Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
34 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1942–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Insurance Co. of Americagreen2 sentences2012See 341 S.W.3d at 337 n.8. 2012See 341 S.W.3d at 337 n. 8. | 3 | 3 |
Rose v. Doctors Hospitalgreen2 sentences2008In Rose v. Doctors Hospital, 801 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex.1990), the Court restated the test for severability: When, therefore, a part of a statute is unconstitutional, that fact does not authorize the courts to declare the remainder void also, unless all the provisions are connected in subject-matter, dependent on each other, operating together for the same purpose, or otherwise so connected in meaning that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have passed the one without the other. 2008In Rose v. Doctors Hospital , 801 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex. 1990), the Court restated the test for severability: When, therefore, a part of a statute is unconstitutional, that fact does not authorize the courts to declare the remainder void also, unless all the provisions are connected in subject-matter, dependent on each other, operating together for the same purpose, or otherwise so connected in meaning that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have passed the one without the other. | 3 | 3 |
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Formangreen2 sentences2015After reciting the Howey test as “the basic test for distinguishing the transaction from other commercial dealings,” the Court restated the test slightly, explaining that “[t]he touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised bn a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.” Id. at 852, 95 S.Ct. 2051 (emphasis added). . 2015After reciting the Howey test as “the basic test for distinguishing the transaction from other commercial dealings,” the Court restated the test slightly, explaining that “[t]he touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.” Id. at 852 (emphasis added). | 2 | 3 |
Dominque v. Stategreen2 sentences1995In Dominque v. State, 787 S.W.2d 107,108 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. refd), untimely filed), the court restated the rule for Texas probated sentences, but took note that under Louisiana law that prior probated sentences constituted final convictions for enhancement purposes. 1994In Dominque v. Stat e, 787 S.W.2d 107, 108 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref'd), untimely filed), the court restated the rule for Texas probated sentences, but took note that under Louisiana law that prior probated sentences constituted final convictions for enhancement purposes. | 2 | 2 |
Giddings v. Steelegreen2 sentences2001The court restated the rule "[t]hat the heirs cannot sue in their own right as heirs for property of the estate; the executor or administrator must sue." Webster, 56 Tex. at 473 (quoting Giddings v. Steele, 28 Tex. 732, 748 (Tex.1866)). 2001The court restated the rule “[t]hat the heirs cannot sue in their own right as heirs for property of the estate; the executor or administrator must sue.” Webster, 56 Tex. at 473 (quoting Giddings v. Steele, 28 Tex. 732, 748 (Tex.1866)). | 1 | 1 |
Couch v. Mallorygreen1 sentence1990See also Couch, 638 S.W.2d at 181 (where, without details, the court restated the rule that a deposition taken before a party is joined is inadmissible against that party). 1 The Texarkana Court of Appeals’ application of the rule is consistent with the Corpus Christi court’s interpretation. | 1 | 1 |
Lawrence M. Miller v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Companygreen1 sentence1987In Miller v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway, 317 F.2d 693, 695 (6th Cir.1963), the court restated the rule that in F.E.L.A. actions, where negligence is essential to recovery, a defendant could not be convicted of negligence for a defective condition, absent proof that such defect was known, or should, have been known by the defendant with an opportunity to correct it. | 1 | 1 |
Todd v. Stategreen1 sentence1984See Todd v. State, 598 S.W.2d 286 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). | 1 | 1 |
Legate v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance Co.green2 sentences1978Co., 536 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd); Legate v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 483 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n. r. e.). 1978Co., 536 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ ref’d); Legate v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 483 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1972, writ ref’d n. r. e.). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Roloffgreen2 sentences1978We are not to look to the consequences of our action here in limiting the application of the statute to the exact words of the Act." (emphasis in original) Recently, in Ex parte Roloff, 510 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex.1974), the Court restated the rule: "If the statute being construed is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of [statutory] construction, and it would be inappropriate to do so." Accord : Brantley v. Phoenix Ins. 1978We are not to look to the consequences of our action here in limiting the application of the statute to the exact words of the Act.” (emphasis in original) Recently, in Ex parte Roloff, 510 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex.1974), the Court restated the rule: “If the statute being construed is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of [statutory] construction, and it would be inappropriate to do so.” Accord: Brantley v. Phoenix Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Brantley v. Phoenix Insurance Co.green2 sentences1978Co., 536 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd); Legate v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 483 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n. r. e.). 1978Co., 536 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ ref’d); Legate v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 483 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1972, writ ref’d n. r. e.). | 1 | 1 |
