20 California opinions name it 3 courts 1882–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Dicksongreen2 sentences1968In short, a proviso carves special exceptions only out of the enacting clause; and those who set up any such exception, must establish it as being within the words as well as within the reason thereof.” (United States v. Dickson (1841) 40 U.S. 141, 163 [ 10 L.Ed. 689 ], quoted with approval in Forbes v. City of Los Angeles (1929) 101 Cal.App. 781, 788 [ 282 P. 528 ] ; see also Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board (1964) 61 Cal.2d 305, 309-310 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 392 P.2d 1 ].) A second principle, also firmly established, which must be applied in analyzing the legislative usage of t 1968In short, a proviso carves special exceptions only out of the enacting clause; and those who set up any such exception, must establish it as being within the words as well as within the reason thereof.” (United States v. Dickson (1841) 40 U.S. 141, 163 [ 10 L.Ed. 689 ], quoted with approval in Forbes v. City of Los Angeles (1929) 101 Cal.App. 781, 788 [ 282 P. 528 ] ; see also Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board (1964) 61 Cal.2d 305, 309-310 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 392 P.2d 1 ].) A second principle, also firmly established, which must be applied in analyzing the legislative usage of t | 2 | 4 |
Forbes v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1968In short, a proviso carves special exceptions only out of the enacting clause; and those who set up any such exception, must establish it as being within the words as well as within the reason thereof.” (United States v. Dickson (1841) 40 U.S. 141, 163 [ 10 L.Ed. 689 ], quoted with approval in Forbes v. City of Los Angeles (1929) 101 Cal.App. 781, 788 [ 282 P. 528 ] ; see also Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board (1964) 61 Cal.2d 305, 309-310 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 392 P.2d 1 ].) A second principle, also firmly established, which must be applied in analyzing the legislative usage of t 1968In short, a proviso carves special exceptions only out of the enacting clause; and those who set up any such exception, must establish it as being within the words as well as within the reason thereof.” (United States v. Dickson (1841) 40 U.S. 141, 163 [ 10 L.Ed. 689 ], quoted with approval in Forbes v. City of Los Angeles (1929) 101 Cal.App. 781, 788 [ 282 P. 528 ] ; see also Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board (1964) 61 Cal.2d 305, 309-310 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 392 P.2d 1 ].) A second principle, also firmly established, which must be applied in analyzing the legislative usage of t | 2 | 2 |
People v. Sprygreen2 sentences2014It is the nature of the exception and not its location which determines the question. . . .” ’ Thus, where exceptions or provisos are not descriptive of the offense, or define it, but rather afford a matter of excuse, ‘they are to be relied on in [the] defense.’ [Citations.]” ’ (People v. Spry (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1364 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 ].) [][] Nowhere in [Health and Safety Code] section 11362.5 is any criminal offense defined. 2014It is the nature of the exception and not its location which determines the question. . . .” ’ Thus, where exceptions or provisos are not descriptive of the offense, or define it, but rather afford a matter of excuse, ‘they are to be relied on in [the] defense.’ [Citations.]” ’ (People v. Spry (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1364 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 ].) [][] Nowhere in [Health and Safety Code] section 11362.5 is any criminal offense defined. | 1 | 1 |
Ortiz v. Board of Supervisorsgreen2 sentences1986(See Ortiz v. Board of Supervisors (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 866, 870, fn. 3 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 100 ].) 4 For example, the enacting clause for an ordinance submitted to the voters of a county must read “The people of the County of-do ordain as follows[]’’ (§ 3718); whereas the enacting clause of all ordinances passed by a board of supervisors must state, “The Board of Supervisors of the County of_ do ordain as follows.” (Gov. 1986(See Ortiz v. Board of Supervisors (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 866, 870, fn. 3 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 100 ].) 4 For example, the enacting clause for an ordinance submitted to the voters of a county must read “The people of the County of-do ordain as follows[]’’ (§ 3718); whereas the enacting clause of all ordinances passed by a board of supervisors must state, “The Board of Supervisors of the County of_ do ordain as follows.” (Gov. