fault principle in Missouri

1979Co., 253 La. 521 , 218 So.2d 580 , 583 where the court stated: ‘ * * * We interpret the words “legally entitled to recover” to mean simply that the plaintiff must be able to establish fault on the part of the uninsured motorist which gives rise to damages and prove the extent of those damages. * * * ’ “Also in Sahloff v. Western Casualty & Surety Company, Wis., 171 N.W.2d 914 , 917 the court agreed with the Louisiana court’s interpretation of this phrase in stating: ‘ * * * We think the phrase [legally entitled to recover] was used only to keep the fault principle as a basis for recovery again

1970Co., 253 La. 521 , 218 So.2d 580 , 583 where the court stated: “* * * We interpret the words ‘legally entitled to recover’ to mean simply that the plaintiff must be able to establish fault on the part of the uninsured motorist which gives rise to damages and prove the extent of those damages. * * *” Also in Sahloff v. Western Casualty & Surety Company, Wis., 171 N.W.2d 914 , 917 the court agreed with the Louisiana court’s interpretation of this phrase in stating: “* * * We think the phrase [legally entitled to recover] was used only to keep the fault principle as a basis for recovery against t

1979Co., 253 La. 521 , 218 So.2d 580 , 583 where the court stated: ‘ * * * We interpret the words “legally entitled to recover” to mean simply that the plaintiff must be able to establish fault on the part of the uninsured motorist which gives rise to damages and prove the extent of those damages. * * * ’ “Also in Sahloff v. Western Casualty & Surety Company, Wis., 171 N.W.2d 914 , 917 the court agreed with the Louisiana court’s interpretation of this phrase in stating: ‘ * * * We think the phrase [legally entitled to recover] was used only to keep the fault principle as a basis for recovery again

1979Co., 253 La. 521 , 218 So.2d 580 , 583 where the court stated: ‘ * * * We interpret the words “legally entitled to recover” to mean simply that the plaintiff must be able to establish fault on the part of the uninsured motorist which gives rise to damages and prove the extent of those damages. * * * ’ “Also in Sahloff v. Western Casualty & Surety Company, Wis., 171 N.W.2d 914 , 917 the court agreed with the Louisiana court’s interpretation of this phrase in stating: ‘ * * * We think the phrase [legally entitled to recover] was used only to keep the fault principle as a basis for recovery again

1998Williams, 706 S.W.2d 508, 512 .

1998In Hoeflicker v. Higginsville Advance, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 650 (Mo.App.1991), we rejected comment e to Section 611, which stated that the privilege did not extend to Petitions filed until the court took some action regarding them.

1970Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 76 , 268 N.Y.S.2d 289 , 215 N.E.2d 482 the court stated that the language in question “legally entitled to recover” simply means and denotes fault on the part of the uninsured motorist.

1970Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 76 , 268 N.Y.S.2d 289 , 215 N.E.2d 482 the court stated that the language in question “legally entitled to recover” simply means and denotes fault on the part of the uninsured motorist.

1959The court said there (137 S.W. loc. cit. 989): “ * * * The fault of the instruction is, that it only required the finding of an ‘intent to kill or do great bodily harm,’ whether justifiable and innocent or wrongful and willful, to make it the duty of the jury to bring in a verdict of guilt. * * * ”' In Gabriel, supra [ 301 Mo. 365 , 256 S.W. 767 ], the instruction hypothesized an assault “willfully, that is to say, intentionally and not by accident * * * with intent to kill * * This instruction was held to be error, as ignoring the defense of self-defense.

1910The latter case “is authority for the point suggested, but it has not been followed by the Supreme Court in later cases.” [Dunn v. Northeast, etc., Co., 81 Mo. App. 42, 45 .] In the other case (Coleman v. Land Co.), which was a suit by the parents for the negligent killing of a minor son, the fault of the instruction appears *to have been that it was broad enough to authorize a recovery for the loss of the minor’s services after he had become of age.

1906Such is not the language of the statute, and the holding of the appellate courts of the State. [Toney v. Goodley, 57 Mo. App. 235 ; Williams v. DeLisle Store Co., 104 Mo. App. 567 .] The plaintiff contends that under the evidence he was entitled to a verdict, on the ground that plaintiff, showed that the corn was grown by the tenant on his premises, that the rent was unpaid, and that defendant knew that the corn was raised on demised premises.

1906Such is not the language of the statute, and the holding of the appellate courts of the State. [Toney v. Goodley, 57 Mo. App. 235 ; Williams v. DeLisle Store Co., 104 Mo. App. 567 .] The plaintiff contends that under the evidence he was entitled to a verdict, on the ground that plaintiff, showed that the corn was grown by the tenant on his premises, that the rent was unpaid, and that defendant knew that the corn was raised on demised premises.

1906A greater speed than ten miles per hour is a violation of the city ordinance and, therefore, is negligence. [Jackson v. Railroad, 157 Mo. 621 , 58 S. W. 32 .] If this negligence directly contributed to cause plaintiff’s injuries, he was entitled to a verdict against the appellant, if he was in the exercise of due care himself, as the instruction required him to be.

1906A greater speed than ten miles per hour is a violation of the city ordinance and, therefore, is negligence. [Jackson v. Railroad, 157 Mo. 621 , 58 S. W. 32 .] If this negligence directly contributed to cause plaintiff’s injuries, he was entitled to a verdict against the appellant, if he was in the exercise of due care himself, as the instruction required him to be.

1905In Van Natta v. Railway, 133 Mo. 13 , defining what care was required of plaintiff, a boy, the instruction was in the following language: “ . . . providing the plaintiff was exercising that degree of reasonable care usually exercised by boys of his age and capacity.” The court held that it was faulty in that it should have told the jury the law required of the boy “exercise of care and prudence equal to his capacity, age, knowledge and experience regardless of what care and prudence boys of his age and capacity are required to exercise.” The fault in the instruction under consideration, if any