restated test in Illinois

1988The fact that the trial court may have admitted the statement under another exception to the hearsay rule is immaterial since “the question before a reviewing court is the correctness of the result reached by the trial court, and not the correctness of the reasoning upon which that result was reached.” (People v. York (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 68, 71 .) In People v. Jones (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 342 , citing People v. Robinson (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 192 , this court restated the test used to determine whether a statement falls within the spontaneous-declaration exception to the hearsay rule: “ ‘This court ha

1988The fact that the trial court may have admitted the statement under another exception to the hearsay rule is immaterial since “the question before a reviewing court is the correctness of the result reached by the trial court, and not the correctness of the reasoning upon which that result was reached.” (People v. York (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 68, 71 .) In People v. Jones (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 342 , citing People v. Robinson (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 192 , this court restated the test used to determine whether a statement falls within the spontaneous-declaration exception to the hearsay rule: “ ‘This court ha

2007Thus, the standard for obtaining a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is a ' "very difficult standard to meet," ’ and [is] limited to ' "extreme situations only." ’ [Citations.]" Knauerhaze, 361 Ill.

2007Thus, the standard for obtaining a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is a ‘ “very difficult standard to meet,” ’ and [is] limited to ‘ “extreme situations only.” ’ [Citations.]” Knauerhaze, 361 Ill.

1988The fact that the trial court may have admitted the statement under another exception to the hearsay rule is immaterial since “the question before a reviewing court is the correctness of the result reached by the trial court, and not the correctness of the reasoning upon which that result was reached.” (People v. York (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 68, 71 .) In People v. Jones (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 342 , citing People v. Robinson (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 192 , this court restated the test used to determine whether a statement falls within the spontaneous-declaration exception to the hearsay rule: “ ‘This court ha

1988The fact that the trial court may have admitted the statement under another exception to the hearsay rule is immaterial since “the question before a reviewing court is the correctness of the result reached by the trial court, and not the correctness of the reasoning upon which that result was reached.” (People v. York (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 68, 71 .) In People v. Jones (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 342 , citing People v. Robinson (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 192 , this court restated the test used to determine whether a statement falls within the spontaneous-declaration exception to the hearsay rule: “ ‘This court ha

1991(Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d at 428 .) To be admissible, three elements must be present: “ ‘(1) an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) absence of time to fabricate; and (3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence.’ ” Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d at 428 , quoting People v. Poland (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 175, 181 .

1991(Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d at 428 .) To be admissible, three elements must be present: “ ‘(1) an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) absence of time to fabricate; and (3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence.’ ” Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d at 428 , quoting People v. Poland (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 175, 181 .

1991App. at 388 .) The court restated the rule in Agnew v. Baker (1917), 204 Ill.

1991App. 56 , as follows: “As a general rule a bailee may not, for his own benefit, deny the right of the bailor or avail himself of the title of a third person, although that person be the true owner. [Citation.] He cannot claim title in himself or title in another except that he may show as against the claim of the bailor that he has been deprived of the property by process of law or has yielded possession to one having paramount title, or that he is defending on the title and right and by the authority of a third person.” 204 Ill.

1988The fact that the trial court may have admitted the statement under another exception to the hearsay rule is immaterial since "the question before a reviewing court is the correctness of the result reached by the trial court, and not the correctness of the reasoning upon which that result was reached." ( People v. York (1963), 29 Ill.2d 68, 71 .) In People v. Jones (1985), 105 Ill.2d 342 , citing People v. Robinson (1978), 73 Ill.2d 192 , this court restated the test used to determine whether a statement falls within the spontaneous-declaration exception to the hearsay rule: "`This court has r

1988The fact that the trial court may have admitted the statement under another exception to the hearsay rule is immaterial since “the question before a reviewing court is the correctness of the result reached by the trial court, and not the correctness of the reasoning upon which that result was reached.” (People v. York (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 68, 71 .) In People v. Jones (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 342 , citing People v. Robinson (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 192 , this court restated the test used to determine whether a statement falls within the spontaneous-declaration exception to the hearsay rule: “ ‘This court ha