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Asamotogreen2 sentences1968In short, a proviso carves special exceptions only out of the enacting clause; and those who set up any such exception, must establish it as being within the words as well as within the reason thereof.” (United States v. Dickson (1841) 40 U.S. 141, 163 [ 10 L.Ed. 689 ], quoted with approval in Forbes v. City of Los Angeles (1929) 101 Cal.App. 781, 788 [ 282 P. 528 ] ; see also Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board (1964) 61 Cal.2d 305, 309-310 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 392 P.2d 1 ].) A second principle, also firmly established, which must be applied in analyzing the legislative usage of t 1968In short, a proviso carves special exceptions only out of the enacting clause; and those who set up any such exception, must establish it as being within the words as well as within the reason thereof.” (United States v. Dickson (1841) 40 U.S. 141, 163 [ 10 L.Ed. 689 ], quoted with approval in Forbes v. City of Los Angeles (1929) 101 Cal.App. 781, 788 [ 282 P. 528 ] ; see also Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board (1964) 61 Cal.2d 305, 309-310 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 392 P.2d 1 ].) A second principle, also firmly established, which must be applied in analyzing the legislative usage of t | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Boardgreen2 sentences1968In short, a proviso carves special exceptions only out of the enacting clause; and those who set up any such exception, must establish it as being within the words as well as within the reason thereof.” (United States v. Dickson (1841) 40 U.S. 141, 163 [ 10 L.Ed. 689 ], quoted with approval in Forbes v. City of Los Angeles (1929) 101 Cal.App. 781, 788 [ 282 P. 528 ] ; see also Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board (1964) 61 Cal.2d 305, 309-310 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 392 P.2d 1 ].) A second principle, also firmly established, which must be applied in analyzing the legislative usage of t 1968In short, a proviso carves special exceptions only out of the enacting clause; and those who set up any such exception, must establish it as being within the words as well as within the reason thereof.” (United States v. Dickson (1841) 40 U.S. 141, 163 [ 10 L.Ed. 689 ], quoted with approval in Forbes v. City of Los Angeles (1929) 101 Cal.App. 781, 788 [ 282 P. 528 ] ; see also Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board (1964) 61 Cal.2d 305, 309-310 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 392 P.2d 1 ].) A second principle, also firmly established, which must be applied in analyzing the legislative usage of t | 1 | 1 |
Channing v. Paytongreen1 sentence1939Cr. 197 [ 4 Pac. (2d) 1,17, 119 ], where it is said, after giving the general rule that the exception need not be negatived, but is a matter of defense: ‘' There are exceptions to this rule, where the nature o£ the exemption constitutes a part of the definition or description of the offense, although it is not in the enacting clause,” citing cases. | 1 | 1 |
Dufton v. Danielsgreen2 sentences1937(People v. Morrill, 26 Cal. 336, 355 .) Also, in Dufton v. Daniels, 190 Cal. 577, 580 [ 213 Pac. 949 ], it is said, “The language of the section is plain and unambiguous, and it is not necessary to invoke the settled rule of construction that an exception contained in a statute to a general rule laid down therein is to be strictly construed (Black on Interpretation of Laws, p. 275; Lewis’ Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 2d ed., sec. 352). ...” And further, in the case of Forbes v. City of Los Angeles, 101 Cal. App. 781, 788 [ 282 Pac. 528 ], it is said: “ ‘Where the enacting clause is ge 1937(People v. Morrill, 26 Cal. 336, 355 .) Also, in Dufton v. Daniels, 190 Cal. 577, 580 [ 213 Pac. 949 ], it is said, “The language of the section is plain and unambiguous, and it is not necessary to invoke the settled rule of construction that an exception contained in a statute to a general rule laid down therein is to be strictly construed (Black on Interpretation of Laws, p. 275; Lewis’ Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 2d ed., sec. 352). ...” And further, in the case of Forbes v. City of Los Angeles, 101 Cal. App. 781, 788 [ 282 Pac. 528 ], it is said: “ ‘Where the enacting clause is ge | 1 | 1 |
Trout v. Ogilviegreen2 sentences1929The framers of our statute deliberately added one express exception, and we must assume that they intended to leave their work complete.” (Trout v. Ogilvie, 41 Cal. App. 167, 174 [ 182 Pac. 333, 335 ].) “We are led to the general rule of law which has always prevailed, and become consecrated almost as a maxim in the interpretation of statutes, that where the enacting clause is general in its language and objects, and a proviso is afterwards introduced, that proviso is construed strictly, and takes no case out of the enacting clause which does not fall fairly within its terms. 1929The framers of our statute deliberately added one express exception, and we must assume that they intended to leave their work complete.” (Trout v. Ogilvie, 41 Cal. App. 167, 174 [ 182 Pac. 333, 335 ].) “We are led to the general rule of law which has always prevailed, and become consecrated almost as a maxim in the interpretation of statutes, that where the enacting clause is general in its language and objects, and a proviso is afterwards introduced, that proviso is construed strictly, and takes no case out of the enacting clause which does not fall fairly within its terms. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Hornef
