moving violation in Michigan

2024“For a defendant’s conduct to be regarded as a proximate cause, the victim’s injury must be a direct and natural result of the defendant’s actions.” People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418, 436 ; 703 NW2d 774 (2005) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2024“For a defendant’s conduct to be regarded as a proximate cause, the victim’s injury must be a direct and natural result of the defendant’s actions.” People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418, 436 ; 703 NW2d 774 (2005) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2018The Court noted that “the Legislature intended to dispense with the criminal intent element of committing a moving violation causing serious impairment of a body function, and . . . intended to make such a violation a strict liability offense.” Id. at 9 .

2018The Court noted that "the Legislature intended to dispense with the criminal intent element *469 of committing a moving violation causing serious impairment of a body function, and ... intended to make such a violation a strict liability offense." Id . at 9, 874 N.W.2d 164 .

2018The general rule is that, based on common grammatical usage, "a modifying clause will be construed to modify only the last antecedent unless some language in the statute requires a different interpretation." People v. Small , 467 Mich. 259 , 263, 650 N.W.2d 328 (2002).

2018The general rule is that, based on common grammatical usage, "a modifying clause will be construed to modify only the last antecedent unless some language in the statute requires a different interpretation." People v. Small , 467 Mich. 259 , 263, 650 N.W.2d 328 (2002).

2024However, “[t]his Court does not second-guess counsel on matters of trial strategy, nor does it assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.” People v Traver (On Remand), 328 Mich App 418 , 422-423; 937 NW2d 398 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2024However, “[t]his Court does not second-guess counsel on matters of trial strategy, nor does it assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.” People v Traver (On Remand), 328 Mich App 418 , 422-423; 937 NW2d 398 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2024Further, while he ultimately did not obtain an acquittal on the lead charge, defense counsel successfully persuaded the jury that Broderick’s death was not caused by defendant’s speed because the jury acquitted on the moving violation causing death charge. 3 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -5- Additionally, defense counsel successfully procured a minimum sentence on the low end of the guidelines range.4 In hindsight, it is tempting to second-guess defense counsel’s decision not to also offer testimony rebutting the prosecution’s evidence of impairment in light of certain

2024Further, while he ultimately did not obtain an acquittal on the lead charge, defense counsel successfully persuaded the jury that Broderick’s death was not caused by defendant’s speed because the jury acquitted on the moving violation causing death charge. 3 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -5- Additionally, defense counsel successfully procured a minimum sentence on the low end of the guidelines range.4 In hindsight, it is tempting to second-guess defense counsel’s decision not to also offer testimony rebutting the prosecution’s evidence of impairment in light of certain

2015MCL 257.60M is a public welfare statute — it imposes criminal penalties on a person who endangers the public, regardless of intent, by committing a moving violation causing serious impairment of a body function to another person. “[I]t is the motorist’s duty in the use and operation of his automobile to exercise ordinary and reasonable care and caution, that is, that degree of care and caution which an ordinarily careful and prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.” Zarzecki v Hatch, 347 Mich 138, 141 ; 79 NW2d 605 (1956).

2015MCL 257.60M is a public welfare statute — it imposes criminal penalties on a person who endangers the public, regardless of intent, by committing a moving violation causing serious impairment of a body function to another person. “[I]t is the motorist’s duty in the use and operation of his automobile to exercise ordinary and reasonable care and caution, that is, that degree of care and caution which an ordinarily careful and prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.” Zarzecki v Hatch, 347 Mich 138, 141 ; 79 NW2d 605 (1956).

2015Based on the above reasoning and the Legislature’s use of the term “moving violation” without any reference to mens rea, we can infer that the Legislature intended to dispense with the criminal intent element of committing a moving violation causing serious impairment of a body function, and that it intended to make such a violation a strict liability offense. “[T]he Legislature is presumed to know of and legislate in harmony with existing laws.” People v Cash, 419 Mich 230, 241 ; 351 NW2d 822 (1984) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2015Based on the above reasoning and the Legislature’s use of the term “moving violation” without any reference to mens rea, we can infer that the Legislature intended to dispense with the criminal intent element of committing a moving violation causing serious impairment of a body function, and that it intended to make such a violation a strict liability offense. “[T]he Legislature is presumed to know of and legislate in harmony with existing laws.” People v Cash, 419 Mich 230, 241 ; 351 NW2d 822 (1984) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2014An offense is either always considered a necessarily included lesser offense or it is not.14 And applying principles of statutory interpretation,15 I believe the Legislature’s use of different 13 Nickens, 470 Mich at 628, 630 ; Cornell, 466 Mich at 345, 361 . 14 See Nickens, 470 Mich at 630 (“In every instance where an actor commits CSC-I involving personal injury and uses force or coercion to accomplish sexual penetration, the actor first commits an attempted-battery assault with the intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration.”) (emphasis added); People v Veling, 443 Mich 23, 36 ; 504

2014An offense is either always considered a necessarily included lesser offense or it is not.14 And applying principles of statutory interpretation,15 I believe the Legislature’s use of different 13 Nickens, 470 Mich at 628, 630 ; Cornell, 466 Mich at 345, 361 . 14 See Nickens, 470 Mich at 630 (“In every instance where an actor commits CSC-I involving personal injury and uses force or coercion to accomplish sexual penetration, the actor first commits an attempted-battery assault with the intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration.”) (emphasis added); People v Veling, 443 Mich 23, 36 ; 504

1997Cummings, supra at 253 . *265 n Next, defendant contends that having tinted film applied to his car windows constitutes defective equipment, a civil infraction for which no points are to be assessed against the operator’s driver’s license, and that he should not have been found responsible for a moving violation for having tinted film on his car windows.

1997Weems, supra at 699-700 .

1977People v Whalen, supra; People v Kuntze, supra; see State v Glasper, 84 Wash 2d 17; 523 P2d 937 (1974) (police who learned that an arrest warrant was outstanding for the owner of a suspicious vehicle had reasonable justification for stopping the vehicle, and evidence of grand larceny in plain view in the car’s partially open trunk was properly admitted); cf. People v McPherson, — Colo —; 550 P2d 311 *585 (1976) (police stopped and searched defendant’s car after he drove away from a house that was under surveillance; the marijuana found in his car was suppressed, the court noting that defendant

1977People v Whalen, supra; People v Kuntze, supra; see State v Glasper, 84 Wash 2d 17; 523 P2d 937 (1974) (police who learned that an arrest warrant was outstanding for the owner of a suspicious vehicle had reasonable justification for stopping the vehicle, and evidence of grand larceny in plain view in the car’s partially open trunk was properly admitted); cf. People v McPherson, — Colo —; 550 P2d 311 *585 (1976) (police stopped and searched defendant’s car after he drove away from a house that was under surveillance; the marijuana found in his car was suppressed, the court noting that defendant