1988The fact that the trial court may have admitted the statement under another exception to the hearsay rule is immaterial since “the question before a reviewing court is the correctness of the result reached by the trial court, and not the correctness of the reasoning upon which that result was reached.” (People v. York (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 68, 71 .) In People v. Jones (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 342 , citing People v. Robinson (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 192 , this court restated the test used to determine whether a statement falls within the spontaneous-declaration exception to the hearsay rule: “ ‘This court ha

1988The fact that the trial court may have admitted the statement under another exception to the hearsay rule is immaterial since “the question before a reviewing court is the correctness of the result reached by the trial court, and not the correctness of the reasoning upon which that result was reached.” (People v. York (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 68, 71 .) In People v. Jones (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 342 , citing People v. Robinson (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 192 , this court restated the test used to determine whether a statement falls within the spontaneous-declaration exception to the hearsay rule: “ ‘This court ha

1988In addition to liberally construing the contract provision in the case before it, the court also restated the rule that when an insurer attempts to limit the uninsured motorists provision of its policy, the limitation must be construed liberally in favor of the policyholder and most strongly against the insured. ( 114 Ill. 2d at 59 , 499 N.E .2d at 466.) Thus, the court’s holding in LeJeune and its language suggest that the court intended that its “continuous and contemporaneous” language would expand coverage.

1984The court restated the rule to be that the seizure of property in plain view is presumptively reasonable assuming that there is “probable cause” to associate the property with criminal activity. ( 460 U.S. 730, 741 , 75 L.

1984The court restated the rule to be that the seizure of property in plain view is presumptively reasonable assuming that there is “probable cause” to associate the property with criminal activity. ( 460 U.S. 730, 741 , 75 L.

1979In the recent case of Arnold Engineering, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 161, 166 , 380 N.E.2d 782 , the court restated the principle that an amendment to a statute of limitations which shortens the period of limitations will not be allowed “to terminate a cause of actions unless the party has a reasonable amount of time after the amendment’s effective date in which to file his action.” This requirement of a reasonable period was applied to a medical malpractice action in Anderson v. Wagner (1978), 61 Ill.

1979In the recent case of Arnold Engineering, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 161, 166 , 380 N.E.2d 782 , the court restated the principle that an amendment to a statute of limitations which shortens the period of limitations will not be allowed “to terminate a cause of actions unless the party has a reasonable amount of time after the amendment’s effective date in which to file his action.” This requirement of a reasonable period was applied to a medical malpractice action in Anderson v. Wagner (1978), 61 Ill.

1979In the recent case of Arnold Engineering, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 161, 166 , 380 N.E.2d 782 , the court restated the principle that an amendment to a statute of limitations which shortens the period of limitations will not be allowed “to terminate a cause of actions unless the party has a reasonable amount of time after the amendment’s effective date in which to file his action.” This requirement of a reasonable period was applied to a medical malpractice action in Anderson v. Wagner (1978), 61 Ill.

1979App. 3d 822, 825 , 378 N.E.2d 805 .

1971By his omission he assumed the burden of showing that the failure to obtain payment of the check was through no fault of his; and, necessarily, that no damage had occurred to the drawer by his delay. [Citation omitted.]” (See also Arnold v. Mangan, 89 Ill.App. 327, 333 , and Forgan v. Allen Bros., 224 N.W. 500, 502 (Iowa).) Further, in National Plumbing & Heating Supply Co. v. Stevenson, 213 Ill.App. 49, 54-55 , the court restated the rule of the Stevens case, quoted above, and affirmed a trial court judgment for the defendant drawer, because the plaintiff holder had failed to present any evid

1971By his omission he assumed the burden of showing that the failure to obtain payment of the check was through no fault of his; and, necessarily, that no damage had occurred to the drawer by his delay. [Citation omitted.]” (See also Arnold v. Mangan, 89 Ill.App. 327, 333 , and Forgan v. Allen Bros., 224 N.W. 500, 502 (Iowa).) Further, in National Plumbing & Heating Supply Co. v. Stevenson, 213 Ill.App. 49, 54-55 , the court restated the rule of the Stevens case, quoted above, and affirmed a trial court judgment for the defendant drawer, because the plaintiff holder had failed to present any evid