third step analysis in California

2015(Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280 .) The Supreme Court later disapproved that standard for purposes of establishing a prima facie case, replacing it with the current test. ( Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 166-168.)4 Moreover, the court here made no factual findings as to any of the reasons offered by the prosecutor, which supports the conclusion that the court did not intend to engage in a third-step analysis. 4.

2015(Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280 .) The Supreme Court later disapproved that standard for purposes of establishing a prima facie case, replacing it with the current test. ( Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 166-168.)4 Moreover, the court here made no factual findings as to any of the reasons offered by the prosecutor, which supports the conclusion that the court did not intend to engage in a third-step analysis. 4.

2021(Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1158 .) The People press that we should conduct a first-stage review.2 Without conceding that Jones established a prima facie case, the People alternately engage in a third-step analysis.

2021(Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1158 .) The People press that we should conduct a first-stage review.2 Without conceding that Jones established a prima facie case, the People alternately engage in a third-step analysis.

2021In Scott, our Supreme Court acknowledged that the law in distinguishing between a first- and a third-stage review “has not always been entirely consistent.” (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 386 .) In Scott, the court “sought to rectify the inconsistency by clarifying that ‘where (1) the trial court has determined that no prima facie case of discrimination exists, (2) the trial court allows or invites the prosecutor to state his or her reasons for excusing the juror for the record, (3) the prosecutor provides nondiscriminatory reasons, and (4) the trial court determines that the prosecutor’s non

2021In Scott, our Supreme Court acknowledged that the law in distinguishing between a first- and a third-stage review “has not always been entirely consistent.” (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 386 .) In Scott, the court “sought to rectify the inconsistency by clarifying that ‘where (1) the trial court has determined that no prima facie case of discrimination exists, (2) the trial court allows or invites the prosecutor to state his or her reasons for excusing the juror for the record, (3) the prosecutor provides nondiscriminatory reasons, and (4) the trial court determines that the prosecutor’s non

2015Chung Failed to Make a Prima Facie Showing When, as here, a trial court finds a defendant has failed to make a prima facie showing giving rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose, we “undertake an independent review of the record to decide ‘the legal question whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on the basis of race.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 614 .) We sustain the finding of the trial court if we conclude the totality of the relevant facts does not give rise to an inference of 4 Whether the trial court applied the corre

2015Chung Failed to Make a Prima Facie Showing When, as here, a trial court finds a defendant has failed to make a prima facie showing giving rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose, we “undertake an independent review of the record to decide ‘the legal question whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on the basis of race.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 614 .) We sustain the finding of the trial court if we conclude the totality of the relevant facts does not give rise to an inference of 4 Whether the trial court applied the corre

2015(Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280 .) The Supreme Court later disapproved that standard for purposes of establishing a prima facie case, replacing it with the current test. ( Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 166-168.)4 Moreover, the court here made no factual findings as to any of the reasons offered by the prosecutor, which supports the conclusion that the court did not intend to engage in a third-step analysis. 4.

2015(Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280 .) The Supreme Court later disapproved that standard for purposes of establishing a prima facie case, replacing it with the current test. ( Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 166-168.)4 Moreover, the court here made no factual findings as to any of the reasons offered by the prosecutor, which supports the conclusion that the court did not intend to engage in a third-step analysis. 4.

2025In In re Young (2004) 32 Cal.4th 900 , the California Supreme Court determined that Three Strike prisoners who had reached their maximum credit limit under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (c)(5) were eligible for a meritorious sentence reduction under Penal Code section 2935.

2025(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 .) If the moving party carries the burden of production, the court reaches the third step of the analysis and determines whether the opposing party has met its burden of production and shown the existence of a triable issue of material fact.

2024(Smith v. Selma Community Hospital (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1515 ; Mau v. Hollywood Commercial Buildings, Inc. (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 459, 466 .) The third step of our analysis addresses Via Appia’s specific contentions about the absence of evidence on particular points.

2024(Smith v. Selma Community Hospital (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1515 ; Mau v. Hollywood Commercial Buildings, Inc. (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 459, 466 .) The third step of our analysis addresses Via Appia’s specific contentions about the absence of evidence on particular points.

2021Where . . . the issue is predominately one of law, we review it de novo.” (Border Business Park, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1538 , 20 1554; see Ali v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 246, 250 .) On our de novo review, we conclude the dedication requirement is constitutional under Nollan and Dolan.

