concurrent sentence rule in Michigan

2026Additionally, the Supreme Court ruled that confining jail credit to the offense for which the defendant was convicted did not violate the concurrent sentence rule, as long as the trial court did not impose the sentence “to commence at the completion or expiration of another sentence.” Id. at 342 .

2026Additionally, the Supreme Court ruled that confining jail credit to the offense for which the defendant was convicted did not violate the concurrent sentence rule as long as the trial court did not impose the sentence “to commence at the completion or expiration of another sentence.” Id. at 342 .

2026This Court added that the concurrent-sentence rule, i.e., the rule prohibiting consecutive sentences unless statutorily authorized, was not implicated “because commencement of the sentence in this case was not delayed until the completion of the sentence in the [other] case . . . .” Id.

2026“Under the concurrent sentence rule, one sentence may not be ordered to begin at the completion of another sentence unless statutory authority provides otherwise.” People v Givans, 227 Mich App 113, 126 ; 575 NW2d 84 (1997).

1989The concurrent sentence rule provides that "in the absence of statutory authority, a sentence may not be imposed to commence at the completion or expiration of another sentence.” In re Carey, 372 Mich 378, 380 ; 126 NW2d 727 (1964).

1989The concurrent sentence rule provides that "in the absence of statutory authority, a sentence may not be imposed to commence at the completion or expiration of another sentence.” In re Carey, 372 Mich 378, 380 ; 126 NW2d 727 (1964).

2026In Idziak, the issue before our Supreme Court was “whether a parolee who is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a felony committed while on parole is entitled, under Michigan’s jail credit statute, MCL 769.11b, to credit for time served in jail after his arrest on the new offense and before sentencing for that offense.” Idziak, 484 Mich at 552 .

2020Adkins, 433 Mich at 749 , quoting Prieskorn, 424 Mich at 342 .

2001In People v Passalacqua, 48 Mich App 634, 635 ; 211 NW2d 59 (1973), a panel of this Court opined: The punishment for the offense of prison escape is an exception to the concurrent sentence requirement.

2001In People v Passalacqua, 48 Mich App 634, 635 ; 211 NW2d 59 (1973), a panel of this Court opined: The punishment for the offense of prison escape is an exception to the concurrent sentence requirement.

2001See also People v Biniecki, 35 Mich App 335, 336-337 ; 192 NW2d 638 (1971) (language of escape statute “clearly requires a consecutive sentence . . .”); People v Bachman; 50 Mich App 682, 686 ; 213 NW2d 800 (1973) (in MCL 750.193 “the Legislature unambigu ously directed that [a] sentence for prison escape commence at the completion of any former sentences ‘then being served’ ”); People v Pruitt, 23 Mich App 510, 516 ; 179 NW2d 22 (1970) (language of § 193 indicates that a sentence for conviction under this statute is “an exception to the concurrent sentence requirement . . .”); People v Andrew

2001See also People v Biniecki, 35 Mich App 335, 336-337 ; 192 NW2d 638 (1971) (language of escape statute “clearly requires a consecutive sentence . . .”); People v Bachman; 50 Mich App 682, 686 ; 213 NW2d 800 (1973) (in MCL 750.193 “the Legislature unambigu ously directed that [a] sentence for prison escape commence at the completion of any former sentences ‘then being served’ ”); People v Pruitt, 23 Mich App 510, 516 ; 179 NW2d 22 (1970) (language of § 193 indicates that a sentence for conviction under this statute is “an exception to the concurrent sentence requirement . . .”); People v Andrew

2001See also People v Biniecki, 35 Mich App 335, 336-337 ; 192 NW2d 638 (1971) (language of escape statute “clearly requires a consecutive sentence . . .”); People v Bachman; 50 Mich App 682, 686 ; 213 NW2d 800 (1973) (in MCL 750.193 “the Legislature unambigu ously directed that [a] sentence for prison escape commence at the completion of any former sentences ‘then being served’ ”); People v Pruitt, 23 Mich App 510, 516 ; 179 NW2d 22 (1970) (language of § 193 indicates that a sentence for conviction under this statute is “an exception to the concurrent sentence requirement . . .”); People v Andrew

2001See also People v Biniecki, 35 Mich App 335, 336-337 ; 192 NW2d 638 (1971) (language of escape statute “clearly requires a consecutive sentence . . .”); People v Bachman; 50 Mich App 682, 686 ; 213 NW2d 800 (1973) (in MCL 750.193 “the Legislature unambigu ously directed that [a] sentence for prison escape commence at the completion of any former sentences ‘then being served’ ”); People v Pruitt, 23 Mich App 510, 516 ; 179 NW2d 22 (1970) (language of § 193 indicates that a sentence for conviction under this statute is “an exception to the concurrent sentence requirement . . .”); People v Andrew

2001See also People v Biniecki, 35 Mich App 335, 336-337 ; 192 NW2d 638 (1971) (language of escape statute “clearly requires a consecutive sentence . . .”); People v Bachman; 50 Mich App 682, 686 ; 213 NW2d 800 (1973) (in MCL 750.193 “the Legislature unambigu ously directed that [a] sentence for prison escape commence at the completion of any former sentences ‘then being served’ ”); People v Pruitt, 23 Mich App 510, 516 ; 179 NW2d 22 (1970) (language of § 193 indicates that a sentence for conviction under this statute is “an exception to the concurrent sentence requirement . . .”); People v Andrew

2001See also People v Biniecki, 35 Mich App 335, 336-337 ; 192 NW2d 638 (1971) (language of escape statute “clearly requires a consecutive sentence . . .”); People v Bachman; 50 Mich App 682, 686 ; 213 NW2d 800 (1973) (in MCL 750.193 “the Legislature unambigu ously directed that [a] sentence for prison escape commence at the completion of any former sentences ‘then being served’ ”); People v Pruitt, 23 Mich App 510, 516 ; 179 NW2d 22 (1970) (language of § 193 indicates that a sentence for conviction under this statute is “an exception to the concurrent sentence requirement . . .”); People v Andrew

1998Affirmed. 1 People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331 ; 132 NW2d 87 (1965). 2 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).

1998Affirmed. 1 People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331 ; 132 NW2d 87 (1965). 2 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).

1998Affirmed. 1 People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331 ; 132 NW2d 87 (1965). 2 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).

1998Affirmed. 1 People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331 ; 132 NW2d 87 (1965). 2 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).