enacting clause in Kansas

1970Under these circumstances the court merely declares the applicability of the law to the facts in a given case. ( In re Estate of Duel, 161 Kan. 593 , 171 P.2d 271 .) A proviso which follows and restricts an enacting clause general in its scope should be strictly construed, so as to take out of the enacting clause only those cases which are fairly within the terms of the proviso, and the burden of proof is on one claiming the *337 benefit of the proviso. ( Emporia Township v. Williams, 149 Kan. 860 , 89 P.2d 919 .) From the findings made and the conclusions reached, it is obvious the trial cour

1970Under these circumstances the court merely declares the applicability of the law to the facts in a given case. ( In re Estate of Duel, 161 Kan. 593 , 171 P.2d 271 .) A proviso which follows and restricts an enacting clause general in its scope should be strictly construed, so as to take out of the enacting clause only those cases which are fairly within the terms of the proviso, and the burden of proof is on one claiming the *337 benefit of the proviso. ( Emporia Township v. Williams, 149 Kan. 860 , 89 P.2d 919 .) From the findings made and the conclusions reached, it is obvious the trial cour

1981That concept was followed in In re Swartz, Petitioner, 47 Kan. 157 , 27 Pac. 839 (1891), where this court found the act in question was invalid because it had been mistakenly published without an enacting clause.

1918(In re Swartz, Petitioner, 47 Kan. 157 , 27 Pac. 839 .) Again, the constitution says that every bill shall have an enacting clause, and that it shall plainly run like this: “Be it enacted by the legislature of the state of Kansas.” Compliance with that provision of the con stitution is wanting in the resolution.

1981That concept was followed in In re Swartz, Petitioner, 47 Kan. 157 , 27 Pac. 839 (1891), where this court found the act in question was invalid because it had been mistakenly published without an enacting clause.

1918(In re Swartz, Petitioner, 47 Kan. 157 , 27 Pac. 839 .) Again, the constitution says that every bill shall have an enacting clause, and that it shall plainly run like this: “Be it enacted by the legislature of the state of Kansas.” Compliance with that provision of the con stitution is wanting in the resolution.

1917But if a proviso be in a subsequent clause or statute, or although in the same section, yet if it be not incorporated with the enacting clause by any words of reference, it is in that case matter of defense for the other party, and need not be negatived in the pleading.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) “ In City of Kansas City v. Gamier, 57 Kan. 412 , 46 Pac. 707 , in a prosecution under a city ordinance, this court said: “In a clause of such an ordinance distinct from the one defining the offense there was a proviso to the effect that it is unnecessary to fúrnish a description of property purchased from manufact

1917But if a proviso be in a subsequent clause or statute, or although in the same section, yet if it be not incorporated with the enacting clause by any words of reference, it is in that case matter of defense for the other party, and need not be negatived in the pleading.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) “ In City of Kansas City v. Gamier, 57 Kan. 412 , 46 Pac. 707 , in a prosecution under a city ordinance, this court said: “In a clause of such an ordinance distinct from the one defining the offense there was a proviso to the effect that it is unnecessary to fúrnish a description of property purchased from manufact

1998The enacting clause of all bills shall be ‘Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Kansas:’ No law shall be enacted except by bill.” (Emphasis added.) “Article 2, § 20, of the Kansas Constitution is a restriction upon the legislature’s power to make a new law except in the manner prescribed.” State v. Kearns, 229 Kan. 207, 209 , 623 P.2d 507 (1981) (holding that the alteration of the enabling language required by art. 2, § 20 renders a statute unconstitutional and void; substantial compliance with the enabling language is not sufficient).

1998The enacting clause of all bills shall be ‘Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Kansas:’ No law shall be enacted except by bill.” (Emphasis added.) “Article 2, § 20, of the Kansas Constitution is a restriction upon the legislature’s power to make a new law except in the manner prescribed.” State v. Kearns, 229 Kan. 207, 209 , 623 P.2d 507 (1981) (holding that the alteration of the enabling language required by art. 2, § 20 renders a statute unconstitutional and void; substantial compliance with the enabling language is not sufficient).

1982We do not agree. *505 As pointed out in Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 197 , 580 P.2d 867 (1978), the purposes of the comparative negligence statute, K.S.A. 60-258a, were expressed in the enacting clause when passed by the legislature.

1982We do not agree. *505 As pointed out in Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 197 , 580 P.2d 867 (1978), the purposes of the comparative negligence statute, K.S.A. 60-258a, were expressed in the enacting clause when passed by the legislature.

1982Emporia Township v. Williams, 149 Kan. 860, 861-62 , 89 P.2d 919 (1939); City of Winfield v. Board of County Commissioners, 205 Kan. 333 , 469 P.2d 424 (1970); Elliott v. State Dept. of Social & Rehab.

