two-day hearing in California

2014(Id. at pp. 344, 358.) Similarly, the media coverage in Estes resulted in the “bombardment of the community with the sights and sounds of a two-day hearing during which the original jury panel, the petitioner, the lawyers, and the judge were highly publicized.” (Estes v. Texas, supra, 381 U.S. at p. 538 .) A tangle of microphone and camera wires connected to devices that were “beamed at the jury box and counsel table” resulted in “considerable disruption of the hearings.” (Id. at p. 536.) The Court concluded that the hearing “was not one of the judicial serenity and calm to which the petitione

2014(Id. at pp. 344, 358.) Similarly, the media coverage in Estes resulted in the “bombardment of the community with the sights and sounds of a two-day hearing during which the original jury panel, the petitioner, the lawyers, and the judge were highly publicized.” (Estes v. Texas, supra, 381 U.S. at p. 538 .) A tangle of microphone and camera wires connected to devices that were “beamed at the jury box and counsel table” resulted in “considerable disruption of the hearings.” (Id. at p. 536.) The Court concluded that the hearing “was not one of the judicial serenity and calm to which the petitione

2014(Id. at pp. 344, 358.) Similarly, the media coverage in Estes resulted in the “bombardment of the community with the sights and sounds of a two-day hearing during which the original jury panel, the petitioner, the lawyers, and the judge were highly publicized.” (Estes v. Texas, supra, 381 U.S. at p. 538 .) A tangle of microphone and camera wires connected to devices that were “beamed at the jury box and counsel table” resulted in “considerable disruption of the hearings.” (Id. at p. 536.) The Court concluded that the hearing “was not one of the judicial serenity and calm to which the petitione

2014(Id. at pp. 344, 358.) Similarly, the media coverage in Estes resulted in the “bombardment of the community with the sights and sounds of a two-day hearing during which the original jury panel, the petitioner, the lawyers, and the judge were highly publicized.” (Estes v. Texas, supra, 381 U.S. at p. 538 .) A tangle of microphone and camera wires connected to devices that were “beamed at the jury box and counsel table” resulted in “considerable disruption of the hearings.” (Id. at p. 536.) The Court concluded that the hearing “was not one of the judicial serenity and calm to which the petitione

2022February 19 was the second day of the two-day hearing on Mother’s DVRO request, at which Father likely presented his defense case and the court likely stated its findings on the 18 record. (§ 3044 (f)(2) [“If the court determines that the presumption in subdivision (a) has been overcome, the court shall state its reasons in writing or on the record,” italics added].)13 Because Mother failed to provide an adequate record to establish error, the “ ‘the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.’ ” (Gee, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1416 .) III.

2021After a two-day hearing, the hearing officer issued a 63-page proposed decision, ultimately concluding there was a preponderance of evidence that the fire was not caused by arson, and there was not a preponderance of evidence that if arson was committed it was committed by Souliotes.9 Therefore, the hearing 7 People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595 ; North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25 . 8 Souliotes was incarcerated from the date of the fire (Jan. 15, 1997) until July 3, 2013. 9 The hearing officer also found there was not a preponderance of the evidence that Souliotes committed involuntary

2021After a two-day hearing, the hearing officer issued a 63-page proposed decision, ultimately concluding there was a preponderance of evidence that the fire was not caused by arson, and there was not a preponderance of evidence that if arson was committed it was committed by Souliotes.9 Therefore, the hearing 7 People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595 ; North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25 . 8 Souliotes was incarcerated from the date of the fire (Jan. 15, 1997) until July 3, 2013. 9 The hearing officer also found there was not a preponderance of the evidence that Souliotes committed involuntary

2020The Trial Court Did Not Violate Rizzo’s Due Process Rights “‘The primary purpose of procedural due process is to provide affected parties with the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” (Edward W. v. Lamkins (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 516, 532 ; see also Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett (1944) 321 U.S. 233, 246 .) In claiming his due process rights were violated, Rizzo contends the judge “rushed” through the two-day hearing and unfairly denied him a third day, which would have given him the opportunity to rebut all of Rampony’s allegations.

2016(La Prade, supra, 27 Cal.2d at pp. 49-50, 52-53.) In Vollstedt , the Court of Appeal held that a city employee, who was challenging his demotion, was denied a fair hearing where (1) the civil service commission, after a two-day hearing, forwarded an advisory recommendation to the city manager, who was the final decision maker, that there was insufficient evidence to support the demotion, but failed to also transmit a statement of facts as required by a city ordinance, and (2) the city manager, without reviewing the evidence presented at the hearing and without a written statement of facts, rej

2015As later explained by the District Court in its 2009 order denying appellant’s federal habeas petition: “The [superior] court found that the 90-day limit of § 1381.5, the speedy trial statute—not the 120-day limit of § 1389 [the IAD statute]—applied, based on the rule articulated in Selfa [v. Superior Court (1980)] 109 Cal.App.3d 182 (where prisoner’s demand for speedy trial complies with both § 1381.5 and § 1389, 90-day period provided by § 1381.5 controls over 180-day period provided by § 1389).” As noted by the District Court, the court in Selfa—following the principle that when two statute

2015(In re Jesse W., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 358 .) In other words, the order remains valid even if it is not approved in the two-day time period.

2005Co. v. Lynette C. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1434 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 496 ] (National Union Fire Ins.), Judge Lichtman said that the “actual trial” requirement of the statute was satisfied by an independent adjudication of facts based on an evidentiary showing, during a process that does not create the potential for abuse, fraud, or collusion. 3 In order to satisfy this standard, Judge Lichtman ordered the parties to submit briefs and present live testimony and other evidence relating to the value of these and other sexual abuse cases during a two-day hearing.

2005Co. v. Lynette C. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1434 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 496 ] (National Union Fire Ins.), Judge Lichtman said that the “actual trial” requirement of the statute was satisfied by an independent adjudication of facts based on an evidentiary showing, during a process that does not create the potential for abuse, fraud, or collusion. 3 In order to satisfy this standard, Judge Lichtman ordered the parties to submit briefs and present live testimony and other evidence relating to the value of these and other sexual abuse cases during a two-day hearing.

2001VI, § 6), would be going beyond the intent underlying the statute (see discussion in In re Richard S., supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 863 ).

1979Vaino Spencer presiding), following a two-day hearing on defendants’ motion to quash the jury panel, that persons unable to extricate themselves from wheelchairs without the assistance of another person are not a cognizable group within the definition of United States v. Guzman, supra, 337 F.Supp. 140 , and the purported unique views held by such individuals were in fact not unique to them alone but present in a larger percentage of the population.

1979Vaino Spencer presiding), following a two-day hearing on defendants’ motion to quash the jury panel, that persons unable to extricate themselves from wheelchairs without the assistance of another person are not a cognizable group within the definition of United States v. Guzman, supra, 337 F.Supp. 140 , and the purported unique views held by such individuals were in fact not unique to them alone but present in a larger percentage of the population.