Bailey v. American General Insurance Companygreen2 sentences1978In Bailey v. American General Insurance Company, 154 Tex. 430 , 279 S.W.2d 315, 318 (1955), the court restated the rule that in determining the meaning of the definition of injury contained in the Workmen’s Compensation Statute the courts should be guided by the rule of construction that since the statute is remedial in its character “if there be any reasonable doubt which may arise in a particular case as to the right of the injured employee to compensation, same should be solved in favor of such right.” Under the record before us it is undisputed that plaintiff contracted pneumonia in the co 1978In Bailey v. American General Insurance Company, 154 Tex. 430 , 279 S.W.2d 315, 318 (1955), the court restated the rule that in determining the meaning of the definition of injury contained in the Workmen’s Compensation Statute the courts should be guided by the rule of construction that since the statute is remedial in its character “if there be any reasonable doubt which may arise in a particular case as to the right of the injured employee to compensation, same should be solved in favor of such right.” Under the record before us it is undisputed that plaintiff contracted pneumonia in the co | 1 | 1 |
| Gunn v. Cavanaughgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Collins v. Collinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Zeid v. Pearce
green
2 sentences2011Id. 2011Id. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Frederick L. v. Willis
green
2 sentences2001The court restated the rule “[t]hat the heirs cannot sue in their own right as heirs for property of the estate; the executor or administrator must sue.” Webster, 56 Tex. at 473 (quoting Giddings v. Steele, 28 Tex. 732, 748 (Tex.1866)). 2001The court restated the rule "[t]hat the heirs cannot sue in their own right as heirs for property of the estate; the executor or administrator must sue." Webster , 56 Tex. at 473 (quoting Giddings v. Steele , 28 Tex. 733 , 748 (Tex. 1866)). | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Safeco Insurance Co. v. Gipson
green
1 sentence2015Co. v. Gipson, 619 S.W.2d 275 , 278 depositions on file. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Wilke v. Finn
green
2 sentences1999Wilke, 39 S.W.2d at 838 . 1999Wilke, 39 S.W.2d at 838 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Rosee v. Board of Trade
neutral
1 sentence1990Id. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Phenix v. State
green
1 sentence1990The Court restated the rule over four decades later in Phenix v. State, 488 S.W.2d 759 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), where it was held when the affidavit is incorporated by reference, it becomes a part of, and can be used to aid the description in, the search warrant. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Wilkerson v. McCarthy
green
2 sentences1987In Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 352 U.S. 500 , 77 S.Ct. 443 , 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957), and Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 , 69 S.Ct. 413 , 93 L.Ed. 497 (1949), the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the proposition that actual or constructive notice of a defect by the defendant must be proved before recovery can be had on negligence arising out of the defect. 1987In Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 352 U.S. 500 , 77 S.Ct. 443 , 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957), and Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 , 69 S.Ct. 413 , 93 L.Ed. 497 (1949), the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the proposition that actual or constructive notice of a defect by the defendant must be proved before recovery can be had on negligence arising out of the defect. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad
green
2 sentences1987In Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 352 U.S. 500 , 77 S.Ct. 443 , 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957), and Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 , 69 S.Ct. 413 , 93 L.Ed. 497 (1949), the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the proposition that actual or constructive notice of a defect by the defendant must be proved before recovery can be had on negligence arising out of the defect. 1987In Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 352 U.S. 500 , 77 S.Ct. 443 , 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957), and Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 , 69 S.Ct. 413 , 93 L.Ed. 497 (1949), the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the proposition that actual or constructive notice of a defect by the defendant must be proved before recovery can be had on negligence arising out of the defect. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Benson v. State
red
1 sentence1987It follows that if it does not conform to the charge, it is insufficient as a matter of law to support the only verdict authorized.” Ibid. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Lower Neches Valley Authority v. Murphy
green
1 sentence1986The Court restated that rule in affirming a summary judgment for a governmental agency in Lower Neches Valley Authority v. Murphy, 536 S.W.2d 561 (Tex.1976). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Miranda v. State
green
1 sentence1986In 1979, this Court in an opinion by Chief Justice Preslar held that in a regular defect case, when the licensor has actual knowledge of a dangerous condition and the licensee does not, “a duty is owed on the part of the licensor to either warn the licensee or to make the condition reasonably safe.” Miranda v. State, 591 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1979, no writ) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Gibson Products, Inc. v. Texas
