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6 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Vanornumgreen2 sentences2014Id. (concluding that “the fact that the instruction is an incorrect statement of the law, and thus was error to give under our decision in Oliphant , is beyond reasonable dispute”). 2 Given that the inclusion of the instruction about the officers’ state of mind in this case was clearly erroneous under Oliphant and Vanornum , we must also address whether defendant was prejudiced. 2014See Vanornum, 354 Or at 630 (noting that “the content of other instructions given or not given may bear on whether” the inclusion of the flawed instruction was prejudicial). | 1 | 1 |
Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Hilton-Greengreen2 sentences1975Co., 158 Or. 476, 487 , 77 P.2d 141 (1938); Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 268, 272 (1958). [6] Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hilton-Green, 241 U.S. 613 , 36 S.Ct. 676, 680 , 60 L.Ed. 1202, 1211 (1916); Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 268(1), 282 (1958). [7] See Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 Minn.L.Rev. 471 (1961). [8] 456 P.2d at 683 . [9] Financial responsibility laws may be regarded as representing a legislative compromise between the interest of the innocent victims of negligence (not all innocent victims) and t 1975Co., 158 Or. 476, 487 , 77 P.2d 141 (1938); Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 268, 272 (1958). [6] Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hilton-Green, 241 U.S. 613 , 36 S.Ct. 676, 680 , 60 L.Ed. 1202, 1211 (1916); Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 268(1), 282 (1958). [7] See Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 Minn.L.Rev. 471 (1961). [8] 456 P.2d at 683 . [9] Financial responsibility laws may be regarded as representing a legislative compromise between the interest of the innocent victims of negligence (not all innocent victims) and t | 1 | 1 |
Mayflower Insurance Exchange v. Gilmontgreen1 sentence1975Co., 149 Or. 126, 177 , 40 P.2d 703 (1935). [1] Specific statutes such as ORS 743.783, which requires the inclusion of a clause requiring the insurer to pay a final judgment of its insured up to the limits of the policy notwithstanding the insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured, create specific exceptions to the indemnity nature of the contract, but do not purport to change entirely the basic nature of the contract. [2] ORS 743.042(1)(b). [3] Cf., Mayflower Insurance Exchange v. Gilmont, 280 F.2d 13, 17 (9th Cir.1960). [4] Plaintiff admitted as much through the testimony of its Arkansas under | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Scott v. Department of Revenue
green
2 sentences2022In support, the state cites Scott v. Dept. of Rev., 358 Or 795, 801 , 370 P3d 844 (2016), where the court observed that, “[o]rdinarily, the use of the word ‘may’ in a statute is permissive; it denotes permission, authority, or lib- erty to do something.” We do not disagree that, here, “may” is permissive. 2022In support, the state cites Scott v. Dept. of Rev., 358 Or 795, 801 , 370 P3d 844 (2016), where the court observed that, “[o]rdinarily, the use of the word ‘may’ in a statute is permissive; it denotes permission, authority, or lib- erty to do something.” We do not disagree that, here, “may” is permissive. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Landwatch Lane Cnty. v. Lane Cnty.
neutral
1 sentence2019LandWatch Lane County , 291 Or. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Smith v. Doe
green
2 sentences2018The Court noted that the inclusion of the requirement in the criminal judgment was "to alert convicted offenders to the **277 civil consequences of their criminal conduct" and that that policy "does not render the consequences themselves punitive." Id. at 95-96 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 . 2018The Court noted that the inclusion of the requirement in the criminal judgment was "to alert convicted offenders to the **277 civil consequences of their criminal conduct" and that that policy "does not render the consequences themselves punitive." Id. at 95-96 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Oregon Business Planning Council v. Department of Land Conservation & Development
green
2 sentences1992“Ordinarily, when the legislature includes an express provision in one statute, but omits such a provision in another statute, it may be inferred that such an omission was deliberate.” Oregon Business Planning Council v. LCDC, 290 Or 741, 749 , 626 P2d 350 (1981). 1992“Ordinarily, when the legislature includes an express provision in one statute, but omits such a provision in another statute, it may be inferred that such an omission was deliberate.” Oregon Business Planning Council v. LCDC, 290 Or 741, 749 , 626 P2d 350 (1981). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Barrera v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
1 sentence1975Co., 158 Or. 476, 487 , 77 P.2d 141 (1938); Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 268, 272 (1958). [6] Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hilton-Green, 241 U.S. 613 , 36 S.Ct. 676, 680 , 60 L.Ed. 1202, 1211 (1916); Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 268(1), 282 (1958). [7] See Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 Minn.L.Rev. 471 (1961). [8] 456 P.2d at 683 . [9] Financial responsibility laws may be regarded as representing a legislative compromise between the interest of the innocent victims of negligence (not all innocent victims) and t | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Fleishhacker v. Portland News Publishing Co.
green
2 sentences1975Co., 158 Or. 476, 487 , 77 P.2d 141 (1938); Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 268, 272 (1958). [6] Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hilton-Green, 241 U.S. 613 , 36 S.Ct. 676, 680 , 60 L.Ed. 1202, 1211 (1916); Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 268(1), 282 (1958). [7] See Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 Minn.L.Rev. 471 (1961). [8] 456 P.2d at 683 . [9] Financial responsibility laws may be regarded as representing a legislative compromise between the interest of the innocent victims of negligence (not all innocent victims) and t 1975Co., 158 Or. 476, 487 , 77 P.2d 141 (1938); Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 268, 272 (1958). [6] Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hilton-Green, 241 U.S. 613 , 36 S.Ct. 676, 680 , 60 L.Ed. 1202, 1211 (1916); Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 268(1), 282 (1958). [7] See Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 Minn.L.Rev. 471 (1961). [8] 456 P.2d at 683 . [9] Financial responsibility laws may be regarded as representing a legislative compromise between the interest of the innocent victims of negligence (not all innocent victims) and t | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Silver Falls Timber Co. v. Eastern & Western Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences1975Co., 149 Or. 126, 177 , 40 P.2d 703 (1935). [1] Specific statutes such as ORS 743.783, which requires the inclusion of a clause requiring the insurer to pay a final judgment of its insured up to the limits of the policy notwithstanding the insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured, create specific exceptions to the indemnity nature of the contract, but do not purport to change entirely the basic nature of the contract. [2] ORS 743.042(1)(b). [3] Cf., Mayflower Insurance Exchange v. Gilmont, 280 F.2d 13, 17 (9th Cir.1960). [4] Plaintiff admitted as much through the testimony of its Arkansas under 1975Co., 149 Or. 126, 177 , 40 P.2d 703 (1935). [1] Specific statutes such as ORS 743.783, which requires the inclusion of a clause requiring the insurer to pay a final judgment of its insured up to the limits of the policy notwithstanding the insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured, create specific exceptions to the indemnity nature of the contract, but do not purport to change entirely the basic nature of the contract. [2] ORS 743.042(1)(b). [3] Cf., Mayflower Insurance Exchange v. Gilmont, 280 F.2d 13, 17 (9th Cir.1960). [4] Plaintiff admitted as much through the testimony of its Arkansas under | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.