10 Mississippi opinions name it 1 courts 1975–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lanier v. Stategreen2 sentences2015This Court restated the test in 1999: “[t]his Court recognizes the theory of ‘imperfect self-defense’ whereby an intentional killing may be considered manslaughter if done without malice but 58 under a bona fide (but unfounded) belief that it was necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm.” Wade v. State, 748 So. 2d 771, 775 (Miss. 1999) (citing Lanier v. State, 684 So. 2d 93, 97 (Miss. 1996)) (emphasis added). 2015This Court restated the test in 1999: “[t]his Court recognizes the theory of ‘imperfect self-defense’ whereby an. intentional killing may be considered manslaughter if done without malice but under a bona fide (but unfounded) belief that it was necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm.” Wade v. State, 748 So.2d 771, 775 (Miss.1999) (citing Lanier v. State, 684 So.2d 93, 97 (Miss.1996)) (emphasis added). | 2 | 2 |
Wade v. Stategreen2 sentences2015This Court restated the test in 1999: “[t]his Court recognizes the theory of ‘imperfect self-defense’ whereby an intentional killing may be considered manslaughter if done without malice but 58 under a bona fide (but unfounded) belief that it was necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm.” Wade v. State, 748 So. 2d 771, 775 (Miss. 1999) (citing Lanier v. State, 684 So. 2d 93, 97 (Miss. 1996)) (emphasis added). 2015This Court restated the test in 1999: “[t]his Court recognizes the theory of ‘imperfect self-defense’ whereby an. intentional killing may be considered manslaughter if done without malice but under a bona fide (but unfounded) belief that it was necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm.” Wade v. State, 748 So.2d 771, 775 (Miss.1999) (citing Lanier v. State, 684 So.2d 93, 97 (Miss.1996)) (emphasis added). | 2 | 2 |
Cook v. Stategreen2 sentences2015In Lanier, we had employed the established standard for imperfect self-defense manslaughter: “that [the defendant] killed the deceased without malice, under the bona fide belief, but without reasonable cause therefor, that it was necessary for him so to do in order to prevent the appellant from inflicting death or great bodily harm upon him; . . . .” Lanier, 684 So. 2d at 97 (quoting Cook v. State, 467 So. 2d 203, 207 (Miss. 1985); Williams, 90 So. at 706 ) (emphasis added). ¶117. 2015In La-nier, we had employed the established standard for imperfect self-defense manslaughter: “that [the defendant] killed the deceased without malice, under the bona fide belief, but without reasonable cause therefor, that it was necessary for him so to do in order to prevent the appellant from inflicting death or great bodily harm upon him;.... ” Lanier, 684 So.2d at 97 (quoting Cook v. State, 467 So.2d 203, 207 (Miss.1985); Williams, 90 So. at 706 ) (emphasis added). ¶ 117. | 2 | 2 |
Burns v. Stategreen2 sentences2004In Burns v. State, 813 So.2d 668, 673 (Miss.2001), this Court restated the standard to be followed in reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, stating: The standard for determining if a defendant received effective assistance of counsel is well settled. 2003In Burns v. State, 813 So.2d 668, 673 (Miss. 2001), this Court restated the standard to be followed in reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, stating: The standard for determining if a defendant received effective assistance of counsel is well settled. | 2 | 2 |
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Blakeneygreen1 sentence1983In considering the standard for review on request for a peremptory instruction, the Court restated the rule in Morrison v. Illinois Central Gulf RR Co., 387 So.2d 754, 756 (Miss. 1980), as follows: In determining whether or not a motion for directed verdict should be granted, the Court is required "... to consider the evidence on behalf of the party against whom a directed verdict is requested, along with all reasonable inferences, in the light most favorable to said party, disregard any evidence of the other party in conflict therewith, and, if the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom | 1 | 1 |
Morrison v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroadgreen1 sentence1983In considering the standard for review on request for a peremptory instruction, the Court restated the rule in Morrison v. Illinois Central Gulf RR Co., 387 So.2d 754, 756 (Miss. 1980), as follows: In determining whether or not a motion for directed verdict should be granted, the Court is required "... to consider the evidence on behalf of the party against whom a directed verdict is requested, along with all reasonable inferences, in the light most favorable to said party, disregard any evidence of the other party in conflict therewith, and, if the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. State
green
2 sentences2015In Lanier, we had employed the established standard for imperfect self-defense manslaughter: “that [the defendant] killed the deceased without malice, under the bona fide belief, but without reasonable cause therefor, that it was necessary for him so to do in order to prevent the appellant from inflicting death or great bodily harm upon him; . . . .” Lanier, 684 So. 2d at 97 (quoting Cook v. State, 467 So. 2d 203, 207 (Miss. 1985); Williams, 90 So. at 706 ) (emphasis added). ¶117. 2015In La-nier, we had employed the established standard for imperfect self-defense manslaughter: “that [the defendant] killed the deceased without malice, under the bona fide belief, but without reasonable cause therefor, that it was necessary for him so to do in order to prevent the appellant from inflicting death or great bodily harm upon him;.... ” Lanier, 684 So.2d at 97 (quoting Cook v. State, 467 So.2d 203, 207 (Miss.1985); Williams, 90 So. at 706 ) (emphasis added). ¶ 117. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2004"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness [of counsel] must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 2004"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness [of counsel] must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). | 2 | 2003–2004 |
