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10 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
W.J.A. v. D.A.green2 sentences2024Our state, "like many other states, maintains a fault standard of negligence for defamation cases involving private-figure defendants." W.J.A. v. D.A., 210 N.J. 229, 242 (2012). 2024The third element of a cause of action for defamation is “fault amounting at least to negligence.” Leang, 198 N.J. at 585 (quoting DeAngelis, 180 N.J. at 13 ); see also W.J.A. v. D.A., 210 N.J. 229 , 242 (2012) (“New Jersey, like many other states, maintains a fault standard of negligence for defamation cases involving private-figure defendants.”) Negligence is defined as “conduct that creates an unreasonable risk of harm.” Restatement § 580B cmt (g) (Am. Law Inst. 1977). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Funicellogreen1 sentence1987See Report of the Governor's Task Force on the Homeless, October 1985, Preface. [2] In his "Annual Message to the New Jersey State Legislature," delivered on January 13, 1987, Governor Kean stated that "[t]he State had to take 900 children because their mothers and fathers could not put a roof over their heads." Id. at 63 . [3] We point out that since the federal statute does not impose a fault standard on the availability of emergency assistance matching funds, a state plan which offered emergency assistance without reference to fault would be eligible for 75% reimbursement of cost. [4] In ad | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Senna v. Walter Florimont & 2400 Amusements, Inc.
green
2 sentences2024The negligence standard requires a plaintiff to prove "that the speaker acted negligently in failing to ascertain the truth of the statement" by a "preponderance of the evidence." Senna, 196 N.J. at 474 , 490 n.16. 2012Senna, supra, 196 N.J. at 491 , 958 A.2d 427 ; Costello v. Ocean Cnty. | 3 | 2012–2024 |
Leang v. Jersey City Board of Education
green
1 sentence2024The third element of a cause of action for defamation is “fault amounting at least to negligence.” Leang, 198 N.J. at 585 (quoting DeAngelis, 180 N.J. at 13 ); see also W.J.A. v. D.A., 210 N.J. 229 , 242 (2012) (“New Jersey, like many other states, maintains a fault standard of negligence for defamation cases involving private-figure defendants.”) Negligence is defined as “conduct that creates an unreasonable risk of harm.” Restatement § 580B cmt (g) (Am. Law Inst. 1977). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
DeAngelis v. Hill
green
1 sentence2024The third element of a cause of action for defamation is “fault amounting at least to negligence.” Leang, 198 N.J. at 585 (quoting DeAngelis, 180 N.J. at 13 ); see also W.J.A. v. D.A., 210 N.J. 229 , 242 (2012) (“New Jersey, like many other states, maintains a fault standard of negligence for defamation cases involving private-figure defendants.”) Negligence is defined as “conduct that creates an unreasonable risk of harm.” Restatement § 580B cmt (g) (Am. Law Inst. 1977). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
green
1 sentence2012In light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold that the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages—even absent a showing of "actual malice." [ Ibid. (footnote and citation omitted).] New Jersey, like many other states, maintains a fault standard of negligence for defamation cases involving private-figure defendants. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Bainhauer v. Manoukian
green
2 sentences1999As we explained in Bainhauer v. Manoukian, 215 N.J.Super. 9, 31 , 520 A. 2d 1154 (App.Div. 1987), the actionability of defamatory speech is based on fault on the part of the speaker, and "fault, by whatever standard it is to be measured, is as much an element of the cause of action as the defamatory publication itself." We also made clear that the applicable fault standard depends on the status of the person claiming to have been aggrieved. 1999As we explained in Bainhauer v. Manoukian, 215 N.J.Super. 9, 31 , 520 A. 2d 1154 (App.Div. 1987), the actionability of defamatory speech is based on fault on the part of the speaker, and "fault, by whatever standard it is to be measured, is as much an element of the cause of action as the defamatory publication itself." We also made clear that the applicable fault standard depends on the status of the person claiming to have been aggrieved. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Rybeck v. Rybeck
green
2 sentences1993Rybeck, supra, 141 N.J.Super. at 492 , 358 A.2d 828 . 1993Rybeck, supra, 141 N.J.Super. at 492 , 358 A.2d 828 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & MacHine Company
green
1 sentence1992Co., (which overruled Cepeda ), 81 N.J. 167 -168, 177 (majority opinion) and 199-201 (Justice Clifford's concurrence), 406 A. 2d 140 . [4] In Green v. Sterling Extruder Corp ., Justice Clifford explained that "the Court remains not of one mind on the issue that divided us in Suter, " but that the issue would not be resolved in Green. 95 N.J. at 270 , 471 A. 2d *480 15. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Company, Inc.
red
1 sentence1992The treatment of a plaintiff's fault as a bar to a claim had been originally explored in the seminal cases of Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., Inc., supra, 76 N.J. at 183-188 (majority opinion) and 201-203 (dissenting opinion), 386 A. 2d 816 , and in Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Green v. Sterling Extruder Corp.
green
1 sentence1992Co., (which overruled Cepeda ), 81 N.J. 167 -168, 177 (majority opinion) and 199-201 (Justice Clifford's concurrence), 406 A. 2d 140 . [4] In Green v. Sterling Extruder Corp ., Justice Clifford explained that "the Court remains not of one mind on the issue that divided us in Suter, " but that the issue would not be resolved in Green. 95 N.J. at 270 , 471 A. 2d *480 15. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Rodgers v. Gibson
green
1 sentence1988In Rodgers v. Gibson, 218 N.J.Super. 452 (App.Div.1987) the same fault standard, but as applied to the GA law, was struck down for the same reason as articulated in Maticka . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co.
green
1 sentence1987We further note that while the holding in Dairy Stores, Inc., supra, 104 N.J. 125 , is expressly premised on the common-law fair-comment privilege, its rationale is also compatible with a fault analysis, namely, the conclusion, akin to that reached in Sisler , that news media comment on issues of compelling public concern is entitled to the benefit of the New York Times fault standard irrespective of whether the aggrieved person is public or private. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.