for their contention that Mr. Perrine could not convey a life estate to Mrs. Perrine in the reservation clause of the deed, the daughters’ brief cites the case of Field v. Morris, 88 Ark. 148 , 114 S.W. 206 (1908).

1997As authority for their contention that Mr. Perrine could not convey a life estate to Mrs. Perrine in the reservation clause of the deed, the daughters’ brief cites the case of Field v. Morris, 88 Ark. 148 , 114 S.W. 206 (1908).

1997The brief of the daughters cite our decision in Beverlin v. Casto, 62 W.Va. 158 , 57 S.E. 411 (1907), as support for their argument that a life estate to Mrs. Perrine could not be *251 created in the reservation clause of the deed.

1997The brief of the daughters cite our decision in Beverlin v. Casto, 62 W.Va. 158 , 57 S.E. 411 (1907), as support for their argument that a life estate to Mrs. Perrine could not be *251 created in the reservation clause of the deed.

1997Mrs. Perrine’s brief cites our decision in McDonald v. Jarvis, 64 W.Va. 62 , 60 S.E. 990 (1908) as standing for the proposition that a grantor may create a life estate for a grantee in a reservation clause.

1997Mrs. Perrine’s brief cites our decision in McDonald v. Jarvis, 64 W.Va. 62 , 60 S.E. 990 (1908) as standing for the proposition that a grantor may create a life estate for a grantee in a reservation clause.

1950(Washburn on Real Property, Section 2354; Devlin on Deeds, Section 979; Pearson v. Hartman, 100 Pa. 84 ; Wadsworth v. Smith, 11 Me. 278 , 26 Am.

1950Va. 281 , 87 S. E. 371 , this Court, citing Bridget v. Pierson, 45 N. Y. 601 , used this language: “A deed may by reservation preserve an existing right of way in a stranger but cannot create it.” And a reservation in a deed will be strictly construed against the grantor.

1950(Washburn on Real Property, Section 2354; Devlin on Deeds, Section 979; Pearson v. Hartman, 100 Pa. 84 ; Wadsworth v. Smith, 11 Me. 278 , 26 Am.

1950L. 1093, the rule is stated in this *910 form: “Neither a reservation nor an exception can be made in favor of a stranger, and the grantee is not estopped so to assert by acceptance of the deed, but an exception may recognize and confirm rights already existing in strangers.” In Gwinn v. Gwinn, 77 W.

1950Va. 281 , 87 S. E. 371 , this Court, citing Bridget v. Pierson, 45 N. Y. 601 , used this language: “A deed may by reservation preserve an existing right of way in a stranger but cannot create it.” And a reservation in a deed will be strictly construed against the grantor.

1949Va. 1 , 32 S.E. 2d 640 , which involved a reservation and exception of standing timber in a deed for land, this Court recognized and applied the well settled principle that forfeitures are not favored in a court of equity, held that a forfeiture of title to real estate will not be declared or enforced where the conduct of the party seeking the forfeiture has been such as to make it inequitable to do so and rejected the claim to the timber of the plaintiff as the grantee in the deed.

1948Va. 347 , 164 S. E. 298 , this Court held that a reservation contained in a deed of conveyance of a parcel of land of “% of all the oil and gas in and underlying said tract of land that may be produced therefrom, and the right of ingress and egress for the purpose of utilizing the same” is not a reservation or exception of the oil and gas in place; and that the “right of ingress and egress” was incident to the grantor’s right to go upon the land and capture his one-eighth interest in the oil and gas after it has been actually produced.

1948Beckley National Exchange Bank v. Lilly, 116 W.

1948The companionate cases of McIntosh v. Vail, 126 W.

1948Realty Securities & Discount Co. v. National Rubber & Leather Co., 122 W.

1934It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the reservation is ambiguous — that the deed first purports to reserve the interest for eighteen years, and in the next clause, which we have italicized, to continue it forever; that the latter clause is .therefore repugnant and should be excluded, under the rule laid down in Paxton v. Benedum-Trees Oil Co., 80 W.

1921The case of Deer Creek Lumber Co. v. Sheets, 75 W.

1921And in-so doing it is unnecessary to discuss the technical differences existing at the common law between a reservation and exception, or determine into which class the clause in question most-readily falls, other than to refer to Freudenberger Oil Co. v. Simmons, 75 W.

1907Under the rule that words may be, and, under certain conditions, should be, taken and applied distributively, it might be said that the intention was to reserve to the wife her dower and to the husband a life support, Building Ass'n v. Sohn, 54 W.