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9 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences1991See State v. Davis, 624 S.W.2d 72, 77 (Mo.App. 1981). *325 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, long a steadfast supporter of the doctrine, peremptorily rejected any further adherence.The en banc court in United States v. De Bright, 730 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir.1984), recapitulated the concurrent sentence doctrine as "only a rule of judicial convenience" whose "discretionary use is justifiable only if the unreviewed conviction has `no adverse collateral legal consequences' for the convicted" person. 1989Under the concurrent sentence doctrine, the Court “may pass on the validity of less than all counts in a multi-count conviction if a ruling in appel lant’s favor as to the challenged counts would not reduce the penalty imposed.as to the valid conviction.” State v. Davis, 624 S.W.2d 72, 77 (Mo.App.1981). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Reynoldsgreen2 sentences1995See, Johnson, 861 S.W.2d at 809-10 (court did not question the materiality of change in oral sentence to add a finding of prior offender status); Cf. State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820, 824-26 [5] (Mo. banc 1988) (retroactive application of sentencing enhancement guidelines was an ex post facto law which altered substantial personal rights and disadvantaged the defendant); State v. Reynolds, 819 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Mo. banc 1991) (court rejected the concurrent sentence doctrine due to adverse collateral legal consequences of multiple sentences, including issues of probation and parole). 1994See, State v. Reynolds, 819 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Mo. banc 1991) (Supreme Court rejected the concurrent sentence doctrine used to bar review of more than one count of multiple count conviction with concurrent sentences due to possible collateral legal consequences of multiple convictions). | 2 | 3 |
United States v. Fred A. Mooregreen2 sentences1991The significance of that evolvement is that the concurrent sentence doctrine, as a principled theory of appellate criminal review in Missouri jurisprudence, rests its validity on United States v. Moore, 555 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir.1977), now placed in question by Bass. 1991The significance of that evolvement is that the concurrent sentence doctrine, as a principled theory of appellate criminal review in Missouri jurisprudence, rests its validity on United States v. Moore, 555 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir.1977), now placed in question by Bass. | 2 | 2 |
Benton v. Marylandgreen2 sentences1991The cases from jurisdictions which have adopted the doctrine do not provide “any satisfactory explanation for the concurrent sentence doctrine.” Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 789 , 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2060 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707, 713 (1969). 1991The cases from jurisdictions which have adopted the doctrine do not provide “any satisfactory explanation for the concurrent sentence doctrine.” Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 789 , 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2060 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707, 713 (1969). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Johnsongreen1 sentence1995See, Johnson, 861 S.W.2d at 809-10 (court did not question the materiality of change in oral sentence to add a finding of prior offender status); Cf. State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820, 824-26 [5] (Mo. banc 1988) (retroactive application of sentencing enhancement guidelines was an ex post facto law which altered substantial personal rights and disadvantaged the defendant); State v. Reynolds, 819 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Mo. banc 1991) (court rejected the concurrent sentence doctrine due to adverse collateral legal consequences of multiple sentences, including issues of probation and parole). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lawhorngreen1 sentence1995See, Johnson, 861 S.W.2d at 809-10 (court did not question the materiality of change in oral sentence to add a finding of prior offender status); Cf. State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820, 824-26 [5] (Mo. banc 1988) (retroactive application of sentencing enhancement guidelines was an ex post facto law which altered substantial personal rights and disadvantaged the defendant); State v. Reynolds, 819 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Mo. banc 1991) (court rejected the concurrent sentence doctrine due to adverse collateral legal consequences of multiple sentences, including issues of probation and parole). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hasnangreen2 sentences1991See also, State v. Hasnan, 806 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Mo.App.1991); United States v. McKenzie, 414 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.1969); United States v. Vargas, 615 F.2d 952 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Kirk, 723 F.2d 1379 (8th Cir. 1983). 1991See also, State v. Hasnan, 806 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Mo. App.1991); United States v. McKenzie, 414 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.1969); United States v. Vargas, 615 F.2d 952 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Kirk, 723 F.2d 1379 (8th Cir. 1983). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jeanne P. Johnson, Clarence A. Johnsongreen2 sentences1991See also, United States v. Johnson, 700 F.2d 699, 701 (11th Cir.1983). 1991See also, United States v. Johnson, 700 F.2d 699, 701 (11th Cir.1983). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Supinskigreen1 sentence1991The doctrine was applied by the Western District of this court in State v. Supinski, 779 S.W.2d 258, 264-265 (Mo.App.1989) and State v. Davis, 624 S.W.2d 72, 77 (Mo.App. 1981). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Hilda Escobar De Brightgreen2 sentences1991The en banc court in United States v. De Bright, 730 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir.1984), recapitulated the concurrent sentence doctrine as “only a rule of judicial convenience” whose “discretionary use is justifiable only if the unreviewed conviction has 'no adverse collateral legal consequences’ for the convicted” person. 1991See State v. Davis, 624 S.W.2d 72, 77 (Mo.App. 1981). *325 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, long a steadfast supporter of the doctrine, peremptorily rejected any further adherence.The en banc court in United States v. De Bright, 730 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir.1984), recapitulated the concurrent sentence doctrine as "only a rule of judicial convenience" whose "discretionary use is justifiable only if the unreviewed conviction has `no adverse collateral legal consequences' for the convicted" person. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Michael Monroe Bass, United States of America v. Charles Earl Pricegreen2 sentences1991United States v. Bass, 794 F.2d 1305, 1311 (8th Cir.1986). 1991United States v. Bass, 794 F.2d 1305, 1311 (8th Cir.1986). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Harpergreen2 sentences1991Then, in State v. Harper, 778 S.W.2d 836 (Mo.App.1989), the Court of Appeals, Southern District, presented with the Davis definition of the concurrent sentence doctrine, rejected such a rule in favor of review on the merits. 1991Then, in State v. Harper, 778 S.W.2d 836 (Mo.App.1989), the Court of Appeals, Southern District, presented with the Davis definition of the concurrent sentence doctrine, rejected such a rule in favor of review on the merits. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Claassen v. United States
