10 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1881–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
MacKall v. Stategreen2 sentences2024The Mackall Court distinguished the case before it from Spurrier, noting that the exceptions listed in subsection (c) were contained in “a subsection subsequent to the enacting clause of the offense” and were “not . . . so incorporated with the definition or description of the offense as to constitute a part thereof.” Mackall, 283 Md. at 111 . 16 15 The Mackall Court explained that Spurrier “concerned the provisions of subsection (b) [of former Article 27, § 36], now subsection (c) and hereinafter referred to as subsection (c)[.]” Mackall, 283 Md. at 109 ; see also id. at 105 n.5 (explaining t 2024The Mackall Court distinguished the case before it from Spurrier, noting that the exceptions listed in subsection (c) were contained in “a subsection subsequent to the enacting clause of the offense” and were “not . . . so incorporated with the definition or description of the offense as to constitute a part thereof.” Mackall, 283 Md. at 111 . 16 15 The Mackall Court explained that Spurrier “concerned the provisions of subsection (b) [of former Article 27, § 36], now subsection (c) and hereinafter referred to as subsection (c)[.]” Mackall, 283 Md. at 109 ; see also id. at 105 n.5 (explaining t | 3 | 4 |
United States v. Watersgreen2 sentences2024United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971); see also, e.g., State v. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn. 1984) (“The test for determining what constitutes a basic element of rather than an exception to a statute has been stated as whether the exception is so incorporated with the clause defining the offense that it becomes in fact a part of the description.” (quotation omitted)); Reed v. United States, 210 A.2d 845, 846 (D.C. 1965) (“When an exception to a statutory crime is not so incorporated in its enacting clause, the burden of showing that the exception applies is upon the one assert 2024United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971); see also, e.g., State v. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn. 1984) (“The test for determining what constitutes a basic element of rather than an exception to a statute has been stated as whether the exception is so incorporated with the clause defining the offense that it becomes in fact a part of the description.” (quotation omitted)); Reed v. United States, 210 A.2d 845, 846 (D.C. 1965) (“When an exception to a statutory crime is not so incorporated in its enacting clause, the burden of showing that the exception applies is upon the one assert | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2024The Mackall Court distinguished the case before it from Spurrier, noting that the exceptions listed in subsection (c) were contained in “a subsection subsequent to the enacting clause of the offense” and were “not . . . so incorporated with the definition or description of the offense as to constitute a part thereof.” Mackall, 283 Md. at 111 . 16 15 The Mackall Court explained that Spurrier “concerned the provisions of subsection (b) [of former Article 27, § 36], now subsection (c) and hereinafter referred to as subsection (c)[.]” Mackall, 283 Md. at 109 ; see also id. at 105 n.5 (explaining t 2024The Mackall Court distinguished the case before it from Spurrier, noting that the exceptions listed in subsection (c) were contained in “a subsection subsequent to the enacting clause of the offense” and were “not . . . so incorporated with the definition or description of the offense as to constitute a part thereof.” Mackall, 283 Md. at 111 . 16 15 The Mackall Court explained that Spurrier “concerned the provisions of subsection (b) [of former Article 27, § 36], now subsection (c) and hereinafter referred to as subsection (c)[.]” Mackall, 283 Md. at 109 ; see also id. at 105 n.5 (explaining t | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Vuitchgreen2 sentences2024United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971); see also, e.g., State v. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn. 1984) (“The test for determining what constitutes a basic element of rather than an exception to a statute has been stated as whether the exception is so incorporated with the clause defining the offense that it becomes in fact a part of the description.” (quotation omitted)); Reed v. United States, 210 A.2d 845, 846 (D.C. 1965) (“When an exception to a statutory crime is not so incorporated in its enacting clause, the burden of showing that the exception applies is upon the one assert 2024United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971); see also, e.g., State v. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn. 1984) (“The test for determining what constitutes a basic element of rather than an exception to a statute has been stated as whether the exception is so incorporated with the clause defining the offense that it becomes in fact a part of the description.” (quotation omitted)); Reed v. United States, 210 A.2d 845, 846 (D.C. 1965) (“When an exception to a statutory crime is not so incorporated in its enacting clause, the burden of showing that the exception applies is upon the one assert | 2 | 2 |
