inclusion instruction in Mississippi

2017However, we reiterate the Armstead court’s holding that “there is little excuse for the omission of this instruction,” as the inclusion of such an instruction does not constitute “an inordinate burden on the State.” Id. at (¶29). ¶17.

2017However, we reiterate the Armstead court’s holding that “there is little excuse for the omission of this instruction,” as the inclusion of such an instruction does not constitute “an inordinate burden on the State.” Id. at (¶29). ¶17.

2005In a case involving interstate commerce and therefore the Federal Arbitration Act, we have held that a right to arbitrate was waived when the party requesting arbitration had "participated in almost every aspect of litigation" and made "extensive use of various modes of pre-trial litigation." Cox, 619 So.2d at 913 (citing Price v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir.1986)).

2003In a case involving interstate commerce and therefore the Federal Arbitration Act, we have held that a right to arbitrate was waived when the party requesting arbitration had “participated in almost every aspect of litigation” and made “extensive use of various modes of pre-trial litigation.” Cox, 619 So. 2d at 913 (citing Price v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1986)).

2005Importantly, in Pass Termite, this Court stated that the inclusion of the defense of arbitration in an answer is not determinative, but rather is "a factor we may consider along with the other facts existing in [the] case." Id. at 1033 . ¶ 30.

2003Importantly, in Pass Termite, this Court stated that the inclusion of the defense of arbitration in an answer is not determinative, but rather is “a factor we may consider along with the other facts existing in [the] case.” Id. at 1033 . ¶30.

2005In a case involving interstate commerce and therefore the Federal Arbitration Act, we have held that a right to arbitrate was waived when the party requesting arbitration had "participated in almost every aspect of litigation" and made "extensive use of various modes of pre-trial litigation." Cox, 619 So.2d at 913 (citing Price v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir.1986)).

2003In a case involving interstate commerce and therefore the Federal Arbitration Act, we have held that a right to arbitrate was waived when the party requesting arbitration had “participated in almost every aspect of litigation” and made “extensive use of various modes of pre-trial litigation.” Cox, 619 So. 2d at 913 (citing Price v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1986)).

1999The Court has also held that "any error in failing to give a lesser-included offense instruction was cured by the inclusion of an instruction requiring the jury to find [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the capital crime with which he was charged." Id.

1994The Court has also held that "any error in failing to give a lesser-included offense instruction was cured by the inclusion of an instruction requiring the jury to find [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the capital crime with which he was charged." Id.

1997Relying on Griffin v. State, 584 So.2d 1274 (Miss. 1991) for the proposition that an indictment may not be changed except by action of the grand jury, he asserts that "the State was allowed to do indirectly what it could not do directly." The record clearly indicates that conspiracy to commit murder was not set forth as a theory of the case at any time during the proceedings.

1995Relying on Griffin v. State, 584 So. 2d 1274 (Miss. 1991) for the proposition that an indictment may not be changed except by action of the grand jury, he asserts that "the State was allowed to do indirectly what it could not do directly." The record clearly indicates that conspiracy to commit murder was not set forth as a theory of the case at any time during the proceedings.

2026The district court agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Compagnie France Film v. Vertex Ltd., 782 F. 2d 1034 , 4 Fed.

2007The supreme court has stated that "an error is harmless only when it is apparent on the face of the record that a fair minded jury could have arrived at no verdict other than that of guilty." Kolberg v. State, 829 So.2d 29 (¶ 34) (Miss.2002) (quoting Carleton v. State, 425 So.2d 1036, 1040 (Miss.1983)).