two-day hearing in Maine

2017More specifically, “[d]ue process requires: notice of the issues, an opportunity to be heard, the right to introduce evidence and present witnesses, the right to respond to claims and evidence, and an impartial fact-finder.” In re Caleb M., 2017 ME 66, ¶ 21 , 159 A.3d 345 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 8] The mother was afforded each of those elements at the two-day hearing held on June 3 and June 14, 2016. 2 In its July 18, 2016, judgment, the court found explicitly that termination was in the child’s best interest and made the findings concerning parental fitness recited supra, although it di

2017More specifically, “[d]ue process requires: notice of the issues, an opportunity to be heard, the right to introduce evidence and present witnesses, the right to respond to claims and evidence, and an impartial fact-finder.” In re Caleb M., 2017 ME 66, ¶ 21 , 159 A.3d 345 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 8] The mother was afforded each of those elements at the two-day hearing held on June 3 and June 14, 2016. 2 In its July 18, 2016, judgment, the court found explicitly that termination was in the child’s best interest and made the findings concerning parental fitness recited supra, although it di

2017More specifically, “[d]ue process requires: notice of the issues, an opportunity to be heard, the right to introduce evidence and present witnesses, the right to respond to claims and evidence, and an impartial fact-finder.” In re Caleb M., 2017 ME 66, ¶ 21 , 159 A.3d 345 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 8] The mother was afforded each of those elements at the two-day hearing held on June 3 and June 14, 2016. 2 In its July 18, 2016, judgment, the court found explicitly that termination was in the child’s best interest and made the findings concerning parental fitness recited supra, although it di

2017More specifically, “[d]ue process requires: notice of the issues, an opportunity to be heard, the right to introduce evidence and present witnesses, the right to respond to claims and evidence, and an impartial fact-finder.” In re Caleb M., 2017 ME 66, ¶ 21 , 159 A.3d 345 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 8] The mother was afforded each of those elements at the two-day hearing held on June 3 and June 14, 2016. 2 In its July 18, 2016, judgment, the court found explicitly that termination was in the child’s best interest and made the findings concerning parental fitness recited supra, although it di

2020Dolliver v. Dolliver, 2001 ME 144 , ¶¶ 10–12, 782 A.2d 316 ; Bradford v. Dumond, 675 A.2d 957 , 962–63 (Me. 1996). 2 We do not consider the “proffer” offered in the mother’s brief concerning what purportedly occurred during an unrecorded chambers conference.

2020The evidence presented on 1 The identity of the child’s father had not been conclusively determined at the time of the hearing. 2 the first day of the two-day hearing was largely at the discretion of the Department, and the evidence presented on the second day was largely at the discretion of the mother. [¶3] Contrary to the mother’s contention that she was deprived of due process because the trial judge did not act impartially, the court’s actions and comments are best viewed as an attempt to assist her in completing her case within the allotted time by advising her as to the areas of inquiry

2020The evidence presented on 1 The identity of the child’s father had not been conclusively determined at the time of the hearing. 2 the first day of the two-day hearing was largely at the discretion of the Department, and the evidence presented on the second day was largely at the discretion of the mother. [¶3] Contrary to the mother’s contention that she was deprived of due process because the trial judge did not act impartially, the court’s actions and comments are best viewed as an attempt to assist her in completing her case within the allotted time by advising her as to the areas of inquiry

2020Dolliver v. Dolliver, 2001 ME 144 , ¶¶ 10–12, 782 A.2d 316 ; Bradford v. Dumond, 675 A.2d 957 , 962–63 (Me. 1996). 2 We do not consider the “proffer” offered in the mother’s brief concerning what purportedly occurred during an unrecorded chambers conference.

2020Dolliver v. Dolliver, 2001 ME 144 , ¶¶ 10–12, 782 A.2d 316 ; Bradford v. Dumond, 675 A.2d 957 , 962–63 (Me. 1996). 2 We do not consider the “proffer” offered in the mother’s brief concerning what purportedly occurred during an unrecorded chambers conference.

2003After a two-day hearing, the Superior Court (Hancock County, Mead, J.) denied the motion, coneludmg that no violation of the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), had occurred and that “all of Defendant’s statements were the result of the exercise of his free will and intellect.” Venue for the trial was ordered transferred to Kennebec County. [¶ 13] In October 2001, the jury trial began with the State presenting its theory of murder, and the defense presentmg its theory of manslaughter.

2003After a two-day hearing, the Superior Court (Hancock County, Mead, J.) denied the motion, coneludmg that no violation of the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), had occurred and that “all of Defendant’s statements were the result of the exercise of his free will and intellect.” Venue for the trial was ordered transferred to Kennebec County. [¶ 13] In October 2001, the jury trial began with the State presenting its theory of murder, and the defense presentmg its theory of manslaughter.