State v. Brechongreen2 sentences2024United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971); see also, e.g., State v. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn. 1984) (“The test for determining what constitutes a basic element of rather than an exception to a statute has been stated as whether the exception is so incorporated with the clause defining the offense that it becomes in fact a part of the description.” (quotation omitted)); Reed v. United States, 210 A.2d 845, 846 (D.C. 1965) (“When an exception to a statutory crime is not so incorporated in its enacting clause, the burden of showing that the exception applies is upon the one assert 2024United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971); see also, e.g., State v. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn. 1984) (“The test for determining what constitutes a basic element of rather than an exception to a statute has been stated as whether the exception is so incorporated with the clause defining the offense that it becomes in fact a part of the description.” (quotation omitted)); Reed v. United States, 210 A.2d 845, 846 (D.C. 1965) (“When an exception to a statutory crime is not so incorporated in its enacting clause, the burden of showing that the exception applies is upon the one assert | 2 | 2 |
Mullaney v. Wilburgreen2 sentences2024United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971); see also, e.g., State v. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn. 1984) (“The test for determining what constitutes a basic element of rather than an exception to a statute has been stated as whether the exception is so incorporated with the clause defining the offense that it becomes in fact a part of the description.” (quotation omitted)); Reed v. United States, 210 A.2d 845, 846 (D.C. 1965) (“When an exception to a statutory crime is not so incorporated in its enacting clause, the burden of showing that the exception applies is upon the one assert 2024United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971); see also, e.g., State v. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn. 1984) (“The test for determining what constitutes a basic element of rather than an exception to a statute has been stated as whether the exception is so incorporated with the clause defining the offense that it becomes in fact a part of the description.” (quotation omitted)); Reed v. United States, 210 A.2d 845, 846 (D.C. 1965) (“When an exception to a statutory crime is not so incorporated in its enacting clause, the burden of showing that the exception applies is upon the one assert | 2 | 2 |
Reed v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971); see also, e.g., State v. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn. 1984) (“The test for determining what constitutes a basic element of rather than an exception to a statute has been stated as whether the exception is so incorporated with the clause defining the offense that it becomes in fact a part of the description.” (quotation omitted)); Reed v. United States, 210 A.2d 845, 846 (D.C. 1965) (“When an exception to a statutory crime is not so incorporated in its enacting clause, the burden of showing that the exception applies is upon the one assert 2024United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971); see also, e.g., State v. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn. 1984) (“The test for determining what constitutes a basic element of rather than an exception to a statute has been stated as whether the exception is so incorporated with the clause defining the offense that it becomes in fact a part of the description.” (quotation omitted)); Reed v. United States, 210 A.2d 845, 846 (D.C. 1965) (“When an exception to a statutory crime is not so incorporated in its enacting clause, the burden of showing that the exception applies is upon the one assert | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Howes v. State
green
2 sentences1984In Howes v. State, 141 Md. 532 , 119 A. 297 (1922), however, the Court unequivocally rejected that distinction, and adopted a somewhat more subjective test, which was succinctly summarized as follows in Spurrier v. State, 229 Md. 110, 111 , 182 A.2d 358 (1962): “Whether an indictment must negative the exceptions, in a statute depends not on whether the exceptions are contained in the enacting clause, but on whether the exceptions are so incorporated with the definition or description of the offense as to constitute a part thereof.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the six-score years between State v. P 1984In Howes v. State, 141 Md. 532 , 119 A. 297 (1922), however, the Court unequivocally rejected that distinction, and adopted a somewhat more subjective test, which was succinctly summarized as follows in Spurrier v. State, 229 Md. 110, 111 , 182 A.2d 358 (1962): “Whether an indictment must negative the exceptions, in a statute depends not on whether the exceptions are contained in the enacting clause, but on whether the exceptions are so incorporated with the definition or description of the offense as to constitute a part thereof.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the six-score years between State v. P | 2 | 1923–1984 |