green
2 sentences1991THE CONCURRENT SENTENCE DOCTRINE The concurrent sentence doctrine is an anomalous extension of a common law practice of federal criminal procedure already in discard. 1 The doctrine was introduced into American criminal jurisprudence by the United States Supreme Court in Claassen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140 , 12 S.Ct. 169 , 35 L.Ed. 966 (1891). 1991THE CONCURRENT SENTENCE DOCTRINE The concurrent sentence doctrine is an anomalous extension of a common law practice of federal criminal procedure already in discard. 1 The doctrine was introduced into American criminal jurisprudence by the United States Supreme Court in Claassen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140 , 12 S.Ct. 169 , 35 L.Ed. 966 (1891). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Hirabayashi v. United States
green
2 sentences1991The concurrent sentence doctrine was again applied in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 , 63 S.Ct. 1375 , 87 L.Ed. 1774 (1943), to find it unnecessary to consider questions as to one count where the conviction was sustained on another count. 1991The concurrent sentence doctrine was again applied in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 , 63 S.Ct. 1375 , 87 L.Ed. 1774 (1943), to find it unnecessary to consider questions as to one count where the conviction was sustained on another count. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Morgan
green
2 sentences1991The doctrine was introduced to Missouri jurisprudence in State v. Morgan, 592 S.W.2d 796 (Mo. banc 1980), but by dictum. 5 The Court explained the doctrine, in terms of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), as a rule of judicial convenience, and in those terms, that proper application entailed regard for the possible collateral legal consequences of the unreviewed conviction. 1991The doctrine was introduced to Missouri jurisprudence in State v. Morgan, 592 S.W.2d 796 (Mo. banc 1980), but by dictum. [5] The Court explained the doctrine, in terms of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), as a rule of judicial convenience, and in those terms, that proper application entailed regard for the possible collateral legal consequences of the unreviewed conviction. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
United States v. Sada Vargas, A/K/A Zaida Hernandez
green
2 sentences1991See also, State v. Hasnan, 806 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Mo.App.1991); United States v. McKenzie, 414 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.1969); United States v. Vargas, 615 F.2d 952 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Kirk, 723 F.2d 1379 (8th Cir. 1983). 1991See also, State v. Hasnan, 806 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Mo. App.1991); United States v. McKenzie, 414 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.1969); United States v. Vargas, 615 F.2d 952 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Kirk, 723 F.2d 1379 (8th Cir. 1983). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Gonterman
green
1 sentence1991State v. Gonterman, 588 S.W.2d 754 (Mo.App.1979). [2] An historical sketch of the concurrent sentence doctrine is drawn in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 788 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 et seq. (1969), and is more amply treated in Comment, The Federal Concurrent Sentence Doctrine 70 Colum.L.Rev. 1099 (1970), and Comment, Benton v. Maryland: A Further Extension of the Rights of the Individual in Criminal Proceedings, 18 Kan.L.Rev. 309 (1970). [3] See A. Emanuel, The Concurrent Sentence Doctrine Dies A Quiet DeathOr Are the Reports Greatly Exaggerated? 16 Fla.St.U.L.Rev. 269 (1988); 3 C | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Atkins v. Hopper
green
2 sentences1991It was in this posture of claim of trial error that, on review to this Court, the prosecution urged exercise of discretion under the concurrent sentence doctrine “and refuse to review any claim concerning double jeopardy.” Id. at 804 . 1991It was in this posture of claim of trial error that, on review to this Court, the prosecution urged exercise of discretion under the concurrent sentence doctrine "and refuse to review any claim concerning double jeopardy." Id. at 804 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
United States v. Eugene C. Kirk
green
2 sentences1991See also, State v. Hasnan, 806 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Mo.App.1991); United States v. McKenzie, 414 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.1969); United States v. Vargas, 615 F.2d 952 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Kirk, 723 F.2d 1379 (8th Cir. 1983). 1991See also, State v. Hasnan, 806 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Mo. App.1991); United States v. McKenzie, 414 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.1969); United States v. Vargas, 615 F.2d 952 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Kirk, 723 F.2d 1379 (8th Cir. 1983). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
United States v. Henry McKenzie William Anthony. William Anthony
green
2 sentences1991See also, State v. Hasnan, 806 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Mo.App.1991); United States v. McKenzie, 414 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.1969); United States v. Vargas, 615 F.2d 952 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Kirk, 723 F.2d 1379 (8th Cir. 1983). 1991See also, State v. Hasnan, 806 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Mo. App.1991); United States v. McKenzie, 414 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.1969); United States v. Vargas, 615 F.2d 952 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Kirk, 723 F.2d 1379 (8th Cir. 1983). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Sproling
green
2 sentences1991The concurrent sentence doctrine was given mention in yet one other reported Missouri decision, State v. Sproling, 752 S.W.2d 884 (Mo.App.1988). 1991In principle, there was no scope in Morgan to apply the doctrine. [6] The concurrent sentence doctrine was given mention in yet one other reported Missouri decision, State v. Sproling, 752 S.W.2d 884 (Mo. App.1988). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.