restated principle (New Jersey) · Go Syfert
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restated principle in New Jersey

8 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1961–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
Waters v. Stategreen
alaska · 1971 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1973–1973
1 sentence

1973Defendant also cites two recent Alaska cases, Waters v. State, 483 P. 2d 199, 202-203 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1971) and Robinson (George Ronald) v. State, 484 P. 2d 686, 690, n. 11 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1971), which follow in substance the legal circumspection that guided the court in People v. Riley, supra. Note also Robinson (Willie-James) v. State, 492 P. 2d 106, 107 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1971) where the court restated the rule in this manner, “a recital of a history of police contacts, -without further explanation is improper and should not be considered by the trial judge.” (Emphasis added).

11
Robinson v. Stategreen
alaska · 1971 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1973–1973
1 sentence

1973Defendant also cites two recent Alaska cases, Waters v. State, 483 P. 2d 199, 202-203 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1971) and Robinson (George Ronald) v. State, 484 P. 2d 686, 690, n. 11 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1971), which follow in substance the legal circumspection that guided the court in People v. Riley, supra. Note also Robinson (Willie-James) v. State, 492 P. 2d 106, 107 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1971) where the court restated the rule in this manner, “a recital of a history of police contacts, -without further explanation is improper and should not be considered by the trial judge.” (Emphasis added).

11
Robinson v. Stategreen
alaska · 1971 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1973–1973
1 sentence

1973Defendant also cites two recent Alaska cases, Waters v. State, 483 P. 2d 199, 202-203 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1971) and Robinson (George Ronald) v. State, 484 P. 2d 686, 690, n. 11 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1971), which follow in substance the legal circumspection that guided the court in People v. Riley, supra. Note also Robinson (Willie-James) v. State, 492 P. 2d 106, 107 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1971) where the court restated the rule in this manner, “a recital of a history of police contacts, -without further explanation is improper and should not be considered by the trial judge.” (Emphasis added).

11
Thornton v. Village of Ridgewoodgreen
nj · 1955 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1961–1961
1 sentence

1961Collection of taxes is a governmental function in the performance of which a city may not be bound or estopped by unauthorized acts of its officers." In Thornton v. Village of Ridgewood, 17 N.J. 499, 511 (1955), the court restated such rule and further held that laches, being a form of estoppel, should not be applied against a taxpayer who sued on behalf of the municipality to prevent the alleged misuse of municipal funds. *479 In my opinion, the defendant, Agency, as a governmental agency, occupies a status similar to the municipality itself as related to the doctrine of estoppel asserted aga

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Rakas v. Illinois green
scotus · 1979
2 sentences

2015Ed. 2d 1201, 1218-19 (1983) (emphasis added), where the Court restated the rule as authorizing police to "order persons out of an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation." And in a concurring opinion in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 155 n.4, 99 S. Ct. 421 , 436 n.4, 58 L.

2015Ed. 2d 1201, 1218-19 (1983) (emphasis added), where the Court restated the rule as authorizing police to "order persons out of an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation." And in a concurring opinion in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 155 n.4, 99 S. Ct. 421 , 436 n.4, 58 L.

22015–2015
Al Walker, Inc. v. Borough of Stanhope green
nj · 1957
2 sentences

2011The Court stated: Thus, the common law development of whether a plaintiff has standing is subject to the following test: "In passing upon a plaintiff's standing the court is properly required to balance conflicting considerations and weigh questions of remoteness and degree." [ Al ] Walker [, Inc. v. Stanhope ], 23 N.J. [657,] 661 [ 130 A. 2d 372 (1957)].

2010The Court stated: Thus, the common law development of whether a plaintiff has standing is subject to the following test: "In passing upon a plaintiff's standing the court is properly required to balance conflicting considerations and weigh questions of remoteness and degree." [ Al ] Walker [, Inc. v. Stanhope ], 23 N.J. [657,] 661, 130 A. 2d 372 [(1957)].

22010–2011
Lonegan v. State green
nj · 2002
1 sentence

2020In contrast, general obligation bonds are enforceable state debts backed by the full faith and credit of the State. [Lonegan I, 174 N.J. at 439 n.1 (citing John Downs & Jordon Elliott Goodman, Barron’s Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 171 (1991)).] Contract bonds often have an independent revenue stream to repay the debt, like tolls or payments on a lease.