1982Emporia Township v. Williams, 149 Kan. 860, 861-62 , 89 P.2d 919 (1939); City of Winfield v. Board of County Commissioners, 205 Kan. 333 , 469 P.2d 424 (1970); Elliott v. State Dept. of Social & Rehab.

1981State v. Doyen, 224 Kan. 482 , 580 P.2d 1351 (1978).

1981State v. Doyen, 224 Kan. 482 , 580 P.2d 1351 (1978).

1971In State v. Hill, 189 Kan. 403 , 369 P. 2d 365 , 91 A. L.

1971In State v. Hill, 189 Kan. 403 , 369 P. 2d 365 , 91 A. L.

1970Under these circumstances the court merely declares the applicability of the law to the facts in a given case. ( In re Estate of Duel, 161 Kan. 593 , 171 P.2d 271 .) A proviso which follows and restricts an enacting clause general in its scope should be strictly construed, so as to take out of the enacting clause only those cases which are fairly within the terms of the proviso, and the burden of proof is on one claiming the *337 benefit of the proviso. ( Emporia Township v. Williams, 149 Kan. 860 , 89 P.2d 919 .) From the findings made and the conclusions reached, it is obvious the trial cour

1970Under these circumstances the court merely declares the applicability of the law to the facts in a given case. ( In re Estate of Duel, 161 Kan. 593 , 171 P.2d 271 .) A proviso which follows and restricts an enacting clause general in its scope should be strictly construed, so as to take out of the enacting clause only those cases which are fairly within the terms of the proviso, and the burden of proof is on one claiming the *337 benefit of the proviso. ( Emporia Township v. Williams, 149 Kan. 860 , 89 P.2d 919 .) From the findings made and the conclusions reached, it is obvious the trial cour

1918Among the modem authorities cited by the appellee, the statute considered in the case of Smythe v. State, 2 Okla.

1917Held that, the proviso being in a subsequent clause and not incorporated in the definition of the offense, it was unnecessary to negative it in the complaint.” (Syl. ¶ 4.) This rule was followed in The State v. Thurman, 65 Kan. 90 , 68 Pac. 1081 ; The State v. Buis, 83 Kan. 273 , 111 Pac. 189 ; and in The State v. Creamery Co., 83 Kan. 389 , 111 Pac. 474 .

1917Held that, the proviso being in a subsequent clause and not incorporated in the definition of the offense, it was unnecessary to negative it in the complaint.” (Syl. ¶ 4.) This rule was followed in The State v. Thurman, 65 Kan. 90 , 68 Pac. 1081 ; The State v. Buis, 83 Kan. 273 , 111 Pac. 189 ; and in The State v. Creamery Co., 83 Kan. 389 , 111 Pac. 474 .

1917Held that, the proviso being in a subsequent clause and not incorporated in the definition of the offense, it was unnecessary to negative it in the complaint.” (Syl. ¶ 4.) This rule was followed in The State v. Thurman, 65 Kan. 90 , 68 Pac. 1081 ; The State v. Buis, 83 Kan. 273 , 111 Pac. 189 ; and in The State v. Creamery Co., 83 Kan. 389 , 111 Pac. 474 .

1917Held that, the proviso being in a subsequent clause and not incorporated in the definition of the offense, it was unnecessary to negative it in the complaint.” (Syl. ¶ 4.) This rule was followed in The State v. Thurman, 65 Kan. 90 , 68 Pac. 1081 ; The State v. Buis, 83 Kan. 273 , 111 Pac. 189 ; and in The State v. Creamery Co., 83 Kan. 389 , 111 Pac. 474 .

1917Held that, the proviso being in a subsequent clause and not incorporated in the definition of the offense, it was unnecessary to negative it in the complaint.” (Syl. ¶ 4.) This rule was followed in The State v. Thurman, 65 Kan. 90 , 68 Pac. 1081 ; The State v. Buis, 83 Kan. 273 , 111 Pac. 189 ; and in The State v. Creamery Co., 83 Kan. 389 , 111 Pac. 474 .

1917Held that, the proviso being in a subsequent clause and not incorporated in the definition of the offense, it was unnecessary to negative it in the complaint.” (Syl. ¶ 4.) This rule was followed in The State v. Thurman, 65 Kan. 90 , 68 Pac. 1081 ; The State v. Buis, 83 Kan. 273 , 111 Pac. 189 ; and in The State v. Creamery Co., 83 Kan. 389 , 111 Pac. 474 .

1904In the case of Railroad Co. v. Kearny County, 58 Kan. 19 , 48 Pac. 583 , a collateral attack upon a municipal organization was permitted because of the appearance of non-existence on the face of the so-called law of its creation.

1904In the case of Railroad Co. v. Kearny County, 58 Kan. 19 , 48 Pac. 583 , a collateral attack upon a municipal organization was permitted because of the appearance of non-existence on the face of the so-called law of its creation.