third step analysis in Kansas

2020In evaluating the possible prejudicial effect of evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs, the district court should consider, among other factors: the likelihood that such evidence will contribute to an improperly based jury verdict; the extent to which such evidence may distract the jury from the central issues of the trial; and how time consuming it will be to prove the prior conduct." State v. Boysaw, 309 Kan. 526 , 541, 439 P.3d 909 (2019).

2020A district court abuses its 16 discretion when: (1) no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the judge; (2) a ruling is based on an error of law; or (3) substantial competent evidence does not support a finding of fact on which the exercise of discretion is based. [Citation omitted]." State v. Boysaw, 309 Kan. 526 , 539, 439 P.3d 909 (2019).

2026Hollins, 320 Kan. at 242 (citing State v. Holley, 313 Kan. 249 , 253, 485 P.3d 614 [2021]).

2019K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3414 provides that, "[i]n cases where there is some evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser included crime as provided in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5109, and amendments thereto, the judge shall instruct the jury as to the crime charged and any such lesser included crime." We recently reiterated that "'lesser included offense instructions must be given when there is some evidence, [viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant,] emanating from whatever source and proffered by whichever party, that would reasonably justify a convi

2016In the third step of the analysis, Daws must establish that the instruction is factually appropriate because there is “some evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser included crime.” K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3414(3); Plummer, 295 Kan. 156 , Syl. ¶ 1.

2016In the third step of the analysis, Daws must establish that the instruction is factually appropriate because there is "some evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser included crime." K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3414(3); Plummer, 295 Kan. 156 , Syl. ¶ 1.

2008As in the instant case, it held that the “district court obviously (albeit implicitly) found the prosecutor’s stated reasons credible.” 187 P.3d at 1174 .

2007Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767 .

2002This court addressed the contention that the Purkett decision allowed attorneys too much leeway in formulating race-neutral reasons in State v. Adams, 269 Kan. 681, 687-88 , 8 P.3d 724 (2000), by responding that it is during the third step of the analysis that the district judge has the ability to reject any pretextual race-neutral justifications.

2002This court addressed the contention that the Purkett decision allowed attorneys too much leeway in formulating race-neutral reasons in State v. Adams, 269 Kan. 681, 687-88 , 8 P.3d 724 (2000), by responding that it is during the third step of the analysis that the district judge has the ability to reject any pretextual race-neutral justifications.