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Steele
green
2 sentences1980I never threatened Mr. Nicholas with a lawsuit.” In the recent case of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Steele, 373 So.2d 797 (Miss.1979), the Court restated the principle governing recovery of punitive damages for breach of contract as follows: “The rule in Mississippi is settled that punitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless such breach is attended by intentional wrong, insult, abuse, or such gross negligence that amounts to an independent tort. . .” 373 So.2d at 801 . 1980I never threatened Mr. Nicholas with a lawsuit.” In the recent case of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Steele, 373 So.2d 797 (Miss.1979), the Court restated the principle governing recovery of punitive damages for breach of contract as follows: “The rule in Mississippi is settled that punitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless such breach is attended by intentional wrong, insult, abuse, or such gross negligence that amounts to an independent tort. . .” 373 So.2d at 801 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Bowden v. Fayard
green
1 sentence1979In Bowden v. Fayard, 355 So.2d 662 (Miss. 1978), this Court restated the rule that once custody of a child has been awarded, the custody will not be changed unless there is a material change in the circumstances adversely affecting the best interest of the child. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Aven v. State
green
2 sentences1976Some of the late cases on this rule are Wilson v. State, 199 So.2d 445 (Miss. 1967); Kinkead v. State, 190 So.2d 838 (Miss. 1966); and Aven v. State, 246 Miss. 839 , 152 So.2d 924 (1963). 1976Some of the late cases on this rule are Wilson v. State, 199 So.2d 445 (Miss. 1967); Kinkead v. State, 190 So.2d 838 (Miss. 1966); and Aven v. State, 246 Miss. 839 , 152 So.2d 924 (1963). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Kinkead v. State
green
1 sentence1976Some of the late cases on this rule are Wilson v. State, 199 So.2d 445 (Miss. 1967); Kinkead v. State, 190 So.2d 838 (Miss. 1966); and Aven v. State, 246 Miss. 839 , 152 So.2d 924 (1963). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Wilson v. State
neutral
1 sentence1976Some of the late cases on this rule are Wilson v. State, 199 So.2d 445 (Miss. 1967); Kinkead v. State, 190 So.2d 838 (Miss. 1966); and Aven v. State, 246 Miss. 839 , 152 So.2d 924 (1963). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Gordon v. State
green
1 sentence1976In Carson v. State, 261 So.2d 462 (Miss. 1972) and Gordon v. State, 258 So.2d 752 (Miss. 1972), the Court restated the rule: "The Weathersby Rule has been accepted by this Court in many cases since it was announced. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Carson v. State
neutral
1 sentence1976In Carson v. State, 261 So.2d 462 (Miss. 1972) and Gordon v. State, 258 So.2d 752 (Miss. 1972), the Court restated the rule: "The Weathersby Rule has been accepted by this Court in many cases since it was announced. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Gulf & S. I. R. v. Beard
neutral
2 sentences1975In two early cases, Gulf & S.I.R.R. v. Beard, 129 Miss. 827 , 93 So. 357 (1922), and Mobile & O.R.R. v. Flannagan, 141 Miss. 7 , 105 So. 749 (1925), this Court restated the rule that there can be no recovery for actual damages for annoyance, worry, or mental anguish disconnected from physical suffering. 1975In two early cases, Gulf & S.I.R.R. v. Beard, 129 Miss. 827 , 93 So. 357 (1922), and Mobile & O.R.R. v. Flannagan, 141 Miss. 7 , 105 So. 749 (1925), this Court restated the rule that there can be no recovery for actual damages for annoyance, worry, or mental anguish disconnected from physical suffering. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Hollingshead
green
1 sentence1975In Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company v. Hollingshead, 236 So.2d 393 (Miss. 1970), this Court restated the rule with respect to the duty owed by a property *925 owner to a trespasser where it was held: Hollingshead was a trespasser on the railroad trestle. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Mobile O.R.C. Co. v. Flannagan
neutral
2 sentences1975In two early cases, Gulf & S.I.R.R. v. Beard, 129 Miss. 827 , 93 So. 357 (1922), and Mobile & O.R.R. v. Flannagan, 141 Miss. 7 , 105 So. 749 (1925), this Court restated the rule that there can be no recovery for actual damages for annoyance, worry, or mental anguish disconnected from physical suffering. 1975In two early cases, Gulf & S.I.R.R. v. Beard, 129 Miss. 827 , 93 So. 357 (1922), and Mobile & O.R.R. v. Flannagan, 141 Miss. 7 , 105 So. 749 (1925), this Court restated the rule that there can be no recovery for actual damages for annoyance, worry, or mental anguish disconnected from physical suffering. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Mississippi Power Co. v. Byrd
green
2 sentences1975The Court then began carving what appears to be an exception to the "physical suffering" rule in Mississippi Power Co. v. Byrd, 160 Miss. 71 , 133 So. 193 (1931). 1975The Court then began carving what appears to be an exception to the "physical suffering" rule in Mississippi Power Co. v. Byrd, 160 Miss. 71 , 133 So. 193 (1931). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.