enacting clause in Pennsylvania

1928The office of a proviso is to “qualify, restrain, or otherwise modify the general language of an enacting clause.” A proviso “is to be strictly [not liberally] construed” (U. S. v. Dickinson, 40 U. S. 141, 164 ; Ryan v. Carter, 93 U. S. 78, 83 ), and “can have no existence separate and apart from the provision Avhich it is designed to limit or qualify.” These are not technical but common sense rules, applicable to the interpretation of any written instrument; they govern the construction of constitutional provisions as well as of statutes.

1878It is to be strictly construed; it takes no case out of the enacting clause which is not fairly within the terms of the proviso: United States v. Dickson, 15 Peters 141 .

1987Commonwealth v. Magwood, 503 Pa. 169 , 469 A.2d 115 (1983); American Surety Company’s Case, 319 Pa. 549 , 181 A. 364 (1935); Commonwealth ex rel.

1952On this point we are guided by the following from the opinion of the Supreme Court in American Surety Company’s case, 319 Pa. 549, 553 , as follows: “Where the enacting clause of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble or the title will not be permitted to contradict that clear intention as evidenced by the enacting clause (Com. ex rel. v. Alliance Petroleum & Coal Co., 53 Pa. 71, 73 ).” Here, this test is met.

1952On this point we are guided by the following from the opinion of the Supreme Court in American Surety Company’s case, 319 Pa. 549, 553 , as follows: “Where the enacting clause of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble or the title will not be permitted to contradict that clear intention as evidenced by the enacting clause (Com. ex rel. v. Alliance Petroleum & Coal Co., 53 Pa. 71, 73 ).” Here, this test is met.

1935The title to the act reads: “An act to provide for the taking of tax duplicates by sureties on the bonds of delinquent or defaulting tax collectors, and the appointment by such sureties of a collector for the collection of taxes due on such duplicates.” Where the enacting clause of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble or the title will not be permitted to contradict that clear intention as evidenced by the enacting clause (Com. ex rel. v. Alliance Petroleum & Coal Co., 53 Pa. 71, 73 ); but where there is doubt as to the intent and purpose of a statute and the title or preamble’will

1939A proviso ‘is to be strictly [not liberally] construed’ (U. S. v. Dickinson, 40 U. S. 141, 164 ; Ryan v. Carter, 93 U. S. 78, 83 ), and ‘can have no existence separate and apart from the provision which it is designed to limit or qualify’.

1928The office of a proviso is to “qualify, restrain, or otherwise modify the general language of an enacting clause.” A proviso “is to be strictly [not liberally] construed” (U. S. v. Dickinson, 40 U. S. 141, 164 ; Ryan v. Carter, 93 U. S. 78, 83 ), and “can have no existence separate and apart from the provision Avhich it is designed to limit or qualify.” These are not technical but common sense rules, applicable to the interpretation of any written instrument; they govern the construction of constitutional provisions as well as of statutes.

1935The title to the act reads: “An act to provide for the taking of tax duplicates by sureties on the bonds of delinquent or defaulting tax collectors, and the appointment by such sureties of a collector for the collection of taxes due on such duplicates.” Where the enacting clause of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble or the title will not be permitted to contradict that clear intention as evidenced by the enacting clause (Com. ex rel. v. Alliance Petroleum & Coal Co., 53 Pa. 71, 73 ); but where there is doubt as to the intent and purpose of a statute and the title or preamble’will

1919The liability is imposed by the enacting clause, not by the title; while the latter is regarded as a part of the statute and may properly be considered in its construction (Halderman’s App., 104 Pa. 251, 259 ; Eby’s App., 70 Pa. 311, 314 ; Pennsylvania R.

2018"Although titles and preambles are accepted aids in resolving ambiguity in an enacting clause [of a statute], they may not be used to create ambiguity where none exists[.]" Hanley and Bird , 590 A.2d at 1387 (quoting Barasch v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission , 516 Pa. 142 , 532 A.2d 325 , 332 (1987) ).

2000The clause, “Except when directed to proceed by a police officer ...” directly precedes the words “every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop....” Against the wording of this statute, it is obvious that the “except clause” is not divorced from the definition. 682 A.2d at 386-87 . ¶ 9 Consistent with the dictates of Lopez, Bigelow, Banellis and the precepts of statutory construction, we conclude that the grammatical structure and syntax of the 1999 version of Section 6106(a)(1) & (2), 7 both being devoid of substantive language or self-contained definitional verbiage require r

1993In Commonwealth v. Saccol, 384 Pa.Super. 161 , 557 A.2d 1095 (1989), this Court analyzed a similar burden-of-proof issue: When a statute defining an offense contains an exception, in the enacting clause, which is so incorporated with the language defining the offense that the ingredients of the offense cannot be accurately and clearly described if the exception is omitted, the rules of good pleading require that an indictment founded upon the statute must allege enough to show that the accused is not within the exception, but if the language of the clause defining the offense is so entirely se

1993In Commonwealth v. Saccol, 384 Pa.Super. 161 , 557 A.2d 1095 (1989), this Court analyzed a similar burden-of-proof issue: When a statute defining an offense contains an exception, in the enacting clause, which is so incorporated with the language defining the offense that the ingredients of the offense cannot be accurately and clearly described if the exception is omitted, the rules of good pleading require that an indictment founded upon the statute must allege enough to show that the accused is not within the exception, but if the language of the clause defining the offense is so entirely se

1987Commonwealth v. Magwood, 503 Pa. 169 , 469 A.2d 115 (1983); American Surety Company’s Case, 319 Pa. 549 , 181 A. 364 (1935); Commonwealth ex rel.

