restated rule in New York

2024As to how foreseeability of harm interconnects with the imposition of a duty of care[*4], this Court restated the principle in On v BKO Express LLC ( 148 AD3d 50 [1st Dept 2017]).

2024As to how foreseeability of harm interconnects with the imposition of a duty of care[*4], this Court restated the principle in On v BKO Express LLC ( 148 AD3d 50 [1st Dept 2017]).

2024Citing Pulka ( 40 NY2d 781 ), this Court explained that foreseeability should not be confused with duty and may not be relied on to create a duty ( id. at 55).

2024Citing Pulka ( 40 NY2d 781 ), this Court explained that foreseeability should not be confused with duty and may not be relied on to create a duty ( id. at 55).

2023There, the Court restated the rule that “[a] statute has retroactive effect if ‘it would impair rights a party possessed when [they] acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed,’ thus impacting ‘substantive’ rights (id. at 365, citing Landgraf, 511 US at 278-280 ).

1980Fifteen years later, in People v Miller ( 6 NY2d 152 ), the court restated the principle of the earlier Gonzalez determination, but noted that reversal was not mandated in the absence of "serious prejudice.” Miller’s conviction was reversed because the trial court reacted to jury interrogatories by offering to repeat its original charge concerning the crimes in question.

1962Garden Corp., ( 225 App. Div. 521, 522 [1929]) wherein the court restated the rule as follows: “a ■broker is not entitled to his commission unless the minds of the parties have met not merely on the price, but on all the terms and incidents of the transaction ” (see also for a discussion of the rule Harper v. Schmulevitz, 12 Misc 2d 568 , and Restatement, Agency, § 445, p. 1040).

1960In the Second Department, there developed a rule that payment by the husband of carrying charges on a house owned by plaintiff wife (Cohn v. Cohn, 246 App. Div. 537 ) or on premises jointly owned (Lampert v. Lampert, 268 App. Div. 920 ) should not be ordered, the wife being sufficiently protected by her right to move for increased alimony if forced to vacate by foreclosure.

1960In Basch v. Basch ( 278 App. Div. 734 ) the same court restated that rule but intimated that a temporary order might be on a different footing.

1960In the Second Department, there developed a rule that payment by the husband of carrying charges on a house owned by plaintiff wife (Cohn v. Cohn, 246 App. Div. 537 ) or on premises jointly owned (Lampert v. Lampert, 268 App. Div. 920 ) should not be ordered, the wife being sufficiently protected by her right to move for increased alimony if forced to vacate by foreclosure.

1952(Clapp v. McCabe, 155 N. Y. 525, 533 .) In Coastal Equipment Co. v. Herrick ( 243 App. Div. 97 ) this court restated the rule as follows: “ The judgment, although entered on default, was unauthorized, in so far as it granted relief more favorable than that demanded in the complaint.

1952(Clapp v. McCabe, 155 N. Y. 525, 533 .) In Coastal Equipment Co. v. Herrick ( 243 App. Div. 97 ) this court restated the rule as follows: “ The judgment, although entered on default, was unauthorized, in so far as it granted relief more favorable than that demanded in the complaint.

1937The conclusion reached was that the “ testator here designed an imperative power of sale with discretion only as to the time of its exercise.” In Matter of Jackson ( 258 N. Y. 281 ) unproductive real estate was included in a trust created by a testator *108 for the benefit of his wife.

1928That rule has most frequently been applied in cases of burglary (Knickerbocker v. People, 43 N. Y. 177 ) and larceny (Stover v. People, 56 N. Y. 315 ) and receiving stolen goods (Goldstein v. People, 82 N. Y. 231 ); but it is not unknown in cases of murder (People v. Jackson, 182 N. Y. 66, 78 ; Wilson v. U. S., 162 U. S. 613, 619 ; Williams v. Comm., 29 Pa. St. 102, 106).

1928That rule has most frequently been applied in cases of burglary (Knickerbocker v. People, 43 N. Y. 177 ) and larceny (Stover v. People, 56 N. Y. 315 ) and receiving stolen goods (Goldstein v. People, 82 N. Y. 231 ); but it is not unknown in cases of murder (People v. Jackson, 182 N. Y. 66, 78 ; Wilson v. U. S., 162 U. S. 613, 619 ; Williams v. Comm., 29 Pa. St. 102, 106).

1928That rule has most frequently been applied in cases of burglary (Knickerbocker v. People, 43 N. Y. 177 ) and larceny (Stover v. People, 56 N. Y. 315 ) and receiving stolen goods (Goldstein v. People, 82 N. Y. 231 ); but it is not unknown in cases of murder (People v. Jackson, 182 N. Y. 66, 78 ; Wilson v. U. S., 162 U. S. 613, 619 ; Williams v. Comm., 29 Pa. St. 102, 106).

1928That rule has most frequently been applied in cases of burglary (Knickerbocker v. People, 43 N. Y. 177 ) and larceny (Stover v. People, 56 N. Y. 315 ) and receiving stolen goods (Goldstein v. People, 82 N. Y. 231 ); but it is not unknown in cases of murder (People v. Jackson, 182 N. Y. 66, 78 ; Wilson v. U. S., 162 U. S. 613, 619 ; Williams v. Comm., 29 Pa. St. 102, 106).

1928In People v. Galbo ( 218 N. Y. 283, 290 ) the court restated the rule and said: “It is the law that recent and exclusive possession of the fruits of crime, if unexplained or falsely explained, will justify the inference that the possessor is the criminal.

1928That rule has most frequently been applied in cases of burglary (Knickerbocker v. People, 43 N. Y. 177 ) and larceny (Stover v. People, 56 N. Y. 315 ) and receiving stolen goods (Goldstein v. People, 82 N. Y. 231 ); but it is not unknown in cases of murder (People v. Jackson, 182 N. Y. 66, 78 ; Wilson v. U. S., 162 U. S. 613, 619 ; Williams v. Comm., 29 Pa. St. 102, 106).