McPherson v. Leonard
green
2 sentences1912In McPherson v. Leonard, 29 Md. 377, the words “by the General Assembly of Maryland” were omitted from an enacting clause, but the omission was held not to invalidate the act. 1912It was for a time supposed that the rule laid down in McPherson v. Leonard, Supra, had been modified, if not overruled *636 by the decision in Archer v. State, 74 Md. 449 , the opinion of the Court being written by Judge Milled, biit that such was not its effect is conclusively shown in the two subsequent cases above cited, in opinions written by Chiee Justice BbYD and Judge Thomas, respectively. | 2 | 1909–1912 |
Spurrier v. State
green
2 sentences1984In Howes v. State, 141 Md. 532 , 119 A. 297 (1922), however, the Court unequivocally rejected that distinction, and adopted a somewhat more subjective test, which was succinctly summarized as follows in Spurrier v. State, 229 Md. 110, 111 , 182 A.2d 358 (1962): “Whether an indictment must negative the exceptions, in a statute depends not on whether the exceptions are contained in the enacting clause, but on whether the exceptions are so incorporated with the definition or description of the offense as to constitute a part thereof.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the six-score years between State v. P 1984In Howes v. State, 141 Md. 532 , 119 A. 297 (1922), however, the Court unequivocally rejected that distinction, and adopted a somewhat more subjective test, which was succinctly summarized as follows in Spurrier v. State, 229 Md. 110, 111 , 182 A.2d 358 (1962): “Whether an indictment must negative the exceptions, in a statute depends not on whether the exceptions are contained in the enacting clause, but on whether the exceptions are so incorporated with the definition or description of the offense as to constitute a part thereof.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the six-score years between State v. P | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Read Drug & Chemical Co. v. Claypoole
green
2 sentences1956Co. v. Claypoole, 165 Md. 250 , the Act contained the usual enacting clause declaring the effective date to be June 1. 1956Co. v. Claypoole, 165 Md. 250 , the Act contained the usual enacting clause declaring the effective date to be June 1. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Barber v. State
neutral
1 sentence1923Barber v. State, 50 Md. 161 ; Kiefer v. State, 81 Md. 562 ; Howes v. State, 141 Md. 532 . | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Commonwealth v. Jennings
green
1 sentence1922The case of Comm. v. Hart, 11 Cush. 130 , which is a leading one referred to by many courts and text writers, so decided, but that was overruled in regard to that question by Comm. v. Jennings, 121 Mass. 47 , and it is not in accord with the weight of authority, although approved by some cases of high standing, such as State v. Abbey, 29 Vt. 60 . | 1 | 1922–1922 |
State v. Price
neutral
1 sentence1922The Court said: “There were no exceptions to be negatived by the indictment; and it was not a case of exemption, to he interposed by the accused, as a- matter of defense.” In State v. Price, 12 G. & J. 260 , it was held, quoting from the syllabus, that “where the enacting clause of a penal act contains an exception, it is not indispensable that an indictment framed under it should set forth an express negation of it. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
State v. Abbey
neutral
2 sentences1922This is clearly pointed out in State v. Abbey, 29 Vt. 60 , where it is said, “The question is whether the exception is so incorporated with, and becomes a part of the enactment, as to constitute a part of the defini *539 tion or description of the offense; for it is immaterial whether the exception or proviso be contained in the enacting clause or section, or be introduced in a different manner. 1922The case of Comm. v. Hart, 11 Cush. 130 , which is a leading one referred to by many courts and text writers, so decided, but that was overruled in regard to that question by Comm. v. Jennings, 121 Mass. 47 , and it is not in accord with the weight of authority, although approved by some cases of high standing, such as State v. Abbey, 29 Vt. 60 . | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Stiefel v. Maryland Institution for the Instruction of the Blind
green
1 sentence1912This presents a condition very similar to that before this Court in Stiefel v. Maryland Institution, 61 Md. 144 , where the title of an act was to repeal only while in the act itself there was contained a second section which enacted new and affirmative legislation. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Matthews v. Offley
neutral
1 sentence1881Offley, 3 Sum., 115, 123 , Judge Stoky allowed to the certificate of a vice-consul, that the master had refused to take on hoard his vessel a destitute seaman, the fullest prima facie effect; and held that the certificate was not only prima facie evidence of the simple fact of refusal, hut of all the facts stated in the enacting clause of the statute, which were necessary to bring the case within the penalty prescribed. | 1 | 1881–1881 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.