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10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1899–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lambeth v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Lambeth v. State, 257 Ga. 15, 16 ( 354 SE2d 144 ) (1987) (stating that “except where First Amendment rights are involved, a party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse 22 For that matter, older caselaw articulates an even stronger rule that would seem to exclude facial challenges altogether: The courts will never blot out of existence a great police and moral enactment on the ground that parts of it are attacked as unconstitutional, in a general onslaught upon it all. 2024See Lambeth v. State, 257 Ga. 15, 16 ( 354 SE2d 144 ) (1987) (stating that “except where First Amendment rights are involved, a party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse 22 For that matter, older caselaw articulates an even stronger rule that would seem to exclude facial challenges altogether: The courts will never blot out of existence a great police and moral enactment on the ground that parts of it are attacked as unconstitutional, in a general onslaught upon it all. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Frostgreen2 sentences2016The language of this provision was intended to create a “rule of inclusion,” with a strong presumption in favor of admissibility as it provides that such evidence “shall be admissible.” See State v. Frost, 297 Ga. 296, 300-01 ( 773 SE2d 700 ) (2015) (OCGA § 24-4-417 applying to DUI cases is a “rule of inclusion,” with a stronger presumption of admissibility than OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) as it provides that such evidence “shall be admissible”); Ronald L. 2016The language of this provision was intended to create a “rule of inclusion,” with a strong presumption in favor of admissibility as it provides that such evidence “shall be admissible.” See State v. Frost, 297 Ga. 296, 300-01 ( 773 SE2d 700 ) (2015) (OCGA § 24-4-417 applying to DUI cases is a “rule of inclusion,” with a stronger presumption of admissibility than OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) as it provides that such evidence “shall be admissible”); Ronald L. | 2 | 2 |
Jefferson v. Stategreen2 sentences2016In Jefferson v. State, 273 Ga. App. 61, 63 (1) ( 614 SE2d 182 ) (2005), this Court stated that “[e]vidence of recent unexplained possession of stolen property will authorize but not require the trior of fact to infer guilt and an appellate court may find it sufficient in itself to support a conviction for the crime of theft by taking.” (Citations and footnotes omitted; emphasis in original.) The nearer the time of the theft to the possession of the item stolen, the stronger the presumption of guilt. 2016In Jefferson v. State, 273 Ga. App. 61, 63 (1) ( 614 SE2d 182 ) (2005), this Court stated that “[e]vidence of recent unexplained possession of stolen property will authorize but not require the trior of fact to infer guilt and an appellate court may find it sufficient in itself to support a conviction for the crime of theft by taking.” (Citations and footnotes omitted; emphasis in original.) The nearer the time of the theft to the possession of the item stolen, the stronger the presumption of guilt. | 1 | 1 |
Shorter v. Watersgreen1 sentence2016See Shorter v. Waters, 275 Ga. at 584 . | 1 | 1 |
Williamson v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Williamson v. State, 248 Ga. 47, 48 (1) (a) ( 281 SE2d 512 ) (1981). 2016Williamson v. State, 248 Ga. 47, 48 (1) (a) ( 281 SE2d 512 ) (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Alston v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Cf. Alston v. State, 277 Ga. App. 117, 117-118 (1) (a) ( 625 SE2d 475 ) (2005) (withdrawal of request for jury charge on an affirmative defense was not ineffective assistance where defendant did not make the requisite admissions to support such a defense). 2010Cf. Alston v. State, 277 Ga. App. 117, 117-118 (1) (a) ( 625 SE2d 475 ) (2005) (withdrawal of request for jury charge on an affirmative defense was not ineffective assistance where defendant did not make the requisite admissions to support such a defense). | 1 | 1 |
Radford v. Stategreen1 sentence2010See Martinez, 284 Ga. at 141-142 (4) (decision not to pursue affirmative defense of insanity based upon post-traumatic stress disorder was a reasonable strategic one, where, among other things, defendant was not prepared to admit that he committed the underlying violent act, and defense counsel believed that jury would not accept such a defense as a plausible explanation for why defendant was violent); Radford, 281 Ga. at 304-305 (2) (decision not to pursue mental health defense was a reasonable strategic one where defense counsel believed that such a defense would have detracted from what he | 1 | 1 |