green
2 sentences1994“It is well established that where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant. [Citations.] “It was stated in Ex parte Homef [(1908)] 154 Cal. 355 [ 97 P. 891 ], that ‘“[t]he question is whether the exception is so incorporated with, and becomes a part of the enactment, as to constitute a part of the definition, or description of the offense; for it is immaterial whether the exception or proviso be contained in the enacting clause or section, or be i 1994“It is well established that where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant. [Citations.] “It was stated in Ex parte Homef [(1908)] 154 Cal. 355 [ 97 P. 891 ], that ‘“[t]he question is whether the exception is so incorporated with, and becomes a part of the enactment, as to constitute a part of the definition, or description of the offense; for it is immaterial whether the exception or proviso be contained in the enacting clause or section, or be i | 5 | 1916–1994 |
Baker v. State
green
2 sentences1939In Baker v. State, (1937) 132 Tex. Cr. 1939In Baker v. State, (1937) 132 Tex. Cr. | 2 | 1939–1939 |
People ex rel. Pierce v. Morrill
green
2 sentences1937(People v. Morrill, 26 Cal. 336, 355 .) Also, in Dufton v. Daniels, 190 Cal. 577, 580 [ 213 Pac. 949 ], it is said, “The language of the section is plain and unambiguous, and it is not necessary to invoke the settled rule of construction that an exception contained in a statute to a general rule laid down therein is to be strictly construed (Black on Interpretation of Laws, p. 275; Lewis’ Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 2d ed., sec. 352). ...” And further, in the case of Forbes v. City of Los Angeles, 101 Cal. App. 781, 788 [ 282 Pac. 528 ], it is said: “ ‘Where the enacting clause is ge 1929In short a proviso carves exceptions only out of the enacting clause; and those who set up any such exception must establish it as being within the words as well as within the reason thereof. ’ (Italics ours.) Our own Supreme Court, in considering the interpretation to be given to a proviso in the case of People v. Morrill, 26 Cal. 336 -355, says: ‘This proviso is to be read *286 in the light of the subject matter, ’ using the expression ‘subject matter’ as synonymous with the legislative field occupied by the enacting clause. | 2 | 1929–1937 |
People v. Fisher
green
1 sentence2014(Fisher, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1151 .) In rejecting the defendant’s argument, the court in Fisher reasoned: “ ‘ “It is well established that where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant. [Citations.] . . . ‘ “[T]he question is whether the exception is so incorporated with, and becomes a part of the enactment, as to constitute a part of the definition, or description of the offense; for it is immaterial whether the exception or proviso be co | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Pay Less Drug Store
green
1 sentence1951Accordingly People v. Pay Less Drug Store, supra, 25 Cal.2d 108, 114 , states that if sales below cost with the requisite intent are shown defendants are required to go forward with such proof as would bring them within one of the exceptions. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Vandeleur v. Jordan
green
2 sentences1942In 1938 the Supreme Court rendered opinions in the cases of Epperson v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 61 [ 82 P.2d 445 ] ; Vandeleur v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 71 [ 82 P.2d 455 ], and Brown v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 75 [ 82 P.2d 450 ]. 1942In 1938 the Supreme Court rendered opinions in the cases of Epperson v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 61 [ 82 P.2d 445 ] ; Vandeleur v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 71 [ 82 P.2d 455 ], and Brown v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 75 [ 82 P.2d 450 ]. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Epperson v. Jordan
green
2 sentences1942In 1938 the Supreme Court rendered opinions in the cases of Epperson v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 61 [ 82 P.2d 445 ] ; Vandeleur v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 71 [ 82 P.2d 455 ], and Brown v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 75 [ 82 P.2d 450 ]. 1942In 1938 the Supreme Court rendered opinions in the cases of Epperson v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 61 [ 82 P.2d 445 ] ; Vandeleur v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 71 [ 82 P.2d 455 ], and Brown v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 75 [ 82 P.2d 450 ]. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Brown v. Jordan
