enacting clause in Oregon

1971There the court said: “* * * [W]here a statute defining an offense contains an exception in the enacting clause of the statute which is so incorporated with the language defining the offense that the ingredients of the offense cannot be accurately and clearly described if the exception is omitted, an indictment founded upon the statute must allege enough to show that the accused is not within the exception.” 113 Or at 171-72 .

1929See State v. Rosasco, 103 Or. 343, 353 ( 205 Pac. 290 ), and Oregon cases there collated; State v. He Quan Chan, 113 Or. 168 ( 232 Pac. 619 ).

1941“The office of a proviso, generally, is either to except something from the enacting clause, to restrain its generality, or to exclude some possible ground of misinterpretation of it, as extending to cases not intended by the legislature to be brought within its purview.” *701 Minis v. United States, 15 Pet. 423 , 10 L. ed. 791, cited in Meyers v. Pacific States Lumber Co., 122 Or. 315, 321 , 259 P. 203 .

1927(U. S.) 423 ( 10 L.

1993That court explained: "Our interpretation of the uninsured motorist statute here follows the statutory construction rule that where the enacting clause of a statute is general in its language and purpose, a proviso subsequently following should be construed strictly so as to exempt no cases from the enacting clause which do not fairly fall within its terms, McRea v. Holcomb, 46 Ark 306 (1885).

1993That court explained: “Our interpretation of the uninsured motorist statute here follows the statutory construction rule that where the enacting clause of a statute is general in its language and purpose, a proviso subsequently following should be construed strictly so as to exempt no cases from the enacting clause which do not fairly fall within its terms, McRea v. Holcomb, 46 Ark 306 (1885).

1952The rule on that subject, as stated in 59 CJ 1003, Statutes, Sec. 597, was quoted by this court with approved in In re Norton’s Estate, 177 Or 342, 347 , 162 P2d 379 , 161 ALR 439 , as follows: “In the absence of anything in the statute clearly indicating a contrary intent, where the same word or phrase is used in different parts of a statute, it will be presumed to be used in the same sense throughout ; and where its meaning in one instance is clear, this meaning will be attached to it elsewhere, * # * ?> See, to the same effect, Lasene v. Syvanen, 123 Or 615, 624 , 257 P 822 , 263 P 59 .

1952The rule on that subject, as stated in 59 CJ 1003, Statutes, Sec. 597, was quoted by this court with approved in In re Norton’s Estate, 177 Or 342, 347 , 162 P2d 379 , 161 ALR 439 , as follows: “In the absence of anything in the statute clearly indicating a contrary intent, where the same word or phrase is used in different parts of a statute, it will be presumed to be used in the same sense throughout ; and where its meaning in one instance is clear, this meaning will be attached to it elsewhere, * # * ?> See, to the same effect, Lasene v. Syvanen, 123 Or 615, 624 , 257 P 822 , 263 P 59 .

1952The rule on that subject, as stated in 59 CJ 1003, Statutes, Sec. 597, was quoted by this court with approved in In re Norton’s Estate, 177 Or 342, 347 , 162 P2d 379 , 161 ALR 439 , as follows: “In the absence of anything in the statute clearly indicating a contrary intent, where the same word or phrase is used in different parts of a statute, it will be presumed to be used in the same sense throughout ; and where its meaning in one instance is clear, this meaning will be attached to it elsewhere, * # * ?> See, to the same effect, Lasene v. Syvanen, 123 Or 615, 624 , 257 P 822 , 263 P 59 .

1952The rule on that subject, as stated in 59 CJ 1003, Statutes, Sec. 597, was quoted by this court with approved in In re Norton’s Estate, 177 Or 342, 347 , 162 P2d 379 , 161 ALR 439 , as follows: “In the absence of anything in the statute clearly indicating a contrary intent, where the same word or phrase is used in different parts of a statute, it will be presumed to be used in the same sense throughout ; and where its meaning in one instance is clear, this meaning will be attached to it elsewhere, * # * ?> See, to the same effect, Lasene v. Syvanen, 123 Or 615, 624 , 257 P 822 , 263 P 59 .

1941On the contrary, this clause extends the legislation beyond the scope and purview of the enacting clause, and the word “provided”, as in Georgia B. and Banking Co. v. Smith, supra, has “no greater signification than would be attached to the conjunction ‘but’ or ‘and’ in the same place”.

1941On the contrary, this clause extends the legislation beyond the scope and purview of the enacting clause, and the word “provided”, as in Georgia B. and Banking Co. v. Smith, supra, has “no greater signification than would be attached to the conjunction ‘but’ or ‘and’ in the same place”.

