inordinately high bar in Indiana

2020That said, our court has recognized that this requirement must not pose “an inordinately high bar.” Lynn v. Freeman, 157 N.E.3d 17 , 25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing T.L. v. J.L., 950 N.E.2d 779, 788 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)).

2016Also, Mother stated that she preferred a neighborhood setting where she and the Child could exercise in the evenings and interact with people. [24] As our court has recognized, if “the requirement of a legitimate and good faith reason[ ] posed an inordinately high bar for a relocating parent to meet, it could too often prevent trial courts from . . . appropriately deciding the dispute based on the best interests of the affected child.” T.L., 950 N.E.2d at 788 .

2016Even so, we recognize that it would render the relocating parent’s burden of proof meaningless if we were to accept as legitimate “any stated reason that is not an outright admission that the parent is relocating to interfere with the other parent’s rights.” Gilbert v. Gilbert, 7 N.E.3d 316, 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). [25] In light of the forgoing, and notwithstanding any evidence indicating that Mother’s relocation was in bad faith and for the purpose of distancing the Child from Father, the record supports the finding that Mother legitimately desired to live in the Fishers area.

2014Even so, we recognize that it would render the relocating parent’s burden of proof meaningless if we were to accept as legitimate “any stated reason that is not an outright admission that the parent is relocating to interfere with the other parent’s rights.” Gilbert v. Gilbert, 7 N.E.3d 316, 326 (lnd.Ct.App. 2014), (Robb, J., dissenting).

2018H.H., 3 N.E.3d at 35 (emphasis added). [10] Here, neither party requested, and the trial court was not required to enter, findings and conclusions.