neutral
2 sentences1985In Gibson Products Co. v. State, 545 S.W.2d 128 (Tex.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 955 , 97 S.Ct. 2677 , 53 L.Ed.2d 272 (1977), the court considered an attack against the constitutionality of article 9001, alleging that the statute denied appellants due process and equal protection of the law. 1985In Gibson Products Co. v. State, 545 S.W.2d 128 (Tex.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 955 , 97 S.Ct. 2677 , 53 L.Ed.2d 272 (1977), the court considered an attack against the constitutionality of article 9001, alleging that the statute denied appellants due process and equal protection of the law. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Gibson Products Co., Inc. v. State
green
2 sentences1985In Gibson Products Co. v. State, 545 S.W.2d 128 (Tex.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 955 , 97 S.Ct. 2677 , 53 L.Ed.2d 272 (1977), the court considered an attack against the constitutionality of article 9001, alleging that the statute denied appellants due process and equal protection of the law. 1985In Gibson Products Co. v. State, 545 S.W.2d 128 (Tex.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 955 , 97 S.Ct. 2677 , 53 L.Ed.2d 272 (1977), the court considered an attack against the constitutionality of article 9001, alleging that the statute denied appellants due process and equal protection of the law. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Cannon v. State
green
1 sentence1984The Court restated the standard, that proper jury argument must fall within one of four general areas: “(1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable deduction from the evidence; (3) answer to argument of opposing counsel; and (4) plea for law enforcement.” Id. at page 404. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Simpkins v. State
green
1 sentence1983Although in Simpkins v. State, 590 S.W.2d 129, 134 , the Court restated the presumption of intent from Art. 45 where the offense was committed after the enactment of the new Code and a charge on aggravated assault was refused, the issue of repeal of the presumption was not addressed. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Reed v. Reed
green
2 sentences1982Recently, in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 468-469 , 101 S.Ct. 1200, 1204-1205 , 67 L.Ed.2d 437 (1981), the Supreme Court of the United States had this to say: “In Reed v. Reed, [ 404 U.S. 71 , 92 S.Ct. 251 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225 ] ... the Court stated that a gender-based classification will be upheld if it bears a ‘fair and substantial relationship’ to legitimate state ends, while in Craig v. Boren, the Court restated the test to require the classification to bear a ‘substantial relationship’ to ‘important governmental objectives.’ Underlying these decisions is the pr 1982Recently, in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 468-469 , 101 S.Ct. 1200, 1204-1205 , 67 L.Ed.2d 437 (1981), the Supreme Court of the United States had this to say: “In Reed v. Reed, [ 404 U.S. 71 , 92 S.Ct. 251 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225 ] ... the Court stated that a gender-based classification will be upheld if it bears a ‘fair and substantial relationship’ to legitimate state ends, while in Craig v. Boren, the Court restated the test to require the classification to bear a ‘substantial relationship’ to ‘important governmental objectives.’ Underlying these decisions is the pr | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County
green
2 sentences1982Recently, in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 468-469 , 101 S.Ct. 1200, 1204-1205 , 67 L.Ed.2d 437 (1981), the Supreme Court of the United States had this to say: “In Reed v. Reed, [ 404 U.S. 71 , 92 S.Ct. 251 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225 ] ... the Court stated that a gender-based classification will be upheld if it bears a ‘fair and substantial relationship’ to legitimate state ends, while in Craig v. Boren, the Court restated the test to require the classification to bear a ‘substantial relationship’ to ‘important governmental objectives.’ Underlying these decisions is the pr 1982Recently, in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 468-469 , 101 S.Ct. 1200, 1204-1205 , 67 L.Ed.2d 437 (1981), the Supreme Court of the United States had this to say: “In Reed v. Reed, [ 404 U.S. 71 , 92 S.Ct. 251 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225 ] ... the Court stated that a gender-based classification will be upheld if it bears a ‘fair and substantial relationship’ to legitimate state ends, while in Craig v. Boren, the Court restated the test to require the classification to bear a ‘substantial relationship’ to ‘important governmental objectives.’ Underlying these decisions is the pr | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Finley v. State
green
1 sentence1982In Finley v. State, 527 S.W.2d 553 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), this Court confronted a similar contention to that made here, but which was based on the 1972 Texas Equal Rights Amendment. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Allen v. State green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Zitterich v. State green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Johnson v. State green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Olson v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Transport Insurance Company v. McCully green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Weed green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| White v. State neutral | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Sofge v. State neutral | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.