2021(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636; Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p, 539.) The Agency argues that we must affirm the juvenile court’s substantial evidence determination even if other evidence supports a contrary conclusion.

2016(People v. Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 900 .) We accord great deference to the trial court, so long as “the trial court has made a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate each stated reason as applied to each challenged juror. [Citations.] When the prosecutor’s stated reasons are both inherently plausible and supported by the record, the trial court need not question the prosecutor or make detailed findings.

2015(Ibid.) Under the second step of the test, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by “ ‘articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.’ ” (Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 861 .) “If the employer sustains this burden, the presumption of discrimination disappears.” ( Guz, supra, at p. 356 .) Under the third step of the test, the “plaintiff must . . . have the opportunity to attack the employer’s proffered reasons as pretexts for discrimination, or to offer any other evidence of discriminatory motive.” (Ibid.) In the summary judgment context

2015(Ibid.) Under the second step of the test, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by “ ‘articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.’ ” (Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 861 .) “If the employer sustains this burden, the presumption of discrimination disappears.” ( Guz, supra, at p. 356 .) Under the third step of the test, the “plaintiff must . . . have the opportunity to attack the employer’s proffered reasons as pretexts for discrimination, or to offer any other evidence of discriminatory motive.” (Ibid.) In the summary judgment context

2015(Ibid.) Under the second step of the test, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by “ ‘articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.’ ” (Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 861 .) “If the employer sustains this burden, the presumption of discrimination disappears.” ( Guz, supra, at p. 356 .) Under the third step of the test, the “plaintiff must . . . have the opportunity to attack the employer’s proffered reasons as pretexts for discrimination, or to offer any other evidence of discriminatory motive.” (Ibid.) In the summary judgment context

2015“So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal.” (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 864 .) The fundamental inquiry is: “[i]s there substantial evidence to support the trial court’s ruling that the prosecutor’s reasons for excusing prospective jurors were based on proper grounds, and not because of the prospective jurors’ membership in a protected group?

2015The relative plausibility or implausibility of each explanation for a particular challenge . . . may strengthen or weaken the assessment of the prosecution’s explanation as to other challenges and thereby assist the fact-finder in determining overall intent.”’” (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 182, fn. 6 .) Because Wheeler motions call upon trial judges’ personal observations, we give great deference to the trial court’s findings under the third step of this analysis (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98, fn. 1 ), and review the trial court’s evaluation of proffered nondiscriminatory reason

2015(Ibid.) Under the second step of the test, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by “ ‘articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.’ ” (Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 861 .) “If the employer sustains this burden, the presumption of discrimination disappears.” ( Guz, supra, at p. 356 .) Under the third step of the test, the “plaintiff must . . . have the opportunity to attack the employer’s proffered reasons as pretexts for discrimination, or to offer any other evidence of discriminatory motive.” (Ibid.) In the summary judgment context

2015(Ibid.) Under the second step of the test, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by “ ‘articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.’ ” (Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 861 .) “If the employer sustains this burden, the presumption of discrimination disappears.” ( Guz, supra, at p. 356 .) Under the third step of the test, the “plaintiff must . . . have the opportunity to attack the employer’s proffered reasons as pretexts for discrimination, or to offer any other evidence of discriminatory motive.” (Ibid.) In the summary judgment context

2013(See Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98 .) Since Batson , the high court has addressed this question in Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. 231 and Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. 472 .

2013(See Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98 .) Since Batson, the high court has addressed this question in Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. 231 and Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. 472 .

2013We held in Leal that the third-step inquiry means that a court finding both CUA authorization and satisfaction of the Lent test cannot automatically deny confirmation; it must go on to balance the competing public policy interests. ( Leal, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at pp. 843-844.) This exercise of discretion also does not constitute a prohibited second-guessing of voters or physicians (id. at p. 844), a prohibition more properly invoked during the step-one inquiry into valid authorization (id. at p. 839).

2013(See Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98 .) Since Batson , the high court has addressed this question in Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. 231 and Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. 472 .

2013(See Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98 .) Since Batson, the high court has addressed this question in Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. 231 and Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. 472 .

2006That step required the court to make “ ‘ “a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor’s explanation[s] in light of the circumstances of the case as then known” ’ ” (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 919 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 769 , 74 P.3d 852 ])—i.e., “all of the circumstances”; (Pe ople v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1322 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 71 P.3d 270 ], overruled on other grounds in Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. 162, 173 .) “This final step involves evaluating ‘the persuasiveness of the justification’ proffered by the prosecutor, but ‘the ultimate burden of pers