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30 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1990–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gibson v. Stategreen2 sentences2014“The ultimate plausibility of that race-neutral explanation is to be considered as part of the third step of the analysis, in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike (usually the defendant) has satisfied his burden of persuasion to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the strike was indeed the product of the proponent’s purposeful discrimination.” Id. (citing Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 ). 5 “Whether the opponent [of the strike] satisfies his burden of persuasion to show that the proponent’s facially race-neutral explanation for his strike is pre- textual, 2013“Whether the opponent [of the strike] satisfies his burden of persuasion to show that the proponent’s facially race-neutral explanation for his strike is pre-textual, not genuine, is a question of fact for the trial court to resolve in the first instance.” Id. (citing Gibson v. State, 144 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Tex. Crim. | 6 | 6 |
Purkett v. Elemgreen2 sentences2014“The ultimate plausibility of that race-neutral explanation is to be considered as part of the third step of the analysis, in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike (usually the defendant) has satisfied his burden of persuasion to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the strike was indeed the product of the proponent’s purposeful discrimination.” Id. (citing Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 ). 5 “Whether the opponent [of the strike] satisfies his burden of persuasion to show that the proponent’s facially race-neutral explanation for his strike is pre- textual, 2014“The ultimate plausibility of that race-neutral explanation is to be considered as part of the third step of the analysis, in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike (usually the defendant) has satisfied his burden of persuasion to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the strike was indeed the product of the proponent’s purposeful discrimination.” Id. (citing Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 ). 5 “Whether the opponent [of the strike] satisfies his burden of persuasion to show that the proponent’s facially race-neutral explanation for his strike is pre- textual, | 5 | 11 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2005See Johnson , 879 S.W.2d at 316 . 2003See Johnson , 879 S.W.2d at 316 . | 4 | 4 |
Watkins v. Stategreen2 sentences2020“The ultimate plausibility of that race-neutral explanation is to be considered as part of the third step of the analysis, in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike (usually the defendant) has satisfied his burden of persuasion to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the strike was indeed the product of the proponent’s purposeful discrimination.” Id. 2017“The ultimate plausibility of that race-neutral explanation is to be considered as part of the third step of the analysis, in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike (usually the defendant) has satisfied his burden of persuasion to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the strike was indeed the product of the proponent’s purposeful discrimination.” Id. | 1 | 12 |
Blackman v. Stategreen1 sentence2018The ultimate plausibility of the race-neutral explanation for exercising a strike is then considered under the third step of the analysis, “in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike has satisfied his burden of persuasion to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the strike was indeed the product of purposeful discrimination.” Blackman v. State, 414 S.W.3d 757, 765 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Mathis v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Mathis v. State , 67 S.W.3d 918, 924-25 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Grant v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Grant, 325 S.W.3d at 657 ; see also Watkins, 245 S.W.3d at 447 (“The ultimate plausibility of that race-neutral explanation is to be considered as part of the third step of the analysis, in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike (usually the defendant) has satisfied his burden of persuasion to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the strike was indeed the product of the proponent’s purposeful discrimination. | 1 | 1 |
Trevino v. Ortegagreen1 sentence2010Offshore Pipelines, Inc., 984 S.W.2d at 666 (citing Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 954-55 (Baker, J., concurring)). | 1 | 1 |
Tompkins v. Stategreen1 sentence2008App. 2002); Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195, 202 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Deborah J. Swenson v. Management Recruiters International, Inc. David Marth, State of Minnesota, Amicus Curiae/appellantgreen1 sentence2001Because the third step of the inquiry focuses on conflicting federal legislation, a contention that federally-mandated arbitration runs afoul of a state statutory scheme is generally irrelevant. 9 See Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int’l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir.1988), overruled on other grounds by Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 , 111 S.Ct. 1647 , 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991); DeSapio v. Josephthal & Co., Inc., 143 Misc.2d 611, 616 , 540 N.Y.S.2d 932 , 936 *99 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1989). | 1 | 1 |
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.green2 sentences2001Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 , 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2337 , 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987); see also Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 627-28 , 105 S.Ct. at 3354-55 ; In re Conseco Fin. 2001Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 , 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2337 , 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987); see also Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 627-28 , 105 S.Ct. at 3354-55 ; In re Conseco Fin. | 1 | 1 |
Younger v. Harrisgreen2 sentences1990See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51 , 91 S.Ct. 746, 754 , 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). 1990See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51 , 91 S.Ct. 746, 754 , 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Guzman v. State
green
1 sentence2008If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.7 At the second step of this process, the proponent of the strike need only tender an explanation that is race neutral on its face.8 The ultimate plausibility of that race-neutral explanation is to be considered as part of the third step of the analysis, in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike (usually the defendant) has satisfied his burden of persuasion to establish by a preponderance of the evid | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
green
2 sentences2001Because the third step of the inquiry focuses on conflicting federal legislation, a contention that federally-mandated arbitration runs afoul of a state statutory scheme is generally irrelevant. 9 See Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int’l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir.1988), overruled on other grounds by Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 , 111 S.Ct. 1647 , 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991); DeSapio v. Josephthal & Co., Inc., 143 Misc.2d 611, 616 , 540 N.Y.S.2d 932 , 936 *99 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1989). 2001Because the third step of the inquiry focuses on conflicting federal legislation, a contention that federally-mandated arbitration runs afoul of a state statutory scheme is generally irrelevant. 9 See Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int’l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir.1988), overruled on other grounds by Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 , 111 S.Ct. 1647 , 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991); DeSapio v. Josephthal & Co., Inc., 143 Misc.2d 611, 616 , 540 N.Y.S.2d 932 , 936 *99 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1989). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
DeSapio v. Josephthal & Co.
green
2 sentences2001Because the third step of the inquiry focuses on conflicting federal legislation, a contention that federally-mandated arbitration runs afoul of a state statutory scheme is generally irrelevant. 9 See Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int’l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir.1988), overruled on other grounds by Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 , 111 S.Ct. 1647 , 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991); DeSapio v. Josephthal & Co., Inc., 143 Misc.2d 611, 616 , 540 N.Y.S.2d 932 , 936 *99 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1989). 2001Because the third step of the inquiry focuses on conflicting federal legislation, a contention that federally-mandated arbitration runs afoul of a state statutory scheme is generally irrelevant. 9 See Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int’l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir.1988), overruled on other grounds by Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 , 111 S.Ct. 1647 , 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991); DeSapio v. Josephthal & Co., Inc., 143 Misc.2d 611, 616 , 540 N.Y.S.2d 932 , 936 *99 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1989). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon
green
2 sentences2001Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 , 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2337 , 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987); see also Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 627-28 , 105 S.Ct. at 3354-55 ; In re Conseco Fin. 2001Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 , 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2337 , 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987); see also Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 627-28 , 105 S.Ct. at 3354-55 ; In re Conseco Fin. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.