1941“The office of a proviso, generally, is either to except something from the enacting clause, to restrain its generality, or to exclude some possible ground of misinterpretation of it, as extending to cases not intended by the legislature to be brought within its purview.” *701 Minis v. United States, 15 Pet. 423 , 10 L. ed. 791, cited in Meyers v. Pacific States Lumber Co., 122 Or. 315, 321 , 259 P. 203 .

1941“The office of a proviso, generally, is either to except something from the enacting clause, to restrain its generality, or to exclude some possible ground of misinterpretation of it, as extending to cases not intended by the legislature to be brought within its purview.” *701 Minis v. United States, 15 Pet. 423 , 10 L. ed. 791, cited in Meyers v. Pacific States Lumber Co., 122 Or. 315, 321 , 259 P. 203 .

1938U. S. v. Cook, 17 Wall. 168 ; Steel v. Smith, 1 Barn. & Ald. 99.

1936In State v. Perry, 77 Or. 453 ( 151 P. 655 ), involving chapter 151, Laws 1913, attempt was made to enlarge the meaning of the act beyond the scope of the title, which read as follows: “An act to prevent the barter, sale, trading, giving or furnishing of intoxi *475 eating liquors * * * to any convict or prisoner in the Oregon state penitentiary. * * * ” The enacting clause imposed a penalty upon the giving, selling, furnishing or aiding in selling, giving or furnishing of intoxicating liquor to any person sentenced to serve a term in the state penitentiary.

1936In State v. Perry, 77 Or. 453 ( 151 P. 655 ), involving chapter 151, Laws 1913, attempt was made to enlarge the meaning of the act beyond the scope of the title, which read as follows: “An act to prevent the barter, sale, trading, giving or furnishing of intoxi *475 eating liquors * * * to any convict or prisoner in the Oregon state penitentiary. * * * ” The enacting clause imposed a penalty upon the giving, selling, furnishing or aiding in selling, giving or furnishing of intoxicating liquor to any person sentenced to serve a term in the state penitentiary.

1927(U. S.) 141 ( 10 L.

1918A. 853), in speaking of an accusation charging a violation of the provisions of a statute creating a misdemeanor and containing excepted clauses, Mr. Justice Bean remarks: “The general rule on this subject, is that where the exception or proviso is stated in the enacting clause, it is necessary to negative them in order that the description of the offense may in all respects correspond with the statute; but where such exception or proviso is contained in another or subsequent section of the statute, it is a matter of defense and need not be negatived in tbe indictment. ’ ’ To the same effect s

1918A. 853), in speaking of an accusation charging a violation of the provisions of a statute creating a misdemeanor and containing excepted clauses, Mr. Justice Bean remarks: “The general rule on this subject, is that where the exception or proviso is stated in the enacting clause, it is necessary to negative them in order that the description of the offense may in all respects correspond with the statute; but where such exception or proviso is contained in another or subsequent section of the statute, it is a matter of defense and need not be negatived in tbe indictment. ’ ’ To the same effect s

1918A. 853), in speaking of an accusation charging a violation of the provisions of a statute creating a misdemeanor and containing excepted clauses, Mr. Justice Bean remarks: “The general rule on this subject, is that where the exception or proviso is stated in the enacting clause, it is necessary to negative them in order that the description of the offense may in all respects correspond with the statute; but where such exception or proviso is contained in another or subsequent section of the statute, it is a matter of defense and need not be negatived in tbe indictment. ’ ’ To the same effect s

1918A. 853), in speaking of an accusation charging a violation of the provisions of a statute creating a misdemeanor and containing excepted clauses, Mr. Justice Bean remarks: “The general rule on this subject, is that where the exception or proviso is stated in the enacting clause, it is necessary to negative them in order that the description of the offense may in all respects correspond with the statute; but where such exception or proviso is contained in another or subsequent section of the statute, it is a matter of defense and need not be negatived in tbe indictment. ’ ’ To the same effect s

1915If there be an exception in the enacting clause of a statute, it must be negatived in pleading, but a separate proviso need not be, and that although it is found in the same section of the act, if it be not referred to and engrafted on the enacting clause.” In Campbell v. Jackman Bros., 140 Iowa, 475 ( 118 N. W. 755 , 27 L.

1915If there be an exception in the enacting clause of a statute, it must be negatived in pleading, but a separate proviso need not be, and that although it is found in the same section of the act, if it be not referred to and engrafted on the enacting clause.” In Campbell v. Jackman Bros., 140 Iowa, 475 ( 118 N. W. 755 , 27 L.

1912Gue v. City of Eugene, 53 Or. 282 ( 100 Pac. 254 ).

1912Gue v. City of Eugene, 53 Or. 282 ( 100 Pac. 254 ).