12020–2020
Roschen v. Ward green
scotus · 1929
2 sentences

1981In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 , 86 S.Ct. 1717 , 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966), the Court restated the principle in this fashion: [W]e are guided by the familiar principles that a “statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did,” Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 839 , [ 49 S.Ct. 336, 336 ,] 73 L.Ed. 722, 729 , that a legislature need not “strike at all evils at the same time,” Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 , [55 S.ct. 570, 571] 79 L.Ed. 1086, 1089 , and that “reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the pro

1981In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 , 86 S.Ct. 1717 , 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966), the Court restated the principle in this fashion: [W]e are guided by the familiar principles that a “statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did,” Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 839 , [ 49 S.Ct. 336, 336 ,] 73 L.Ed. 722, 729 , that a legislature need not “strike at all evils at the same time,” Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 , [55 S.ct. 570, 571] 79 L.Ed. 1086, 1089 , and that “reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the pro

11981–1981
Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners green
scotus · 1935
2 sentences

1981In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 , 86 S.Ct. 1717 , 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966), the Court restated the principle in this fashion: [W]e are guided by the familiar principles that a “statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did,” Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 839 , [ 49 S.Ct. 336, 336 ,] 73 L.Ed. 722, 729 , that a legislature need not “strike at all evils at the same time,” Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 , [55 S.ct. 570, 571] 79 L.Ed. 1086, 1089 , and that “reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the pro

1981In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 , 86 S.Ct. 1717 , 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966), the Court restated the principle in this fashion: [W]e are guided by the familiar principles that a “statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did,” Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 839 , [ 49 S.Ct. 336, 336 ,] 73 L.Ed. 722, 729 , that a legislature need not “strike at all evils at the same time,” Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 , [55 S.ct. 570, 571] 79 L.Ed. 1086, 1089 , and that “reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the pro

11981–1981
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. green
scotus · 1955
2 sentences

1981In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 , 86 S.Ct. 1717 , 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966), the Court restated the principle in this fashion: [W]e are guided by the familiar principles that a “statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did,” Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 839 , [ 49 S.Ct. 336, 336 ,] 73 L.Ed. 722, 729 , that a legislature need not “strike at all evils at the same time,” Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 , [55 S.ct. 570, 571] 79 L.Ed. 1086, 1089 , and that “reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the pro

1981In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 , 86 S.Ct. 1717 , 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966), the Court restated the principle in this fashion: [W]e are guided by the familiar principles that a “statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did,” Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 839 , [ 49 S.Ct. 336, 336 ,] 73 L.Ed. 722, 729 , that a legislature need not “strike at all evils at the same time,” Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 , [55 S.ct. 570, 571] 79 L.Ed. 1086, 1089 , and that “reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the pro

11981–1981
Katzenbach v. Morgan green
scotus · 1966
2 sentences

1981In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 , 86 S.Ct. 1717 , 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966), the Court restated the principle in this fashion: [W]e are guided by the familiar principles that a “statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did,” Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 839 , [ 49 S.Ct. 336, 336 ,] 73 L.Ed. 722, 729 , that a legislature need not “strike at all evils at the same time,” Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 , [55 S.ct. 570, 571] 79 L.Ed. 1086, 1089 , and that “reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the pro

1981In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 , 86 S.Ct. 1717 , 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966), the Court restated the principle in this fashion: [W]e are guided by the familiar principles that a “statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did,” Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 839 , [ 49 S.Ct. 336, 336 ,] 73 L.Ed. 722, 729 , that a legislature need not “strike at all evils at the same time,” Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 , [55 S.ct. 570, 571] 79 L.Ed. 1086, 1089 , and that “reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the pro

11981–1981

Where else courts name it

AL 36 (1982–2023) TX 34 (1942–2015) CA 11 (1918–2024) FL 11 (1964–2015) NY 11 (1928–2024) MS 10 (1975–2015) MD 10 (1968–2010) IL 10 (1971–2007) LA 10 (1935–2026) NJ 8 (1961–2020) PA 6 (1973–2024) KS 5 (1936–2000) MO 5 (1951–2023) WV 5 (1948–2013) GA 5 (1933–2003) WI 5 (1953–2008) WY 4 (1982–1992) WA 4 (1952–2009) TN 4 (1988–2018) MI 4 (1970–1997) MT 4 (1982–1994) IN 3 (1978–2007) OR 3 (1984–2002) OH 3 (1940–2002) OK 3 (1984–2010) NM 2 (1994–1994) DC 2 (1981–1996) MA 2 (1945–1971) NV 2 (1976–1981) NE 2 (1983–1983) ID 2 (1992–1994) NC 2 (1969–2000) CT 2 (1988–2017) IA 2 (1987–1987) ME 2 (1970–1978)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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