1987Commonwealth v. Magwood, 503 Pa. 169 , 469 A.2d 115 (1983); American Surety Company’s Case, 319 Pa. 549 , 181 A. 364 (1935); Commonwealth ex rel.

1974The general rule is that where an exception is incorporated in the enacting clause of a criminal statute, the burden is on the prosecution to establish the fact that defendant is not within the exception, but the burden is on defendant to bring himself within an exception made by proviso or other clause distinct from the enacting clause: McKelvey v. United States, 260 U. S. 353 , 43 S. Ct. 132 , 67 L.Ed. 301 .

1974The general rule is that where an exception is incorporated in the enacting clause of a criminal statute, the burden is on the prosecution to establish the fact that defendant is not within the exception, but the burden is on defendant to bring himself within an exception made by proviso or other clause distinct from the enacting clause: McKelvey v. United States, 260 U. S. 353 , 43 S. Ct. 132 , 67 L.Ed. 301 .

1952In State Highway Route No. 72, 265 Pa. 369, 374-75 , it was held: “The liability is imposed by the enacting clause, not by the title; while the latter is regarded as a part of the statute and may properly be considered in its con struction . . yet the title cannot give vitality to a subject omitted from the body of the act; for while a statute cannot be broader than its title, the title may’ be broader than the statute; if so, the latter must control; . . . the act may be valid although its title is broader than the act itself.” In the instant case the title is broader than the act, giving the

1951In Whitaker Borough v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 238 , it was held that all provisions in an act must be read in the light of their immediate context, and that this is particularly true of provisos, and that under section 54 of the Statutory Construction Act, 46 PS §554, provisos shall be construed to limit rather than to extend the portion of the clause to which they refer.

1946Falk & Bros., 204 U. S. 143 .

1935It will be noted that under the above sections, the ingredients of the offense, to wit, the unlawful keeping, can be proven without reference to the exceptions. ££When a statute defining an offense contains an exception in the enacting clause......and if the language of the clause defining the offense is so entirely separable from the exception that the ingredients constituting the offense may be accurately and clearly defined without any reference to the exception, the pleader may safely omit any such reference, as the matter contained in the exception is matter of defense and must be shown b

1935It will be noted that under the above sections, the ingredients of the offense, to wit, the unlawful keeping, can be proven without reference to the exceptions. ££When a statute defining an offense contains an exception in the enacting clause......and if the language of the clause defining the offense is so entirely separable from the exception that the ingredients constituting the offense may be accurately and clearly defined without any reference to the exception, the pleader may safely omit any such reference, as the matter contained in the exception is matter of defense and must be shown b

1935It will be noted that under the above sections, the ingredients of the offense, to wit, the unlawful keeping, can be proven without reference to the exceptions. ££When a statute defining an offense contains an exception in the enacting clause......and if the language of the clause defining the offense is so entirely separable from the exception that the ingredients constituting the offense may be accurately and clearly defined without any reference to the exception, the pleader may safely omit any such reference, as the matter contained in the exception is matter of defense and must be shown b

1934When the proviso is read with the enacting clause, the act declares that all “other things being equal the widow is entitled to be preferred,” (Wilkey’s App., 108 Pa. 567 ), but she cannot claim that she is in a class entirely by herself.

1934When the proviso is read with the enacting clause, the act declares that all “other things being equal the widow is entitled to be preferred,” (Wilkey’s App., 108 Pa. 567 ), but she cannot claim that she is in a class entirely by herself.

1925In construing the provisions of the act of assembly under consideration, the same is to be construed strictly so as to take no ease out of the enacting clause which is not fairly within the terms of the proviso: Folmer’s Appeal, 87 Pa. 133 .

1922Numerous authorities might be cited in support of this conclusion, but we deem the discussion of the question in those following convincing: Com. v. Tuttle, 12 Cushing 502 ; Com. v. Jennings, 121 Mass. 47 ; State v. Abbey, 29 Vt. 60 ; State v. Bevins, 70 Vt. 574 ; Fleming v. The People, 27 N. Y. 329 .

1922Numerous authorities might be cited in support of this conclusion, but we deem the discussion of the question in those following convincing: Com. v. Tuttle, 12 Cushing 502 ; Com. v. Jennings, 121 Mass. 47 ; State v. Abbey, 29 Vt. 60 ; State v. Bevins, 70 Vt. 574 ; Fleming v. The People, 27 N. Y. 329 .

1922Numerous authorities might be cited in support of this conclusion, but we deem the discussion of the question in those following convincing: Com. v. Tuttle, 12 Cushing 502 ; Com. v. Jennings, 121 Mass. 47 ; State v. Abbey, 29 Vt. 60 ; State v. Bevins, 70 Vt. 574 ; Fleming v. The People, 27 N. Y. 329 .