Lawton v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See Martinez, 284 Ga. at 141-142 (4) (decision not to pursue affirmative defense of insanity based upon post-traumatic stress disorder was a reasonable strategic one, where, among other things, defendant was not prepared to admit that he committed the underlying violent act, and defense counsel believed that jury would not accept such a defense as a plausible explanation for why defendant was violent); Radford, 281 Ga. at 304-305 (2) (decision not to pursue mental health defense was a reasonable strategic one where defense counsel believed that such a defense would have detracted from what he 2010See Martinez, 284 Ga. at 141-142 (4) (decision not to pursue affirmative defense of insanity based upon post-traumatic stress disorder was a reasonable strategic one, where, among other things, defendant was not prepared to admit that he committed the underlying violent act, and defense counsel believed that jury would not accept such a defense as a plausible explanation for why defendant was violent); Radford, 281 Ga. at 304-305 (2) (decision not to pursue mental health defense was a reasonable strategic one where defense counsel believed that such a defense would have detracted from what he | 1 | 1 |
Rigo v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See Martinez, 284 Ga. at 141-142 (4) (decision not to pursue affirmative defense of insanity based upon post-traumatic stress disorder was a reasonable strategic one, where, among other things, defendant was not prepared to admit that he committed the underlying violent act, and defense counsel believed that jury would not accept such a defense as a plausible explanation for why defendant was violent); Radford, 281 Ga. at 304-305 (2) (decision not to pursue mental health defense was a reasonable strategic one where defense counsel believed that such a defense would have detracted from what he 2010See Martinez, 284 Ga. at 141-142 (4) (decision not to pursue affirmative defense of insanity based upon post-traumatic stress disorder was a reasonable strategic one, where, among other things, defendant was not prepared to admit that he committed the underlying violent act, and defense counsel believed that jury would not accept such a defense as a plausible explanation for why defendant was violent); Radford, 281 Ga. at 304-305 (2) (decision not to pursue mental health defense was a reasonable strategic one where defense counsel believed that such a defense would have detracted from what he | 1 | 1 |
Martinez v. Stategreen1 sentence2010See Martinez, 284 Ga. at 141-142 (4) (decision not to pursue affirmative defense of insanity based upon post-traumatic stress disorder was a reasonable strategic one, where, among other things, defendant was not prepared to admit that he committed the underlying violent act, and defense counsel believed that jury would not accept such a defense as a plausible explanation for why defendant was violent); Radford, 281 Ga. at 304-305 (2) (decision not to pursue mental health defense was a reasonable strategic one where defense counsel believed that such a defense would have detracted from what he | 1 | 1 |
Ruffin v. Stategreen1 sentence2009Ruffin, supra, 284 Ga. at 57 (2) (b) (i) (the longer the delay, the stronger the presumption that it has prejudiced the accused). | 1 | 1 |
Hayes v. Stategreen1 sentence2009Hayes, 298 Ga. App. at 341 (2) (a). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Callaway v. State
green
2 sentences1933In Callaway v. State, 151 Ga. 342 ( 106 S. E. 577 ), the court instructed the jury that “where the only witness is an accomplice, the corroborating circumstances referred to must be such as to connect the defendant with the perpetration of the crime and tend to show his participation therein.” In the Callaway case the court said: “If the rule upon the subject of corroborating evidence, that corroborating circumstances must be such as, independently of the testimony of the accomplice, would lead to the inference of the guilt of the accused, and must in some way connect the defendant with the cr 1933In Callaway v. State, 151 Ga. 342 ( 106 S. E. 577 ), the court instructed the jury that “where the only witness is an accomplice, the corroborating circumstances referred to must be such as to connect the defendant with the perpetration of the crime and tend to show his participation therein.” In the Callaway case the court said: “If the rule upon the subject of corroborating evidence, that corroborating circumstances must be such as, independently of the testimony of the accomplice, would lead to the inference of the guilt of the accused, and must in some way connect the defendant with the cr | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Brewster v. Wooldridge
green
1 sentence1899Under the decision of this court in Brewster v. Wooldridge, 100 Ga. 305 , “the common-law action of ejectment was not affected, nor the provisions of. the code applicable thereto repealed, by the pleading-act approved December 15th, 1893.” The court therefore erred in his charge to the jury in this case, touching the manner in which the verdict was obtained in the ejectment case, that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to introduce any evidence in order to obtain that verdict, “the law being that when a case is properly paragraphed and not denied in writing, the plaintiff is entitled to a | 1 | 1899–1899 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.