concurrent sentence doctrine in Florida

2015The concurrent sentence doctrine is "an outgrowth of the historic requirement of the writ of habeas corpus that one seeking the writ must be entitled to immediate discharge from all custody if successful in his petition.” Frizzell, 238 So.2d at 68 , It has been described as a "rule of ‘judicial convenience' in the area of collateral post-conviction relief” and a doctrine that has largely been "whittled away.” Id. at 69 .

2015The concurrent sentence doctrine is "an outgrowth of the historic requirement of the writ of habeas corpus that one seeking the writ must be entitled to immediate discharge from all custody if successful in his petition.” Frizzell, 238 So.2d at 68 , It has been described as a "rule of ‘judicial convenience' in the area of collateral post-conviction relief” and a doctrine that has largely been "whittled away.” Id. at 69 .

2018As to the State’s invocation of the concurrent sentence doctrine, the State relies on Jordan v. State, 143 So. 3d 335, 338 (Fla. 2014) (“in the case of multiple concurrent sentences, an appellate court need not address challenges to every conviction where another conviction with a concurrent sentence of equal or greater length has been affirmed on appeal.” (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943)).

2014See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 , 63 S.Ct. 1375 , 87 L.Ed. 1774 (1943).

2018As to the State’s invocation of the concurrent sentence doctrine, the State relies on Jordan v. State, 143 So. 3d 335, 338 (Fla. 2014) (“in the case of multiple concurrent sentences, an appellate court need not address challenges to every conviction where another conviction with a concurrent sentence of equal or greater length has been affirmed on appeal.” (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943)).

2017Jordan v. State, 143 So.3d 335, 337 (Fla. 2014) (“The concurrent sentence doctrine provides that in the case of multiple concurrent sentences, an appellate court need not address challenges to every conviction where another conviction with a concurrent sentence of equal or greater length has been affirmed on appeal.”).

2014See Jordan, 83 So. 3d at 911 (citing Velez, then stating, “We recognize that the Florida Supreme Court abrogated this concurrent sentence doctrine in 1970” (emphasis added)).

2014See Jordan, 83 So.3d at 911 (citing Velez , then stating, “We recognize that the Florida Supreme Court abrogated this concurrent sentence doctrine in 1970” (emphasis added)).

2018More recently, this Court applied the doctrine in Green v. State, 224 So. 3d 252, 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (life sentence for kidnapping and sexual battery charges did not amount to fundamental error because the defendant was serving a concurrent life sentence for an armed robbery conviction).

2015See Frizzell v. State, 238 So.2d 67, 69 (Fla.1970) (receded from on other grounds by State v. Wooden, 246 So.2d 755 (Fla.1971)) (recognizing that the fact a defendant is serving two concurrent sentences does not bar an appeal challenging the tegality of only one of those sentences); Mallory v. State, 577 So.2d 987 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). 3 We therefore reverse and remand with instructions that the trial court vacate the thirty-year sentence imposed on the second-degree murder count, conduct a resen-tencing proceeding pursuant to Heggs , and impose a new, lawful sentence. 4 Camellón shall be prese

2000See Smith v. State, 613 So.2d 603 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), disapproved of on other grounds, Bradley v. State, 631 So.2d 1096 (Fla.1994); Uptagrafft v. State, 499 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

2000See Smith v. State, 613 So.2d 603 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), disapproved of on other grounds, Bradley v. State, 631 So.2d 1096 (Fla.1994); Uptagrafft v. State, 499 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).