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9 California opinions name it 1 courts 1969–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Mezagreen1 sentence2022After the Accord was pulled over, (1) Avendano “look[ed] at [Eddy] in the side mirror” and then “turn[ed] around and . . . ha[d] a conversation with somebody,” either Lizeth (the front seat passenger) or her brother Miguel (the rear passenger); and (2) all three “mov[ed] around.” (Cf. People v. Meza, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1746 [the defendants “looked around in all directions” before they entered a residence and left in a vehicle carrying over 70 pounds of cocaine].) Subsequently, defendants were removed from the Accord and Poteete conducted a search of the vehicle. “[O]n the floorboard i | 1 | 1 |
County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co.green2 sentences2014(County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 332 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 313 ].)” (Id. at p. 1254.) Declarations in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are not a substitute for amending the pleadings to raise additional theories of liability. 2014(County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 332 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 313 ].)” (Id. at p. 1254.) Declarations in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are not a substitute for amending the pleadings to raise additional theories of liability. | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.green2 sentences2014(See Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1252 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223 , 876 P.2d 1022 ].) “The materiality of a disputed fact is measured by the pleadings [citations] . . . .” (Conroy v. Regents of University of California, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1250; see id. at p. 1254.) Moving defendants have “the burden on summary judgment of negating only those ‘ “theories of liability as alleged in the complainf ’ and [are] not obliged to ‘ “ ‘ “refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings,” ’ ” ’ simply because such a claim was raised in plaintiff’s decl 2014(See Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1252 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223 , 876 P.2d 1022 ].) “The materiality of a disputed fact is measured by the pleadings [citations] . . . .” (Conroy v. Regents of University of California, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1250; see id. at p. 1254.) Moving defendants have “the burden on summary judgment of negating only those ‘ “theories of liability as alleged in the complainf ’ and [are] not obliged to ‘ “ ‘ “refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings,” ’ ” ’ simply because such a claim was raised in plaintiff’s decl | 1 | 1 |
Conroy v. Regents of University of Californiagreen1 sentence2014(See Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1252 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223 , 876 P.2d 1022 ].) “The materiality of a disputed fact is measured by the pleadings [citations] . . . .” (Conroy v. Regents of University of California, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1250; see id. at p. 1254.) Moving defendants have “the burden on summary judgment of negating only those ‘ “theories of liability as alleged in the complainf ’ and [are] not obliged to ‘ “ ‘ “refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings,” ’ ” ’ simply because such a claim was raised in plaintiff’s decl | 1 | 1 |
Petersen v. City of Vallejogreen2 sentences1969Summary judgment procedures are drastic and should be used with caution, (Petersen v. City of Vallejo (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 757, 775 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 776 ].) While it has been established that a party may not refusé to admit or deny matters set forth in a request for admissions of facts merely because he lacks personal knowledge of those facts if the means of knowledge are reasonably within his power (Lindgren v. Superior Court (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 743, 746 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 298 , 20 A.L.R.3d 748 ]), there is a question as to whether the requests for admissions in the case at bench are within the 1969Summary judgment procedures are drastic and should be used with caution, (Petersen v. City of Vallejo (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 757, 775 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 776 ].) While it has been established that a party may not refusé to admit or deny matters set forth in a request for admissions of facts merely because he lacks personal knowledge of those facts if the means of knowledge are reasonably within his power (Lindgren v. Superior Court (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 743, 746 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 298 , 20 A.L.R.3d 748 ]), there is a question as to whether the requests for admissions in the case at bench are within the | 1 | 1 |
Lindgren v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1969Summary judgment procedures are drastic and should be used with caution, (Petersen v. City of Vallejo (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 757, 775 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 776 ].) While it has been established that a party may not refusé to admit or deny matters set forth in a request for admissions of facts merely because he lacks personal knowledge of those facts if the means of knowledge are reasonably within his power (Lindgren v. Superior Court (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 743, 746 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 298 , 20 A.L.R.3d 748 ]), there is a question as to whether the requests for admissions in the case at bench are within the 1969Summary judgment procedures are drastic and should be used with caution, (Petersen v. City of Vallejo (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 757, 775 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 776 ].) While it has been established that a party may not refusé to admit or deny matters set forth in a request for admissions of facts merely because he lacks personal knowledge of those facts if the means of knowledge are reasonably within his power (Lindgren v. Superior Court (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 743, 746 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 298 , 20 A.L.R.3d 748 ]), there is a question as to whether the requests for admissions in the case at bench are within the | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chavers v. Gatke Corp.
green
1 sentence2024It reasoned that a conspiracy to commit tortious acts can only be formed by parties who are already under a duty to the plaintiff, “the breach of which will support a cause of action against them—individually and not as conspirators—in tort,” citing Chavers v. Gatke Corp. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 606, 614 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Smith
green
1 sentence2023(People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733 , 738–739 [“‘“[W]e must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence”’”].) Lish also contends there was “no substantial evidence of a vehicle collision” (capitalization omitted), but trial testimony by what the trial court believed to be a credible witness negates the contention. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Rodriguez v. United States
green
2 sentences2023So too do safety precautions taken in order to facilitate such detours. [Citation.]” (Rodriguez, supra, 575 U.S. at p. 356 .) While “[a]n officer . . . may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop,” the officer “may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 355.) In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court explained when an officer uses a police dog to detect the presence of drugs (a dog sniff) during a stop that was based on a moving violation, the 2023(Rodriguez, supra, 575 U.S. at p. 356 .) The dog sniff’s purpose is not connected to roadway safety (ibid.) but to “‘detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.’ [Citations.]” (id. at p. 355). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Mountains Recreation Conservation Authority v. Kaufman
green
2 sentences2015(Kaufman, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th Supp. at p. 4 .) The trial court found the citee guilty of the moving violation. 2015(Kaufman, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th Supp. at p. 4 .) The trial court found the citee guilty of the moving violation. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
King v. Meese
green
1 sentence2008In light of these factors and the importance of the case, we take the unusual, but practical, step of reaching and resolving the merits ourselves.” (King v. Meese, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1228 , italics added.) King v. Meese involved an action to restrain the enforcement of a statute that made it an infraction for a motorist stopped for a moving violation to fail to provide proof of financial responsibility. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman
green
1 sentence2006(Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 785 .) *480 DISPOSITION The order of the trial court denying the special motion to strike is reversed. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.