green
2 sentences1942In 1938 the Supreme Court rendered opinions in the cases of Epperson v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 61 [ 82 P.2d 445 ] ; Vandeleur v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 71 [ 82 P.2d 455 ], and Brown v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 75 [ 82 P.2d 450 ]. 1942In 1938 the Supreme Court rendered opinions in the cases of Epperson v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 61 [ 82 P.2d 445 ] ; Vandeleur v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 71 [ 82 P.2d 455 ], and Brown v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 75 [ 82 P.2d 450 ]. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Fleming v. . the People
green
1 sentence1930In Fleming v. People, 27 N. Y. 329 , the indictment contained none of the statutory exceptions which rendered a subsequent marriage valid. | 1 | 1930–1930 |
State v. Abbey
neutral
1 sentence1930The disturbing question of whether the exception is in the enacting clause or in a subsequent clause or subsequent section of the clause led to such refinement as to justly provoke the observation made in State v. Abbey, 29 Vt. 60 [ 67 Am. | 1 | 1930–1930 |
City of Napa v. Easterby
green
2 sentences1920(City of Napa v. Easterby, 76 Cal. 222 , [ 18 Pac. 253 ].) [11] We see no escape from the proposition that the proceedings of the board of public works in the letting of the contract and the taking of the bond were ratified by the subsequent resolutions of the board supervisors in the appropriate manner for such ratification, that is, by the appropriation of the money for the purpose of carrying out of the contract. 1920(City of Napa v. Easterby, 76 Cal. 222 , [ 18 Pac. 253 ].) [11] We see no escape from the proposition that the proceedings of the board of public works in the letting of the contract and the taking of the bond were ratified by the subsequent resolutions of the board supervisors in the appropriate manner for such ratification, that is, by the appropriation of the money for the purpose of carrying out of the contract. | 1 | 1920–1920 |
People v. Russell
neutral
2 sentences1909In San Luis Obispo v. Hendricks, 71 Cal. 264 , [ 11 Pac. 684 ], it is said: “The essential thing to be done was to publish the ordinance in some newspaper published in the county, if there was one, for at least one week, with the names of the members voting for and against the same.” And in People v. Russell, 74 Cal. 578 , [ 16 Pac. 395 ], it is held that “Under section 26 of the County Government Act of March 14, 1883, an ordinance of a board of supervisors of a county does not take effect until it has been published in its entirety, as required by that section, and a publication which omits 1909In San Luis Obispo v. Hendricks, 71 Cal. 264 , [ 11 Pac. 684 ], it is said: “The essential thing to be done was to publish the ordinance in some newspaper published in the county, if there was one, for at least one week, with the names of the members voting for and against the same.” And in People v. Russell, 74 Cal. 578 , [ 16 Pac. 395 ], it is held that “Under section 26 of the County Government Act of March 14, 1883, an ordinance of a board of supervisors of a county does not take effect until it has been published in its entirety, as required by that section, and a publication which omits | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Rice v. State
green
1 sentence1908In Rice v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 36, [ 38 S. W. 801 ], the information failed to state that the prosecutrix was not the wife of the defendant; and it was held that it did not state a public offense. | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Ex parte Haskell
green
2 sentences1908(Ex parte Haskell, 112 Cal. 412 , [ 44 Pac. 725 ].) We are also unable to sustain petitioner’s contention that the recital as to section 13 makes the ordinance the act o£ the people and not that of the board. 1908(Ex parte Haskell, 112 Cal. 412 , [ 44 Pac. 725 ].) We are also unable to sustain petitioner’s contention that the recital as to section 13 makes the ordinance the act o£ the people and not that of the board. | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Barnes v. Jones
neutral
1 sentence1882Sections 300 and 301 are found in chapter seven of title nine, and the head note to this chapter is in these words: “ Crimes against religion and conscience, and other offenses against good morals.” “While,” as was said of the Practice Act in Barnes v. Jones, “ while the rule is well settled that the title of an act will not control the language in the body of the statute, but may be referred to as tending to explain the intention (only) when the language is doubtful, we are of opinion that these head notes are entitled to more consideration than the title to the entire Act.” ( 51 Cal. 303 .) | 1 | 1882–1882 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.